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INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Job loss is a life event with lasting consequences for workers’ income and employment
trajectories. Empirical studies reveal that periods of unemployment have a persistent
negative effect on job finding, earnings and job quality (see e.g. van den Berg and
van Ours, 1994 and Burda and Mertens, 2001). In the long run, being out of work
adversely affects the human and social capital accumulation, the mental and physical
well-being and the hiring prospects of the unemployed (see e.g. Pissarides, 1992 and
Clark and Oswald, 1994).
This dissertation explores through which channels unemployment leads to exclusion
from society and how policy interventions and technological innovations affect individual
job search behavior and are able to bring unemployed persons back into the labor market.
This thesis starts with an analysis of how job loss impacts different dimensions of so-
cial exclusion. Thereafter, I investigate whether participation in job creation schemes
improved the employment prospects of participants in the years following German reuni-
fication. The last two chapters of this thesis study the impact of two key macroeconomic
events, the introduction of a uniform minimum wage and the emergence of high-speed
internet, on search frictions in the German labor market and the resulting effects on
employment outcomes.
All four chapters contained in this dissertation are based on large individual-level data
sets from Germany. Using administrative data from the German Federal Employment
Agency, it is possible to precisely measure the duration of different labor market states and
transitions between them. Information on subjective assessments, job search strategies
and employment biographies of East Germans from the 1990s are provided by survey
data. In all of the studies, the aim is to identify causal relationships by employing
different empirical methods, ranging from instrumental variable estimation to structural
modeling.
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I analyze the economic and social consequences of job
loss that might lead to marginalization from society. The concept of social exclusion
has become increasingly prominent in public debates regarding social vulnerability and
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disadvantage (Federal Government, 2017). In this context unemployment is considered
one of the main risk factors for social marginalization. I investigate the causal impact
of job loss on multiple dimensions of social exclusion by combining inverse propensity
score weighting with a difference-in-differences approach. In this way, individuals who
become unemployed can be compared to workers still in employment. Based on linked
survey and administrative data from Germany for the time period 2007–2015, the results
suggest that job loss has particularly detrimental effects on the subjective perception
of social integration, life satisfaction, the access to economic resources and mental
health. Moreover, this chapter shows that becoming unemployed hinders the fulfillment
of psychosocial needs that are typically associated with an employment relationship,
such as social status and higher self-efficacy. The effects of job loss are long-lasting,
growing more profound the longer the duration of unemployment and remaining present
even if the individual finds a job again. Looking at effect heterogeneity, I find that having
a partner and being highly educated reduces the negative effects of job loss. The chapter
shows that unemployment leads to exclusion from society through multiple channels.
Social marginalization carries a high risk of individuals ending up in a state from which
they will never return to work. Less job search effort and lower chances of being hired
due to discouragement, stigmatization, human capital depreciation and living in deprived
neighborhoods can lead to long-term unemployment (see e.g. Atkinson and Kintrea,
2001 and Biewen and Steffes, 2010). Following the severe negative effects of job loss
documented in Chapter 1, the next chapters of the thesis focus on various instruments
that may help to get the unemployed back into work.
There is much debate over the optimal design of policy interventions to effectively
reduce the risk of unemployment persistence and to increase the stability of employment
relationships. Active labor market policies (ALMPs), such as training programs and job
creation schemes (JCSs), aim at advancing the reintegration of unemployed individuals
into regular employment.1 In industrialized countries, such ALMPs are a popular tool for
fighting unemployment, especially in times of economic instability. These programs offer
workers the opportunity to keep a foot in the labor market and thus prevent depreciation
of social and human capital.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, which is co-authored by Annette Bergemann and Arne
Uhlendorff, we analyze the impact of participation in JCSs on job search outcomes
in the context of the turbulent East German labor market in the aftermath of German
reunification. This was an economic environment characterized by high levels of job de-
struction. JCSs that offer temporary work opportunities for the unemployed in the public
1See e.g. the overview articles of Card et al. (2010) and Card et al. (2017) on the effectiveness of
ALMP programs.
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and nonprofit sector were implemented extensively in order to cushion this development.
These schemes reached their peak in 1992 when, on average, 388,000 individuals were
employed through JCSs and public spending from both the German Federal Government
and the German Federal Employment Agency amounted to 10.4 billion DM in East Ger-
many. Using survey data from the East German state of Sachsen–Anhalt for the period
1990-1999 and building upon the timing-of-events approach, we estimate multivariate
discrete time duration models taking selection based on both observed and unobserved
heterogeneity into account. Our results indicate that after initial negative effects during
the typical program duration of twelve months the impact on the job finding probability
becomes insignificantly positive. These effects are probably driven by reduced job search
effort during participation resulting in a rearrangement of the job queue. Additional
results, however, suggest that female and highly skilled participants leave unemployment
quicker than other groups, which results in highly skilled women benefiting from partici-
pation. In general, we find no significant impact on post-unemployment employment
stability.
Policies that impact on national systems of wage determination might influence an
economy’s competitiveness and employment levels through wage restraint and labor
unit costs. One of the most important wage-related commitments of the previous leg-
islative period was the introduction of a uniform statutory minimum wage amounting to
8.50 euros an hour. Prior to this, minimum wages had been implemented only in selected
industries. Accordingly, most of the existing empirical work on the impact of minimum
wages in Germany has been conducted non-structurally for these industry-specific mini-
mum wages (for an overview see e.g. Möller, 2012). Reduced form approaches have
significant limitations as they typically rely on the assumption that there are no general
equilibrium effects of minimum wages and they are not able to assess the impacts of
different minimum wage levels. Modeling both sides of the labor market is important
as firms are likely to adjust their number of vacancies and wage offers in response to
minimum wage changes.
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, my co-authors Maximilian Blömer, Nicole Gürtzgen,
Holger Stichnoth, Gerard van den Berg and I estimate an equilibrium search model and
simulate the introduction of a uniform minimum wage based on German administrative
data. Equilibrium search models explicitly incorporate firms’ adjustments and provide,
for instance, theoretical foundations for spillover effects on workers earning more than
the minimum wage. Moreover, structural models of the labor market can help to gain
a better understanding of the magnitude of search frictions which may create a certain
amount of power for employers. The model used in Chapter 3 incorporates worker
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and firm heterogeneity and allows for different job offer arrival rates for the employed
and the unemployed. In this setting, the sign of the employment effects of a minimum
wage is not restricted a priori. Our simulations show that unemployment is, except
for a small range of very low minimum wages, a monotonically increasing non-linear
function of the minimum wage level. We find that medium to high minimum wages
have an overall negative employment effect but the results differ strongly across different
segments of the labor market defined by region and type of occupation. Our analysis
indicates that the heterogeneity in the employment effects is mainly driven by differences
in firm productivity rather than by variation in search frictions or the opportunity costs of
employment.
There are other ways to reduce search frictions and make the job search process more
efficient that might help unemployed job seekers find a job more easily. For instance, the
emergence of high-speed internet as a new mass medium during the last two decades has
made the accumulation of information about potential job offers in the market less costly.
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, which is co-authored by Nicole Gürtzgen, André Nolte and
Gerard van den Berg, we study the effects of the emergence of high-speed internet on the
reemployment probabilities of unemployed job seekers on the West German municipality
level. We combine data on the share of households who could technically have access to
broadband internet via digital subscriber line (DSL) technology with administrative data
on individual employment biographies and construct monthly reemployment propensities
for an inflow sample into unemployment. To address the endogeneity in broadband inter-
net availability, we follow an instrumental variable approach by exploiting technological
peculiarities at the regional level that affected the roll-out of high-speed internet in the
early DSL period. Our results suggest that the introduction of high-speed internet has
positive effects on reemployment probabilities, with the internet improving the prospects
of finding a job especially for male workers after the first four months of unemployment.
To further explore the relationship between increased internet availability and individuals’
job search behavior, we complement the analysis with individual survey data. Our results
reveal that home internet access is indeed causally related to online job search, though
there is no evidence that this leads to a higher number of job interviews attended. On a
descriptive basis, however, the duration dependent incidence of job interviews indicates
that home internet access is associated with more job interviews after three months in
unemployment. This finding provides some tentative evidence that being able to search
for a job online increases job offer arrival rates with a certain time delay, which appears
to match the delay found in the municipality level analysis.
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Chapter 1
Unemployment and Social Exclusion∗
1.1 Introduction
The negative consequences of unemployment are discussed in many empirical studies.
Long periods of unemployment reduce the reemployment probability (see e.g. van den
Berg and van Ours, 1994 and Kroft et al., 2013) and coincide with lower reemployment
wages (see e.g. Addison and Portugal, 1989 and Burda and Mertens, 2001). Beside the
classical economic effects of job loss, the literature documents a negative link between
unemployment and health (see e.g. Browning and Heinesen, 2012 and Black et al., 2015),
between unemployment and physical and mental well-being (see e.g. Clark and Oswald,
1994 and Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009) and between unemployment and
social ties (see e.g. Eliason, 2012 and Kunze and Suppa, 2017).
There is a growing research and policy interest in the link between labor market
integration and social integration. The term ‘social exclusion’ has become increasingly
prominent in policy debates regarding poverty and social inequality and often refers to
disadvantages in core living conditions that reduce the possibilities of participating in
society (European Commission, 2010 and Federal Government, 2017). Social exclusion
can be viewed as dynamic multidimensional process where various deficits reinforce
each other (Room, 1995). In this context unemployment is considered one of the main
risk factors for social exclusion. Exclusion from employment might lead to alienation
from society and increase the risk of long-term dependency on social welfare benefits
(see e.g. Bhuller et al., 2017), committing suicide (see e.g. Sullivan and von Wachter,
2009), becoming a criminal or victim of a crime (see e.g. Freeman, 1999) and to support
∗This chapter has benefited from comments and suggestions by Gerard van den Berg, Clemens
Hetschko, Boris Ivanov, André Nolte, Friedhelm Pfeiffer, Carsten Trenkler and Arne Warnke. I would
further like to thank the Research Data Centre (FDZ) at the IAB for data access.
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extreme parties (see e.g. Falk et al., 2011). Furthermore, social exclusion may not only
affect the current generation, it may be passed on to the next generation (Machin, 1998).
The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the causal impact of job loss on social
exclusion by discussing in great detail the driving mechanisms behind this association.
From an individual’s point of view, periods of unemployment can affect the economic and
social situation in different ways and to varying degrees. The reduction in disposable in-
come due to job loss creates restrictions on the financial side. Consequently, maintaining
a minimum standard of living, but also participating in social and cultural activities, could
become more challenging (Jenkins and Cappellari, 2007). Beside the economic strain,
unemployment may take away non-pecuniary benefits associated with working such as
time structure, the chance to demonstrate competences and skills, an individual’s status
and social relations (see e.g. Jahoda, 1981). Moreover, sociologists and psychologists
emphasize that redundancy could come with stigmatization, the feeling of insecurity and
shame. Hence, the loss of a job represents a potential source of stress and can lead to
emotional and physical distress, isolation and alienation.1 These economic and social
consequences of unemployment are expected to contribute to or be accompanied by the
subjective feeling of social exclusion.
There are some empirical studies that investigate the relationship between labor
market integration and an overall subjective evaluation of social integration with the help
of survey data. Based on the first five waves of the survey ‘Labour Market and Social
Security’ (PASS), Gundert and Hohendanner (2014) make use of panel data techniques
and find that the risk of feeling socially excluded is higher among the unemployed than
among employed workers. Furthermore, their results indicate that the degree to which
employment contributes to perceived social affiliation is related to the level of job security.
The reports conducted by Gallie and Paugam (2003), Böhnke (2004) and Layte et al.
(2010) provide a comparative analysis of social exclusion across European countries and
point to a positive relationship between unemployment and average levels of perceived
social exclusion in a society.
Instead of concentrating on one overall measure of social exclusion as in the studies
mentioned above, I define a set of multiple interdependent factors which characterize
marginalization from society and might be affected by periods of unemployment. Social
exclusion describes an objectively precarious financial situation, but also refers to the
feeling of being part of society. This subjective feeling might depend on the individual’s
emotional stability, social network, relative position in society but also on personality
traits which could help to cope with multiple deprivation (Popp and Schels, 2008). In
1See e.g. Brand (2015) who provides a literature review on the economic and non-economic impacts
of job loss for the United States.
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this analysis I study the effects of job loss on several dimensions of social exclusion:
the individual perception of social integration, life satisfaction, mental health status,
economic resources, social participation, social status and self-efficacy. Gundert and
Hohendanner (2014) discuss how different mechanisms meditate the relationship between
employment status and social integration. However, the identification of mediation
effects relies on strong assumptions that are likely to be violated in my setting (see
e.g. Gelman and Hill, 2007 and Imai et al., 2010). For instance, it is not possible to
identify effects mitigated by so-called mediators and direct effects of job loss as long as
further unobserved mediators are existent. Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish between
mediators and outcome variables as the social and economic effects of unemployment
can mutually reinforce each other. That is the reason why my study concentrates on the
total effects of job loss on the different dimensions defined above. In addition, I provide
new insights into the consequences of unemployment by studying heterogeneous effects
for subgroups defined by sociodemographic characteristics and by the type of job loss
and the duration of the unemployment spell.
I contribute to the literature by analyzing the effects of becoming unemployed based
on a combination of survey and administrative data and a method that allows me to
account for selection effects due to time-constant unobserved characteristics and reversed
causality. This study makes use of the panel data set PASS-ADIAB 7515 which covers
about 10,000 households per wave and includes individual information on the areas of
employment, education, income, health, social life and housing. Additionally, the rich
administrative data set of the Federal Employment Agency provides detailed information
on job and firm characteristics and employment histories. In a first step, I estimate the
probability of job loss given a large set of control variables reflecting individual and
household characteristics as well as the labor market history. In a second step, I apply
inverse propensity score weighting combined with a difference-in-differences approach
to control for observed and permanent unobserved differences between individuals who
become unemployed and those who do not.
My results are in line with previous findings and point in the expected direction.
Unemployment has particularly detrimental effects on the subjective perception of social
integration, life satisfaction, the access to economic resources as well as on mental health.
Looking at psychosocial needs that are typically met by an employment relationship, I
find that social participation is not affected by job loss while the social status and the self-
efficacy level become lower. Furthermore, I find some evidence for effect heterogeneity
across subgroups. Individuals with a partner and high-skilled workers suffer less from
unemployment. I also study the effects of job loss depending on the type and the time
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that passed by since the employment relationship has ended. The main finding is that the
effects become more profound the longer the duration of unemployment. The negative
consequences of previous unemployment are still present even if the individual finds a
job again.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 discusses theories
regarding the concept of social exclusion and the consequences of job loss. Section 1.3
describes the data source and the measurement of the outcome variables. Section 1.4
presents the empirical identification strategy. Section 1.5 describes the sample and shows
model diagnostics. Section 1.6 presents the results of the empirical analysis and Section
1.7 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Considerations
1.2.1 The Concept of Social Exclusion
The term ‘social exclusion’ has its origins in France in the 1970s and referred to persons
who were unprotected by social insurance and at risk of permanent detachment from
society. A widespread adoption of the term in Europe started in the 1980s, when
unemployment rates were high and threatened national modes of social integration
(Kronauer, 1998). More recently, the European Union declared 2010 as the European
Year for Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion.
Thus far no operationalization of the concept of social exclusion has been established
as a standard in the literature. However, sociologists have emphasized some key charac-
teristics of the concept on which the theoretical framework of my analysis is based (see
e.g. Room, 1995; Rodgers et al., 1995; Atkinson, 1998 and Sen, 2000). Social exclusion
is viewed as a dynamic process, involving deprivation across a range of dimensions
which affect individual opportunities to be connected to mainstream society.2 Exclusion
from society can be described as disadvantages in core living conditions, such as hous-
ing, income, education, employment and well-being (Andreß, 2003), which reduce the
possibility of maintaining an ‘appropriate’ standard of living and social participation.
However, social exclusion is not only determined by an objectively precarious financial
situation but also by the individual perception of belonging to society. Criteria and
standards that define social integration are to a large degree subjective and are weighted
2Social exclusion might depend on several interdependent dimensions of society such as the labor
market, economic resources, social participation, educational, health care and social welfare institutions
or civic and human rights. As the institutional and political system of western social welfare states like
Germany or the Scandinavian states should in principle be accessible for every citizen I do not consider
these dimensions in this study.
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differently by individuals. In order for an individual to feel part of society and take part
in social activities it is of great importance that the individual is able to shape his or her
life according to subjective perceptions and aims. Hence, social integration depends on
both an individual’s capacity to act and an individual’s actual actions (Sen, 1985). The
subjective feeling of social integration might be influenced by general life satisfaction,
mental health status, an individual’s close social surrounding, the relative position in
society but also on personality traits such as self-efficacy which could help to cope with
multiple deprivation (Popp and Schels, 2008).
The above reasoning shows that social exclusion has multiple interdependent di-
mensions which can reinforce each other. Exclusion from society can also impact, for
instance, on social participation or mental health through the lack of perceived integration
as well as alienation. Higher perceived alienation is associated with lower well-being
and a higher risk of depression (Layte et al., 2010). As it is not clear which variables act
as mediators and which ones as outcomes, I concentrate on the total effects of job loss on
the following outcome variables which might lead to social exclusion: perceived social
integration, well-being and mental health, economic resources and the psychosocial
needs social participation, social status and higher self-efficacy.
From an economic point of view, social exclusion is strongly related to exclusion
from the labor market. Obsolete skills, living in deprived neighborhoods and discourage-
ment effects (see e.g. Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001; Murie and Musterd, 2004 and Clark
et al., 2010) might in turn considerably reduce the individual employment prospects
and hence lead to long-term dependency on social welfare benefits. However, these
channels should be highly related to the outcomes I am looking at, as social capital,
emotional stability and personality traits such as self-efficacy are important determinants
of reemployment probabilities (see e.g. Darity and Goldsmith, 1996 and Helliwell
and Putnam, 2004). In the following I will provide more detailed explanations for
potential effects of job loss on the outcome variables under consideration. The empirical
identification of the causal effects is discussed in Section 1.4.
1.2.2 The Consequences of Job Loss
Economic resources. Job loss leads to exclusion from the labor market and needs
that are associated with an employment relationship. Two main functions of paid
employment can be emphasized: the first function is the provision of financial resources,
which allow individuals to maintain a minimum standard of living and to shape life
according to subjective perceptions and aims. Job loss coincides with earnings losses and
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hence might constrain the access to economic resources. As a consequence unemployed
individuals might have to adjust their lifestyle, for instance by changing their diet,
their place of residence or their general spending behavior. Financial constraints could
also affect their participation in social and cultural activities (Jenkins and Cappellari,
2007). Poverty researchers usually distinguish two approaches of measuring poverty,
a resource-based poverty measure and a measure of deprivation. While the former
defines poverty primarily in financial terms (lack of income and consumption), the latter
measure concentrates on a direct measure of what individuals are able to be or to do.
This approach was suggested by Sen (1992) who defines poverty as the inability of
individuals to achieve a minimal level of capabilities to function (such as the inability to
be healthy, clothed, sheltered, etc.). The advantage of this approach is that it takes into
account the inherent ability of individuals to translate consumption into welfare as well
as the impact of public goods on welfare (e.g. public health, education, etc.). In this
study I will concentrate on economic deprivation due to job loss which is reflected by the
non-availability of basic goods and the non-participation in activities satisfying basic
needs.
Psychosocial needs. The second function of employment refers to psychosocial needs
that go beyond the need for financial resources. Jahoda (1981) proposed a latent depri-
vation theory which states that unemployment causes deprivation not only of manifest
economic resources, but also of five latent psychosocial needs that are usually met
through an employment relationship: the need for a time structure to one’s day, the
need for social contacts outside of the immediate family, the need to be a part of a
collective purpose, the need for status and personal identity and the need for regular
activity. According to Jahoda (1981) and others (e.g. Creed and Muller, 2006; Paul
and Batinic, 2010 and Gundert and Hohendanner, 2014) the absence of those functions,
together with economic strain, might explain why an individual’s perception of social
integration as well as subjective well-being declines when becoming unemployed. In this
study I focus on the following psychosocial needs that can be met more easily through
working: social participation, social status and higher self-efficacy.
Social participation. On the one hand, when individuals become unemployed they
typically lose their daily social contacts, for example to colleagues or customers. In
addition, the literature documents a negative relationship between unemployment and
social participation. Social participation might comprise formal participation like activity
in a club or organization and informal participation like interaction with friends and
relatives (Dieckhoff and Gash, 2015). It has been found that the unemployed engage
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in social activities less often (see e.g. Kunze and Suppa, 2017) and have less social
support from close relations and authority figures compared to employed individuals (see
e.g. Jackson, 1999). Moreover, the psychological distress that goes along with being
unemployed is compounded by the negative social attitudes towards unemployment which
risk further alienating the unemployed from mainstream society (Gallie et al., 2003).
As a consequence, the loss of social contacts can lead to lower life satisfaction. Dolan
et al. (2008) provide a detailed literature review on the determinants of subjective well-
being and find evidence that an important factor which positively influences subjective
well-being is social contacts.
On the other hand, the additional leisure time could also be beneficial for social
participation of the unemployed. Studies that focus on the time use of employed and
unemployed individuals show that unemployed persons spent more time on home pro-
duction and leisure activities such as socializing than the employed (see e.g. Krueger
and Mueller, 2012). Hence, the net effect of job loss on social participation is not clear a
priori.
Social status. According to Jahoda (1981) an individual’s position in life is in large part
defined by one’s job. This notion is supported by Paul and Batinic (2010) who state that
individuals tend to see themselves in a similar way as others see them and even employed
workers with a relatively low occupational status, for example manual workers, feel that
they are treated with more respect and recognition than unemployed persons. Job loss
might bring a certain stigma as well as feelings of shame and worthlessness. The loss in
social prestige may be reflected in the subjective perception of occupying a lower social
status. There are studies that focus on the relationship between social norms that are
associated with different labor market states and subjective well-being. Findings point to
lower life satisfaction due to status and identity effects caused by the event of job loss
(see e.g. Clark, 2003; Stutzer and Lalive, 2004 and Hetschko et al., 2014).
Self-efficacy. In social-cognitive theory the construct of self-efficacy deals with the
ability of an individual to deal with demanding situations by taking adaptive action
(Bandura, 1997). Self-efficacy might be an important individual characteristic in modern
labor markets in which more and more responsibility is shifted to the worker. Tisch and
Wolff (2015) discuss the link between employment and self-efficacy. Employed workers
are likely to be more confident with respect to their problem-solving capabilities due to
the feedback received from people outside of their family like colleagues and superiors.
Moreover, an employment relationship links individuals to a collective purpose or goal
that might lead to increased self-efficacy when such goals are achieved. Regular activity
at the workplace might help an individual to learn about and to value his or her own skills.
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Hence, Jahoda’s latent functions of employment should positively influence self-efficacy.
Fryer (1986) states that individuals might differ in their reaction to unemployment which
cannot be explained by Jahoda’s deprivation theory. He assumes that individuals want
to actively control their lives by making plans and pursuing goals. Hence, job loss
and the associated loss of the above mentioned functions may lead to a lower level of
self-efficacy. In addition, becoming unemployed might be viewed as individual failure
(Silver et al., 2005).
Social integration. Labor market integration plays a central role in feeling part of
society. Sociologists have provided some empirical evidence that employment is related
to a higher level of perceived social integration than unemployment (see e.g. Gundert
and Hohendanner, 2014 and Layte et al., 2010). As discussed above job loss might lead
to multiple deprivations such as financial constraints, social contacts and social status
which could determine the degree to which individuals feel as though they belong to
society. In this study I analyze the impact of job loss on an overall subjective evaluation
of social integration as defined by those components which are regarded as important
from an individual’s point of view.
Well-being and mental health. There are a number of existing studies that show the
detrimental effects of unemployment on individuals’ subjective well-being (see e.g.
Frey and Stutzer, 2002 and Helliwell, 2006 who give a literature review on happiness
research). Life satisfaction can be viewed as the ultimate result of what resources enable
people to do and to be, in other words their ability to convert resources into a good life.
Furthermore, being emotionally stable is a central dimension of employability and a
basis for regular activity, which can be interpreted as an individual’s potential to be part
of society. In contrast, job displacement could cause psychosocial and financial stress
which might result in unhappiness and mental health problems (see e.g. McKee-Ryan
et al., 2005 and Paul and Moser, 2009 for meta-analyses on the mental health effects of
unemployment). In the short-run, mental health problems might appear, for instance,
in the form of fear, dejection or irritability. Studies showed that in the long-run the
unemployed face a higher risk of dying early and are more likely to commit suicide (see
e.g. Ruhm, 2000 and Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009) which could be interpreted as the
worst form of social exclusion.
However, individuals might also quit their job voluntarily, for instance due to
dissatisfaction with working-conditions. In this scenario, the effect of becoming
unemployed on subjective well-being is ambiguous from a theoretical point of view.
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There might be additional contributing factors to why unemployed individuals are
socially excluded. Anxiety due to reduced life-course predictability might also influence
whether an individual feels part of society or not. Unemployed individuals are likely to
face a lower level of life-course predictability compared to employed workers as their
situation might require a change of residence or to get involved with new social groups
(Gundert and Hohendanner, 2014). In addition, the trust in institutions and other people
might decline due to job loss, which could in turn affect social and mental well-being
(Helliwell and Wang, 2011). Furthermore, stigmatization and human capital depreciation
might also foster social exclusion. Unfortunately, the PASS-ADIAB 7515 does not
contain questions reflecting information on these potential channels.
1.3 Data and Measurement of Outcomes
1.3.1 Data Source
This study is based on individual level data provided by the German Federal Employment
Agency. The PASS-ADIAB 7515 data set combines weakly anonymous survey data
provided by the household panel study ‘Labour Market and Social Security’ (PASS) with
administrative data from the Integrated Employment Biographies which are based on
employers’ notifications to the social security authorities.
The PASS is a household panel survey and is designed for research on the living-
conditions of low-income households in Germany (Trappmann et al., 2010). The survey
is financed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and has been conducted on yearly
basis since December 2006.3 The PASS-ADIAB 7515 is based on the nine subsequent
annual waves of the PASS (2007–2015). In the first wave about 12,500 households and
19,000 individuals were interviewed. The initial sample consists of two subsamples
of almost equal size, one of which is drawn from the unemployment registers of the
Federal Employment Agency and contains a sample of households with at least one
benefit unit on the reference date in July 2006, while the second is a general population
sample, oversampling low status households. The initial subsample of benefit recipients
is refreshed each year. In the context of panel surveys sample attrition between survey
waves plays a crucial role. Attrition might be caused by death, moving abroad or non-
3The response rate on the household level in the first wave of 30.5% (Bethmann et al., 2016) is in line
with other surveys in comparable populations. For example the LSS 2005 (Meßmann et al., 2008) and the
benefit-recipient survey conducted as part of the evaluation of the experimentation clause (ZEW, IAQ and
TNS Emnid, 2007) achieve almost equal response rates.
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response due to non-contactability or refusal. The attrition rates of the PASS panel range
between 18% (Wave 9) and 43% (Wave 2) of households between two consecutive waves.
Approximately 20% of the dropouts are only temporary and return in the following wave.
In the ninth wave 13,271 individuals living in 8,921 households were interviewed.4
The PASS gathers detailed information on individual and household characteristics
in the fields of employment, education, income, health, social life and housing. For the
purpose of this study, examining the effects of job loss, the PASS has the advantage of
including questions on the subjective assessment of well-being, living conditions and
individual attitudes. The Integrated Employment Biographies complement the survey
data with detailed information on individual employment histories including start and
end date of dependent employment, registered unemployment or registered job-search
or unemployment benefit receipt periods on a daily basis. In this way, I am able to
construct precise durations and numbers of periods in a particular employment state.5
This administrative data source covers all surveyed persons who have at least one entry in
their social security records from 1975 onwards in West Germany and starting from 1992
in East Germany. Periods of self-employment, civil service, and of military service are
not included in the data set. Alongside information on different labor market states, the
data include individual information on (daily) wage records and on firm characteristics
such as industry code, median wage paid or firm size. An individual’s past labor market
performance should be highly related to unobserved factors like ability and motivation
which are likely to influence my outcome variables. Hence, information on individual
employment histories may help to identify the causal effects of job loss (Heckman et al.,
1997).
1.3.2 Measurement of Outcome Variables
In the following I describe how the outcome variables social integration, well-being and
mental health, economic resources and the psychosocial needs social participation, social
status and self-efficacy are measured in this study. The PASS questions underlying the
outcome variables and a description of their construction is presented in the corresponding
section in Appendix 1.B.
Social integration is quantified by the subjective perception of social affiliation
ranging from 1 to 10; from feeling excluded (1) to feeling part of society (10) (see
4Table 1.A.1 in Appendix 1.A provides a detailed description of the number of interviews in each
wave.
5Survey data can only be linked to administrative data from the Federal Employment Agency for those
who agreed to the linkage. Table 1.A.2 in Appendix 1.A shows that on average 80% of the respondents
agree on merging the two data sets in each wave.
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Section 1.B.1). In this analysis the impact of job loss on two measures of emotional
stability is analyzed (see Section 1.B.2): life satisfaction and mental health status. To
quantify life satisfaction I make use of a question which is standard in large-scale surveys
like the GSOEP or the BHPS. Individuals are asked to assess on a 0 to 10 scale how
satisfied they are currently with their life as a whole, with 0 meaning that the person is
completely dissatisfied and 10 meaning completely satisfied. In addition, I use a variable
with five categories indicating whether an individual has been "extremely", "quite a bit",
"moderately", "a little bit" or "not at all" affected by mental health problems, like fear,
dejection or irritability in the last four weeks.
To measure the access to resources enabling a basic standard of living and social
participation, I use two variables (see Section 1.B.3). First, I use a deprivation index
which is included in the PASS data set. The surveyed households are asked to indicate
whether they possess a list of basic goods considered essential for an appropriate standard
of living in society. For instance, the household is asked whether it has an apartment with
at least as many rooms as persons living there, with a garden or balcony and whether
the household possesses a car. Moreover, the household members are asked to indicate
whether they participate in activities satisfying basic needs, such as having a hot meal or
saving a fixed amount of money, as well as in social activities, such as inviting friends for
dinner at home or going to the cinema once in a while. All in all the deprivation index
is based on a list of 26 goods or activities. In addition, survey participants are asked
whether the household does not possess these goods or does not participate in certain
activities due to financial or other reasons. In order to construct the deprivation index
properly only items that are missing for financial reasons are counted. In this way, it is
ensured that conscious decisions, for instance a household choosing not to own a car or
television, are not misinterpreted as a reduced standard of living. As a second measure of
economic resources, I use the subjective satisfaction with the standard of living in total
on a 0 to 10 scale, ranging from "completely dissatisfied" to "completely satisfied".
I quantify social participation with the help of two different measures (see Section
1.B.4). First, I exploit information on how many close friends (can also include family
members outside the household) the individuals have.6 Moreover, I use information on
the activity in organizations or associations. The PASS includes a question on whether
the respondent is actively engaged in a union, political party, church community, clubs
such as music, sport or culture clubs or another organization. Based on the responses to
this question I construct a variable ranging from 0 to 5 indicating how many activities the
6Unfortunately, the PASS-ADIAB does not include information on the composition of the social
network. The network of unemployed persons might change with a higher proportion of friends being also
unemployed and at risk of social marginalization (Gallie and Paugam, 2003).
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individual is engaged in. To measure social status the relative ranking matters. I make
use of a question asked in PASS, where the respondent should rank himself or herself
on a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 means belonging to the bottom of society and 10 to the top
(see Section 1.B.5). The self-efficacy index used in this study is introduced and tested by
Schwarzer and Jerusalem (2006). It is based on a five item battery where the respondent
has to decide whether they "apply completely", "tend to apply", "tend not to apply" or
"do not apply at all" (see Section 1.B.6).
1.4 Empirical Identification
The aim of this chapter is to determine the causal effects of job loss on the dimensions
of social exclusion defined in Section 1.2. The identification of causal effects relies
on a comparison of the outcome levels of workers becoming unemployed to those of
otherwise identical but still employed workers. However, in this setting selectivity issues
are likely to play a role.
In general, an employment relationship ends either because workers are laid off,
their contract expires and is not prolonged or they quit voluntarily. In the empirical
analysis I study how the effects depend on the type of job loss. The distinction between
voluntary and involuntary unemployment allows me to learn more about the self-selection
of employees into unemployment. The PASS-ADIAB does not contain information on
mass layoffs which could be used to estimate the effects of involuntary job loss as it is
often done in the literature. However, the individual risk of being affected by a mass
layoff might also be influenced by selection both on the part of the firm as well as on
the employee side.7 Firms of a different size, sector or workforce composition face
different business risks and vary with respect to their employment contract designs.
Similarly, employees might self-select, for instance due to family reasons, to work in
firms that are less likely to make layoffs. The German Employment Protection Act
(Kündigungsschutzgesetz) prescribes the requirements for making workers redundant.8
This law states that termination with notice is only valid if it is based on reasons relating
to either the employees’ character, conduct, or urgent operational business requirements.
The employer has to undertake a social selection of the relevant employees on the
basis of length of employment, age, family support obligations and severe disability.
However, there might still be a certain scope for an employer to lay off workers with low
productivity or bad health. The individual probability of becoming unemployed might be
7See e.g. Kletzer, 1998 and Pfann, 2006 who discuss selection of the employees who are affected by
mass layoffs.
8This law applies only to firms that employ at least ten full-time employees.
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influenced by unobservable factors like ability or motivation but also by lower levels of
the outcome variables before job loss. For instance, unhappy people or people with few
social contacts or mental health problems could be more likely to become unemployed.
The fundamental challenge of causal inference arises because we cannot observe the
outcome levels of the same individual simultaneously with and without job loss which
makes it impossible to observe causal effects directly (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).
To address this issue, I apply inverse propensity score weighting (IPW). The basic idea
of this approach is to make those workers who do not experience a job loss comparable
in their observable characteristics to workers who do lose their job. This is achieved by
weighting down the outcome levels for individuals from the comparison group who are
over-represented and weighting up those who are under-represented. The weights are
determined by the propensity score, the probability of not being employed in the next
period (T = 1), given observed covariates x:
p(x) = P(T = 1|X = x) (1.1)
The difference between the weighted outcome levels of the two groups is then a consistent
estimate of the effect of job loss on the different dimensions of social exclusion of
unemployed individuals (average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)).
The key assumption for identification of the ATT is the conditional independence
assumption, which states that, conditional on the propensity score, potential outcomes are
independent of the event of job loss (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). To make the assump-
tion that all selectivity is captured by observables reasonable in my application, I make
use of a very large set of determinants of job displacement. For instance, the data provide
information on sociodemographic characteristics, subjective indicators, individual health
status and household situation. In addition, I have detailed information on individual
employment histories and on previous jobs including firm characteristics and whether
the position was a permanent position. The selection of the covariates follows screening
of control variables used in other empirical studies on the non-pecuniary effects of job
loss (see e.g. Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009 and Marcus, 2013).9 Moreover,
I carefully study the influence of the outcome levels before job loss on the probability of
becoming unemployed.
Given concerns over potentially biased results due to unobserved differences be-
tween workers who lose their job and their matching partners, I follow Heckman et al.
9In the final specification I rely on a set of covariates that might determine job loss from a theoretical
point of view and that allows differences between unemployed individuals and those still in employment
to disappear for an even larger set of variables.
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(1997) who developed a conditional difference-in-differences extension of matching.
In this study I combine IPW with a difference-in-differences approach (IPW-DID), as
suggested by Abadie (2005), to eliminate permanent differences that are time-invariant
and unobserved by the researcher.
In a nutshell, I make use of a two-step procedure to estimate the effect of job loss.
In a first step, I estimate the individual probability of job loss between two consecutive
waves by means of logit models given a detailed set of observed individual, household,
job and firm characteristics. These variables are measured at the first of two consecutive
waves such that their levels are not affected by future job loss. Then, I use the fitted
values of the propensity scores to calculate the weights. In a second step, I use the
inverse-probability weights to compute weighted averages of the changes between the
two survey waves of outcome levels for each treatment level. The estimator is given by
τˆAT T =
1
N ∑
N
i=1 p˜(x
t0
i )
(
T t1i (Y
t1
i −Y
t0
i )
p˜(x
t0
i )
− (1−T
t1
i )(Y
t1
i −Y
t0
i )
1−p˜(xt0i )
)
1
N ∑
N
i=1 p˜(x
t0
i )
(1.2)
where T t1i indicates the event of job loss for individual i, i = 1, ...,N, in period t1. Y
t0
i and
Y t1i denote the observed outcomes of each individual in two consecutive periods t0 and t1.
The weights are normalized to ensure that the weighted number of control observations
sums up to the number of treated: p˜(xt0i ) =
pˆ(x
t0
i )
1
N ∑
N
i=1 pˆ(x
t0
i )
, where pˆ(xt0i ) is the estimated
probability of job loss conditional on observed characteristics measured in t0.
The IPW-DID approach identifies the ATT under the assumption that the average
outcomes of unemployed and still employed workers would follow a parallel trend
in absence of the event job loss. Hence, this approach assumes that both groups are
characterized by similar changes and not by similar levels of the outcome variables in
the case of no job displacement. To test for the similarity or divergence, for example
due to anticipation of the treatment, I conduct placebo tests by comparing the change in
outcomes of both groups in periods before the event of job loss takes place.
1.5 The Sample and Model Diagnostics
1.5.1 Sample Selection
The analysis of the impact of job loss on several dimensions of social exclusion is built
on the nine waves of PASS (2007–2015). The sample is restricted to respondents who
were interviewed in two consecutive waves t0 and t1 and whose administrative records
could be identified. Daily information on employment biographies allow me to determine
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an individual’s current employment status at the interview date. Individuals are either
part-time or full-time employed and do not receive unemployment benefits in the first
of the two consecutive waves (wave t0). I define two different groups of individuals
that can be distinguished by the event of job loss in the second of two consecutive
waves (wave t1). The treatment group consists of individuals who stated that they were
employed in wave t0 and are unemployed and not employed in parallel, for instance
via a mini job or an active labor market program in wave t1.10 This means that I am
analyzing a combination of short-term and medium-term effects of job loss: the duration
of the current unemployment spell ranges between one day and one year. Individuals
that belong to the control group are continuously employed between two consecutive
waves.11 The sample is restricted to individuals who are between 18 and 64 years old,
not in education and for whom no information on observable characteristics and outcome
variables that are used in the empirical specification are missing. A detailed description
of the variables used in this study can be found in Appendix 1.C (Tables 1.C.1 and 1.C.2).
I end up with a treatment group that consists of 635 cases in which workers are
employed in wave t0 and are unemployed in wave t1 and a control group that consists
of 17,047 cases in which workers are continuously employed between two consecutive
survey waves. Table 1.D.1 in Appendix 1.D shows that the same individual might
be either in the treatment group, the control group or in both groups several times.
Approximately half of the group of workers who lose their jobs and 11% of the control
cases are individuals who are considered only once in the analysis.
1.5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 shows selected descriptive statistics of the observable characteristics that are
used in the empirical analysis separately for workers that become unemployed and
workers that are continuously employed between two consecutive waves. Additional
descriptives are reported in Table 1.D.2 in Appendix 1.D. The variables presented in
Tables 1.1 and 1.D.2 can be grouped into the following categories: initial levels of
outcome variables, sociodemographics, subjective indicators, household and partner
characteristics, characteristics of the previous job and the previous firm as well as
information on the employment history.
10I consider individuals as unemployed in wave t1 in case they are unemployed according to the
Integrated Employment Biographies in t1 or they have no unemployment entry in the social security
records for at most six months but had one before and have an unemployment or employment entry
thereafter. In addition, I consider individuals as unemployed in wave t1 if they have no unemployment
entry in t1 but enter unemployment from employment within three months. I use survey data on the actual
labor market state in t1 in case administrative information are missing.
1194% of the control persons do not change their employer between two consecutive waves t0 and t1.
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Table 1.1: Selected descriptive statistics
Job loss Yes No Difference
Initial outcome levels
Social integration [1-10] 7.39 7.99 -0.60 ***
Life satisfaction [0-10] 6.77 7.43 -0.66 ***
Mental health status [1-5] 3.85 4.04 -0.18 ***
Deprivation index [0-11] 0.82 0.39 0.43 ***
Satisfaction with standard of living [0-10] 6.62 7.39 -0.77 ***
Number of close friends 1.98 2.19 -0.21 ***
Social engagement [0-5] 0.50 0.77 -0.27 ***
Social status [1-10] 5.73 6.28 -0.55 ***
Self-efficacy [1-4] 3.03 3.08 -0.04 *
Sociodemographics & household characteristics
Female 0.41 0.53 -0.12 ***
Age 40.93 44.18 -3.25 ***
Migrant 0.07 0.04 0.03 ***
Married 0.39 0.60 -0.20 ***
Number of own children 1.24 1.46 -0.22 ***
Home owner 0.22 0.47 -0.25 ***
Serious health restrictions 0.25 0.18 0.06 ***
PQ: no vocational training 0.17 0.09 0.08 ***
PQ: vocational training 0.66 0.64 0.02 *
PQ: advanced vocational training 0.05 0.10 -0.05 ***
PQ: academic degree 0.13 0.17 -0.05 ***
East Germany 0.30 0.26 0.04 **
Previous job characteristics & employment history
Permanent contract 0.57 0.86 -0.29 ***
Tenure 19.82 71.85 -52.03 ***
Daily wage 51.90 77.57 -25.67 ***
Sector: Agriculture/Production 0.10 0.17 -0.07 ***
Sector: Consumption/Food 0.05 0.07 -0.01
Sector: Construction 0.09 0.05 0.05 ***
Sector: Trade 0.12 0.13 -0.01
Sector: Transportation/Services I 0.29 0.19 0.10 ***
Sector: Services II 0.15 0.07 0.08 ***
Sector: Education/Health 0.12 0.20 -0.07 ***
Sector: Public 0.08 0.12 -0.05 ***
Number of employment periods with ssc 7.86 5.52 2.34 ***
Employment duration with scc 115.72 183.84 -68.12 ***
Number of marginal employment periods 1.63 1.14 0.49 ***
Marginal employment duration 12.71 16.77 -4.06 ***
Number of unemployment periods 4.53 2.30 2.23 ***
Unemployment duration 68.17 30.44 37.74 ***
Number of non-employment periods 2.92 2.07 0.85 ***
Non-employment duration 41.51 40.69 0.81
Number of observations 635 17,047
Notes: PQ: Professional qualification. ssc: social security contributions. Scales of the outcome variables
are shown in squared brackets. Differences are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
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There are substantial differences in the baseline outcome levels between both groups.
I find significant lower levels in all dimensions for workers whose employment rela-
tionship ends between two waves except for the deprivation index, for which I find a
significantly higher level indicating limited access to economic resources. Regarding
sociodemographics, I find that men, young workers as well as workers with an immi-
gration background are more likely to become unemployed. Individual unemployment
probabilities are higher for low-skilled individuals. Furthermore, workers who lose their
job between two consecutive waves are on average less healthy. There are significant
differences between both groups with respect to household characteristics. Workers that
become unemployed are less often married and are less likely to have children or to be
homeowners. Finally, I find a clear pattern when looking at previous job characteristics
as well as at the employment history. Individuals that become unemployed have shorter
tenures as well as less employment experience and more often suffer from interruptions
caused by periods of unemployment or non-employment. Moreover, they are more often
employed on a temporary basis, receive on average lower wages and are more likely to
work in the production, construction or service industry than individuals who remain
employed.
1.5.3 Model Diagnostics
In the baseline specification I apply IPW-DID on the pooled sample based on the nine
waves of PASS. In this paragraph I describe balance diagnostics for assessing whether
the specification of the propensity score model has been adequately chosen. The results
of the propensity score matching can be found in Table 1.D.3 in Appendix 1.D. As shown
in the previous subsection, before weighting, individuals that become unemployed and
those who remain employed differ with respect to most determinants of job loss as well
as the baseline levels of the social exclusion measures. Following Austin (2011) and
Guo and Fraser (2015), I examine the standardized differences in means after weighting
between individuals who become unemployed and those who do not to test for balance.
The standardized difference gives the difference in averages by treatment status, scaled
by the square root of the sum of the variances and is formally given by
d =
(x¯treatment− x¯control)√
S2treatment+S2control
2
(1.3)
where x¯treatment and x¯control denote the sample means and S2treatment and S
2
control the sample
variances in treatment and control group, respectively. Moreover, I also look at variance
ratios. A perfectly balanced covariate has a standardized difference of zero and variance
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ratio of one. Austin (2011) points out that there exists no universally agreed criterion for
how small a standardized difference has to be to provide balance. I follow his rule of
thumb according to which a standardized difference of less than 0.1 is taken to indicate a
negligible difference in the means of treatment and control group.
The balancing tests of my baseline specification can be found in Table 1.D.4 in
Appendix 1.D. This table shows that the standardized differences are close to zero and
the variance ratios are close to one for a large set of covariates which is larger than the
set of covariates included in the baseline specification.12
Table 1.D.6 in Appendix 1.D shows summary statistics of the propensity
scores for the unemployed and individuals still in work, which show that there is suffi-
cient overlap between treatment and control group to be able to conduct a proper analysis.
1.6 Empirical Findings
In this section I present the baseline results of the IPW-DID estimates of the effect of
job loss on the different dimensions of social exclusion as defined in Section 1.2.2. In
a next step I look at heterogeneous effects for subgroups defined by sociodemographic
characteristics and by the type of and amount of time since job loss. Finally, I discuss
the robustness of the results.
1.6.1 Baseline Results
Table 1.2 presents the estimation results of the baseline specification. The number of
observations for individuals that become unemployed between two consecutive waves
corresponds to 635 while the number of observations for individuals that remain em-
ployed corresponds to 17,047 for all outcomes except for the self-efficacy index. The
measure of self-efficacy is not available in wave 5 and 9, which leads to roughly 40%
fewer observations. The results show that individuals who become unemployed on
average lose out in multiple dimensions. The changes in the outcome variables are
12The baseline specification is based on information for 46 covariates. These variables are partly
divided into dummy variables which leads to 99 control variables in total. I conduct several robustness
checks to examine the sensitivity of the choice of covariates included in the estimations. Table 1.D.5 in
Appendix 1.D presents the estimation results for a larger set of covariates, e.g. including the "Big Five"
personality traits: extraversion, tolerance, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness and an aggregation
of the control variables to independent factors using factor analysis. The results are comparable to the
baseline specification.
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standardized in order to allow for better comparability of the estimated effect sizes.13
My findings provide evidence that job loss is accompanied by a decrease in the overall
assessment of social integration and subjective well-being. The estimated short- and
medium-term effects on life satisfaction are stronger: job loss leads to a decrease of 0.55
standard deviations (SDs) in life satisfaction compared to 0.33 SDs in social integration.
My results suggest further that job loss can be associated with severe mental health
problems. Becoming unemployed reduces mental health by 0.31 SDs. Moreover, I find
that the deprivation index, which represents a measure of poverty, increases substantially
by 0.61 SDs while satisfaction with the standard of living decreases by 0.53 SDs.
Table 1.2: Baseline results for the consequences of job loss
Change in outcomes Effect of Standard Standard
job loss error deviation
Social integration -0.333∗∗∗ (0.054) 1.602
Well-being and mental health
Life satisfaction -0.549∗∗∗ (0.060) 1.330
Mental health status -0.309∗∗∗ (0.046) 1.152
Economic resources
Deprivation index 0.608∗∗∗ (0.071) 0.493
Satisfaction with standard of living -0.529∗∗∗ (0.057) 1.451
Psychosocial needs
Social participation
Number of close friends -0.049 (0.043) 1.084
Social engagement -0.048 (0.038) 0.650
Social status -0.244∗∗∗ (0.048) 1.354
Self-efficacy -0.202∗∗∗ (0.062) 0.379
Notes: Estimates from IPW-DID are based on 635 treated and 17,047 control persons (the estimates for
self-efficacy are based on 417 treated and 10,359 control persons). The propensity of job loss is based on a
logit model with the control variables reported in Tables 1.C.1 and 1.C.2 in Appendix 1.C. The differences
in the outcome variables are standardized. Standard errors are robust and calculated by taking into account
that propensity scores are estimated. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗
1% level.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
The psychosocial needs that are typically met by an employment relationship are
partly influenced by periods of unemployment; I find no relationship between unem-
ployment and social participation. There is no change in the number of close friends or
activities an individual is engaged in due to job loss. The variable social status which
measures the position in society decreases by 0.24 SDs if an individual becomes unem-
13Figure 1.D.1 in Appendix 1.D presents the distributions of changes in outcome variables between
two consecutive waves.
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ployed. The results imply negative and significant effects of 0.20 SDs on the self-efficacy
index which measures an individual’s ability to cope with demanding situations.
To sum it up, the largest negative short- and medium-term effects of job loss can be
found with respect to economic resources and life satisfaction. The individual’s percep-
tion of social integration and mental health status are affected by the same magnitude
while the impact on social status and self-efficacy are slightly less strong. Furthermore,
I find no effect of becoming unemployed on social participation. The long-term con-
sequences of job loss might be more severe and will be investigated in more detail in
Section 1.6.2.
1.6.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Heterogeneous effects by sociodemographic characteristics. In this subsection I will show
estimation results for different subgroups defined by sociodemographic characteristics.
I conduct the analysis separately for men and women, low-/medium-skilled and high-
skilled workers, individuals who have a partner and those who do not. For each of these
subgroups I redo the two-step estimation procedure as described in Section 1.4. In this
way, I ensure that observable characteristics are balanced between treated and control
individuals for each subgroup. The results are shown in Table 1.3.
It is well known that women react differently to labor market events and shocks
compared to men (see e.g. Bergemann and van den Berg, 2008). Moreover, men and
women differ with respect to preferences, for instance concerning risk or leisure (Croson
and Gneezy, 2009). However, the results in Table 1.3 point to no substantial effect
heterogeneity by gender despite for social engagement. I do find that men reduce their
social activities significantly, although this effect is comparatively small.
The results in Table 1.3 suggest that low- and medium-skilled individuals feel the
effects of unemployment more strongly.14 The negative effects of job loss are stronger in
every dimension except for economic resources, for which the results are comparable.
In particular, low- and medium-skilled workers are significantly more dissatisfied with
their life (difference of 0.38) than high-skilled. This finding is in line with results from
other studies that show that high-skilled workers face a lower risk of becoming long-term
unemployed due to higher job search intensity and reemployment success compared
to unemployed individuals with lower levels of education (see e.g. Farber, 2005 and
Riddell and Song, 2011). Furthermore, being highly educated might help in coping with
shocks like job loss (Bonanno, 2004) which is reflected in the fact that I find no impact
14Low-skilled individuals are defined as having no professional qualification, medium-skilled as having
a vocational training and high-skilled as having an advanced vocational training or an academic degree.
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of becoming unemployed on self-efficacy for this group of workers.
With respect to family status, the estimates indicate that individuals who have a
partner experience less harsh effects from unemployment than single people do. This
is especially true for life satisfaction and financial restrictions. For instance, the effect
on the deprivation index is significantly lower than for individuals without a partner. A
potential second income source seems to compensate at least partly for the financial loss
due to unemployment. Moreover, a supportive partner can compensate for some of the
latent negative effects of unemployment like loss of time structure, social contacts and
activity.
Table 1.3: Heterogeneous effects by sociodemographic characteristics
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Men Women Low-/medium- High- Partner No partner
skilled skilled
Change in outcomes Effect of job loss
Social integration -0.320∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ -0.114 -0.360∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.076) (0.059) (0.151) (0.066) (0.094)
Well-being and mental health
Life satisfaction -0.472∗∗∗ -0.594∗∗∗ -0.589∗∗∗ -0.205 -0.415∗∗∗ -0.663∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.083) (0.066) (0.125) (0.070) (0.149)
Mental health status -0.310∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗ -0.128 -0.353∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.068) (0.051) (0.110) (0.057) (0.073)
Economic resources
Deprivation index 0.677∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.100) (0.076) (0.184) (0.093) (0.123)
Satisfaction with -0.509∗∗∗ -0.541∗∗∗ -0.532∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗ -0.660∗∗∗
standard of living (0.075) (0.079) (0.061) (0.150) (0.065) (0.133)
Psychosocial needs
Social participation
Number of close friends -0.020 -0.090 -0.044 -0.121 -0.025 -0.086
(0.058) (0.059) (0.047) (0.105) (0.055) (0.071)
Social engagement -0.099∗∗ 0.040 -0.069∗ 0.043 -0.049 -0.103
(0.049) (0.054) (0.040) (0.106) (0.049) (0.084)
Social status -0.226∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.202∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗
(0.068) (0.067) (0.052) (0.131) (0.059) (0.092)
Self-efficacy -0.202∗∗ -0.183∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ 0.080 -0.177∗∗ -0.203∗
(0.103) (0.087) (0.067) (0.161) (0.078) (0.112)
Notes: Estimates from IPW-DID are based on 377 treated and 8,053 control persons in specification (1), on 258 and 8,994 in (2),
on 525 and 12,401 in (3), on 110 and 4,646 in (4), on 350 and 12,146 in (5) and on 285 and 4,901 in (6). The propensity of job
loss is based on a logit model with the control variables reported in Tables 1.C.1 and 1.C.2 in Appendix 1.C. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. They are calculated by taking into account that propensity scores are estimated. Coefficients are statistically
significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level. Differences in the effects of job loss between subgroups that are significantly
different from zero at the 10% level are indicated by bold numbers. Standard errors of the differences are obtained by bootstrapping
(2,500 replications).
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
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Heterogeneous effects by amount of time since and type of job loss. In this subsection
I start by empirically testing the hypothesis that the negative consequences of job loss
become more severe the longer the duration of unemployment. To do so, I distinguish
individuals who have been unemployed for at least six months and less than six months
at the interview date after job loss. Furthermore, I consider the change in outcome levels
two waves after becoming unemployed in case the individual has still not found a job
at this interview date. The results are reported in column (2), (3) and (4) of Table 1.4
and suggest that the negative consequences of job loss become more severe the longer
the duration of unemployment, which is in line with recent findings in the literature
on subjective well-being (see e.g. Clark et al., 2008). The coefficients in column (2)
indicate that this is particularity true with respect to life satisfaction (decrease by 0.20)
and economic resources (the deprivation index increases by 0.27 and satisfaction with
standard of living decreases by 0.26). The coefficients point in the same direction by
looking at the unemployment duration at the first interview date after job loss.
Individuals who experience periods of unemployment between two waves but are
employed again in the second of two consecutive waves, are not included in my analysis
so far as their outcome levels are measured during periods of employment. However, it
would be interesting to study whether the negative effects of job loss are only temporary
and vanish as soon as the individual finds a job again. Column (5) in Table 1.4 shows the
estimates for treated individuals who are reemployed in t1. I find that individuals whose
employment relationship is interrupted by a period of unemployment have still lower
levels in most dimensions. These results suggest that unemployment has long-lasting
negative effects even for the currently employed. This finding receives support by Clark
et al. (2001) who find that employees with past unemployment experience have lower
life satisfaction.
Finally, I show results separately for individuals who are laid off and those who
lose their job due to other reasons, e.g. whose contract expired or who quit their job
voluntarily (specification (6) and (7) in Table 1.4). In my sample 71% of all workers
become unemployed due to dismissal by the employer. I find a stronger effect of being
laid off on social status. The other coefficients do not differ much. I also studied the
effects of unemployment dependent on previous job characteristics (results are reported
in Table 1.D.7 in Appendix 1.D). Interestingly, I find stronger effects of job loss on
mental health and self-efficacy for individuals who previously worked in small firms
(firms with less than 50 employees). This could be a hint that redundancies in small firms
are less anonymous and more often considered as individual failure.
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Table 1.4: Heterogeneous effects by time since and type of job loss
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Unemployed ≥ 6 months < 6 months Reemployed Laid off Other
in t2 unemployed unemployed in t1 job loss
Change in outcomes Effect of job loss
Social integration -0.333∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -0.060∗ -0.361∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.103) (0.076) (0.070) (0.032) (0.077) (0.085)
Well-being and mental health
Life satisfaction -0.549∗∗∗ -0.747∗∗∗ -0.568∗∗∗ -0.535∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗ -0.560∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.106) (0.085) (0.070) (0.034) (0.074) (0.098)
Mental health status -0.309∗∗∗ -0.417∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗ -0.057∗ -0.334∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.092) (0.068) (0.058) (0.030) (0.060) (0.078)
Economic resources
Deprivation index 0.608∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.146) (0.110) (0.088) (0.042) (0.088) (0.132)
Satisfaction with -0.529∗∗∗ -0.787∗∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗ -0.465∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗∗ -0.482∗∗∗
standard of living (0.057) (0.105) (0.080) (0.068) (0.035) (0.070) (0.090)
Psychosocial needs
Social participation
Number of close friends -0.049 -0.088 -0.130∗∗ -0.001 -0.012 -0.053 -0.011
(0.043) (0.074) (0.061) (0.054) (0.029) (0.061) (0.069)
Social engagement -0.048 0.083 -0.029 -0.066 -0.015 -0.054 0.010
(0.038) (0.062) (0.053) (0.046) (0.027) (0.043) (0.075)
Social status -0.244∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.109
(0.048) (0.097) (0.071) (0.059) (0.031) (0.063) (0.078)
Self-efficacy -0.202∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗ -0.070 -0.293∗∗∗ -0.049 -0.228∗∗∗ -0.101
(0.062) (0.129) (0.092) (0.075) (0.039) (0.080) (0.090)
Notes: Estimates from IPW-DID are based on 635 treated and 17,047 control persons in specification (1), (3) - (7), on 187 and
12,885 in (2), on 271 treated in (3), on 363 in (4), on 1,290 in (5), on 415 in (6) and on 172 in (7) (for 48 treated this information
is missing). The propensity of job loss is based on a logit model with the control variables reported in Tables 1.C.1 and 1.C.2 in
Appendix 1.C. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They are calculated by taking into account that propensity scores are
estimated. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level. Differences in the effects of job loss
between subgroups that are significantly different from zero at the 10% level are indicated by bold numbers. Standard errors of the
differences are obtained by bootstrapping (2,500 replications).
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
1.6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection I conduct some sensitivity checks to examine the robustness of my
findings. The results are reported in Table 1.5.
In a first step, I check the robustness of my results with respect to the model specifi-
cation. The review article of Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) discusses in great detail the
properties of different estimators which are standard in the treatment effects literature. In
comparison to simple matching estimators which impute the missing potential outcomes
of the treated individuals with outcome levels of nearest neighbors of the comparison
group, IPW avoids the requirement of choosing any tuning parameter. Hence, finding
an optimal value for the number of nearest neighbors for nearest-neighbor matching, a
caliper for radius caliper matching or a bandwidth for kernel matching is not needed.
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) point out that with IPW estimators concerns arise when
the covariate distributions of the two treatment groups are substantially different, im-
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plying that the propensity score is approaching zero or one. One concern is that in this
case the parametric model choice of the propensity score, such as probit vs logit models,
becomes more important. To address this issue, specification (2) of Table 1.5 shows the
estimation results by applying a probit instead of a logit estimation of the probability of
job loss. Moreover, I compare the results of the baseline specification to results obtained
by alternative estimators (specification (3) and (4) of Table 1.5): IPW with regression
adjustment (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2007) and one-to-five nearest-neighbor matching (see
e.g. Abadie and Imbens, 2006). Overall, the estimates are not sensitive to the choice of
the model specification.
Table 1.5: Robustness checks: results for the consequences of job loss
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Probit IPW-RA 5 NN One person
Change in outcomes Effect of job loss
Social integration -0.333∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.053) (0.050) (0.051) (0.064)
Well-being and mental health
Life satisfaction -0.549∗∗∗ -0.530∗∗∗ -0.539∗∗∗ -0.518∗∗∗ -0.597∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.055) (0.054) (0.052) (0.075)
Mental health status -0.309∗∗∗ -0.315∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.059)
Economic resources
Deprivation index 0.608∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.068) (0.079)
Satisfaction with -0.529∗∗∗ -0.510∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ -0.510∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗
standard of living (0.057) (0.053) (0.052) (0.046) (0.070)
Psychosocial needs
Social participation
Number of close friends -0.049 -0.049 -0.065 -0.019 -0.061
(0.043) (0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.056)
Social engagement -0.048 -0.045 -0.051 -0.026 -0.078
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.049)
Social status -0.244∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.047) (0.046) (0.043) (0.061)
Self-efficacy -0.202∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.060) (0.060) (0.056) (0.074)
Notes: IPW-RA: Inverse propensity score weighting with regression adjustment, 5 NN: one-to-five nearest-neighbor matching.
Estimates are based on 635 treated and 17,047 control persons in specification (1) - (4) and on 412 treated and 5,499 control persons
in specification (5). The propensity of job loss is based on a logit model in specification (1), (3) - (5). The variables used in the
propensity score estimation are reported in Tables 1.C.1 and 1.C.2 in Appendix 1.C. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. They
are calculated by taking into account that propensity scores are estimated. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗
5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
In a last step, I only include the first observation of each individual in the estimation
sample (specification (5) of Table 1.5). The number of individuals that become unem-
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ployed decreases to 412 and the number of individuals that remain employed between two
consecutive waves to 5,499. The estimated coefficients are comparable to the baseline
specification.
1.6.4 Placebo Tests
Finally, I test the reliability of my results by conducting placebo tests. In particular, I
estimate the effect of job loss on the change in outcomes between wave t−1 and t0. If
the outcomes are affected in periods before the job loss occurs that would suggest that
either treatment and control group are still systematically different or anticipation effects
play a role. The results of the placebo test shown in Table 1.D.8 in Appendix 1.D do not
indicate any significant effects. In addition, Figure 1.D.2 in Appendix 1.D presents the
mean of the outcome variables in levels in the consecutive waves t−3, t−2, t−1, t0 and t1
separately for treated and control individuals before and after inverse propensity score
weighting. While there are highly significant differences between treatment and control
group before weighting in the time period before job loss, these differences vanish after
weighting.15 All in all the placebo tests indicate that the treatment and control groups are
similar with respect to changes in outcomes in earlier periods.
1.7 Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter I empirically assess the economic and social consequences of job loss.
While the number of economic studies on the relationship between unemployment and
measures of social integration are quite rare, studies in the field of psychology and
sociology point to social exclusion as a result of unemployment (see e.g. Böhnke, 2004;
Layte et al., 2010 and Gundert and Hohendanner, 2014). These studies typically rely on
survey data only, cannot rule out bias due to unobservables or reversed causality and do
not examine the multidimensionality of the consequences of job loss in great detail.
By applying inverse probability weighting combined with differences-in-differences,
I study the causal impact of unemployment on different dimensions of the process of
social exclusion. I find the strongest negative effects in terms of size on life satisfaction
and economic resources, slightly weaker negative effects on perceived social integration,
15The number of observations decreases considerably the further I go back in time. The difference in
outcome levels between treatment and control group after IPW is insignificant for each outcome variable
in the time periods before job loss, except for mental health status in t−2 and deprivation index in t−1
(significant at 10% level) and number of close friends in t−2 (significant at 5% level). However, the reduced
number of observations and the three mentioned differences in outcome levels do not lead to diverging
trends across both groups.
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mental health, social status and self-efficacy and no effect on social participation. More-
over, I find some evidence for effect heterogeneity. The results suggest that high-skilled
workers and individuals with a partner experience the effects of unemployment less
strongly. In addition, I find larger negative effects of job loss in the long-run. Individuals
who are unemployed for more than one year do feel more socially excluded, are unhap-
pier and more financially constrained. The negative effects of job loss are still present
even if the individual becomes employed again.
This study shows that the loss of regular work influences social exclusion in various
ways. From an economic point of view, social isolation carries a high risk of individuals
ending up in a state from which they will never return to work. Discouragement effects,
stigmatization, the decay of human capital and living in deprived neighborhoods can
lead to both less job search effort and lower chances of being hired, and hence to longer
durations of unemployment (see e.g. Pissarides, 1992; Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001 and
Biewen and Steffes, 2010).
These considerations could provide new insights into the effectiveness of active
labor market policy programs with respect to reducing this risk. While the effects of
government sponsored programs on reemployment probabilities are rather mixed (see e.g.
Bergemann and van den Berg, 2008 and Card et al., 2017 for an overview), temporary
employment, for instance in the form of job creation schemes or wage subsidies might
foster the reintegration of the unemployed into society. For instance, the studies of
Wulfgramm (2011) and Gundert and Hohendanner (2015) on the effects of the German
‘One-Euro-Job’ workfare program on social integration and life satisfaction, respectively,
emphasize that the unemployed benefit from participation the more the activities resemble
regular jobs. Hence, from a policy perspective, it is important to design active labor
market policy programs that credibly simulate regular employment in terms of duration,
working hours, social and financial benefits. Programs that positively influence the
employability of participants as well as boost self-esteem might prevent individuals from
feeling rejected by society and thus avoid the onset of a downward spiral ending in
long-term unemployment.
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1.Appendix
1.A PASS Data Addendum
Table 1.A.1: Number of interviews
Sample Number of interviews Refreshment sample
1st wave (2006/07) 18,954 individuals living in 12,794 households
2nd wave (2007/08) 12,487 individuals living in 8,429 households 1,041 households
3rd wave (2008/09) 13,439 individuals living in 9,535 households 1,186 households
4th wave (2010) 11,768 individuals living in 7,848 households 748 households
5th wave (2011) 15,607 individuals living in 10,235 households 753 households
6th wave (2012) 14,619 individuals living in 9,513 households 961 households
7th wave (2013) 14,449 individuals living in 9,509 households 949 households
8th wave (2014) 13,460 individuals living in 8,998 households 795 households
9th wave (2015) 13,271 individuals living in 8,921 households 900 households
Notes: The panel household sample in wave 5 was supplemented for both recipients of Unemployment
Benefit II and the general population sample from new postcode regions in wave 4.
Source: Bethmann et al. (2016).
Table 1.A.2: Agreement on linkage of survey data to administrative data
Sample Number of interviews with Number of interviews with in %
question on linkage agreement on linkage
1st wave (2006/07) 17,249 13,766 79.8
2nd wave (2007/08) 3,358 2,560 76.2
3rd wave (2008/09) 2,656 2,128 80.1
4th wave (2010) 2,032 1,774 87.3
5th wave (2011) 5,145 4,414 85.8
6th wave (2012) 2,482 2,002 80.7
7th wave (2013) 1,973 1,613 81.8
8th wave (2014) 1,653 1,327 80,3
9th wave (2015) 1,727 1,471 85.2
Source: Bethmann et al. (2016).
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1.B Construction of the Outcome Variables
1.B.1 Social Integration
PASS question on social integration
Some people may feel like they are integrated into normal social life and that they
are a proper part of society while others may feel excluded. What about in your
case? To what extent do you feel that you are part of society or to what extent do
you feel excluded? Please use the numbers from 1 to 10 to rate your opinion. 1
means that you feel excluded from social life. 10 means, that you feel part of it.
The numbers from 2 to 9 allow you to grade your assessment.
1.B.2 Well-being and Mental Health
1. PASS question on life satisfaction
How satisfied are you currently with your life as a whole? 0 means that you
are "completely dissatisfied", 10 means that you are "completely satisfied". The
numbers 1 to 9 allow you to grade your assessment.
2. PASS question on mental health status
How strongly have you been affected by mental health problems, like fear, dejection
or irritability in the past four weeks? Please tell me, whether you have been affected
"not at all", "a little bit", "moderately", "quite a bit" or "extremely"?
3. Construction of variable "mental health status"
The variable measures the mental health status ranging from 1 "extreme problems"
to 5 "no problems".
1.B.3 Economic Resources
1. PASS question on deprivation
If you think of your household, which of the following items do you have? For the
items you don’t have, is this for financial reasons or for other reasons?
(a) Do you have an apartment with at least as many rooms as persons living
there?
(b) Do you have an apartment without damp walls or floors?
(c) Do you have a separate bathroom with a bathtub or shower in your apartment?
(d) Do you have a toilet inside your apartment?
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(e) Do you have central heating, self-contained central heating or district heating?
(not asked after wave 5)
(f) Do you have a garden, a balcony or a terrace?
(g) Do you have sufficient winter clothing for each member of the household?
(h) Do you have a car?
(i) Do you have a television?
(j) Do you have a video recorder or DVD player?
(k) Do you have a computer with internet access?
(l) Do you have a washing machine?
(m) Do you have an upright freezer, a chest freezer or a refrigerator with a freezer
section? (not asked after wave 5)
And which of the following things do you or does your household do? For
those activities you don’t do, is this for financial reasons or for other reasons?
(n) Buy new clothing once in a while for each family member, even if the old
clothes are not yet worn out?
(o) Have you a hot meal at least once a day?
(p) Go on a holiday away from home for at least one week a year for each
member of the family (this need not be taken jointly)?
(q) Invite friends over for dinner at your home at least once a month?
(r) Eat out at a restaurant with the family at least once a month?
(s) Can each member of the family go to the cinema, the theater or a concert at
least once a month?
(t) Save a fixed amount of money at least once a month?
(u) Replace worn but still usable furniture with new furniture?
(v) Pay for unexpected expenses with one’s own money, e.g. to replace a broken
washing machine?
(w) Receive medical treatment which is not fully covered by your health insur-
ance, such as dentures or glasses if you/one of your family members need
them?
(x) Buy over-the-counter drugs such as pain relievers or medication for a cold, if
you/someone in the family needs them even if your health insurance does not
cover the costs?
(y) Always pay the rent for the apartment and/or the interest on the house or
apartment one lives in on time?
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(z) Always pay the gas, heating and electricity bill on time? (not asked after
wave 5)
2. Construction of deprivation index
The deprivation index used in this study is included in PASS and ranges between 0
and 11.08 (see Bethmann et al. (2016) for a detailed description of the construction
of the variable). This index is based on how many items are missing and how many
activities are not done for financial reasons. Items that are answered with "don’t
know" or "details refused" are not considered. The index is a weighted index
which weights the items according to the share of respondents who considered a
particular item as necessary. This procedure is commonly used for the construction
of poverty measures (applied for instance by Halleröd, 1995).
3. PASS question on satisfaction with standard of living
How satisfied are you today with your overall standard of living? For your assess-
ment you can use the numbers from 0 to 10. 0 means that you are "completely
dissatisfied", 10 means you are "completely satisfied". The numbers 1 to 9 allow
you to grade your assessment.
1.B.4 Social Participation
1. PASS question on number of close friends
How many close friends, or family members with whom you have a close relation-
ship, do you have outside your household?
2. PASS question on social engagement
Are you actively engaged in one of the following organizations or associations?
(Multiple responses possible.)
(a) Union
(b) Political party
(c) Church community
(d) Clubs such as music, sport or culture clubs
(e) Another organization not mentioned here
(f) No, not actively engaged
3. Construction of variable "social engagement"
This variable indicates the engagement in organizations/associations out of the
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five options (a) to (f). This measure ranges from 0 "not actively engaged" to 5
"engaged in all 5 organizations/associations".
1.B.5 Social Status
PASS question on social status
There are groups in our society which tend to be at the top of the social ladder and
other groups that tend to be at the bottom. How would you rank yourself using
the numbers 1 to 10? 1 means that you are at the very bottom, 10 means that you
are positioned at the very top. The numbers from 2 to 9 allow you to grade your
assessment.
1.B.6 Self-Efficacy
1. PASS question on self-efficacy
If unexpected difficulties or problems occur, you can deal with them in a number
of different ways. Here we have compiled a couple of opinions regarding this topic.
Please tell me whether they apply to you "completely", "tend to apply" or "tend
not to apply" or "do not apply at all".
(a) For every problem I have a solution.
(b) Even if surprising events occur, I believe I can handle them well.
(c) I have no difficulties in realizing my goals.
(d) In unexpected situations I always know how to act.
(e) I always succeed in resolving difficult problems if I make an effort.
2. Construction of self-efficacy index
I take the sum of the four possible outcomes of the five items for each individual
and divide by the number of items. If an individual responded only to some of
the items, the index is based on the items that are answered. The resulting index
ranges from 1 "low self-efficacy" to 4 "high self-efficacy".
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1.C Description of Variables
Table 1.C.1: Description of variables based on PASS
Variable Description
Outcomes measured in waves t0 and t1
Social integration Categorical variable measuring perceived social affiliation rang-
ing from 1 (feeling excluded) to 10 (feeling affiliated)
Life satisfaction Categorical variable measuring life satisfaction ranging from 0
(completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied)
Mental health status Categorical variable for assessment of mental health status over
the last 4 weeks ranging from from 1 (extreme problems) to 5 (no
problems)
Economic resources Deprivation index based on 26 items (for construction of variable
see Appendix 1.B Section 1.B.3) &
Categorical variable measuring satisfaction with standard of liv-
ing ranging from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely
satisfied)
Social participation Number of close friends &
Categorical variable measuring social engagement ranging from
0 (not actively engaged) to 5 (engaged in all 5 organiza-
tions/associations) (for construction of variable see Appendix
1.B Section 1.B.4)
Social status Categorical variable measuring assessment of position in society
ranging from 1 (belonging to bottom) to 10 (belonging to the top)
Self-efficacy Index ranging from 1 (low self-efficacy) to 4 (high self-efficacy)
(for construction of variable see Appendix 1.B Section 1.B.6)
Job loss measured in wave t1 Dummy for becoming unemployed between two consecutive
waves t0 and t1
Control variables measured in wave t0
Sociodemographics
Female Dummy for being female
Age Dummies for age groups: 25 - 34 years, 35 - 44 years, 45 - 54
years, > 54 years, reference category is < 25 years
Migrant Dummy for being an immigrant
Married Dummy for being married
Religious community Dummy for belonging to a religious community
Smoker Dummy for having ever smoked on a regular basis (in 2% of
cases the information is missing and is treated as 0)
Serious health restrictions Dummy for having serious health restrictions (includes officially
recognized disabilities)
Hospital visits in last 12 months Dummy for hospital visits in the last 12 months (in 1% of cases
the information is missing and is treated as 0)
Professional qualification Dummies for highest professional qualification level: vocational
training (Teilfacharbeiter, Lehre, abgeschlossene Berufsfach-
schule), advanced vocational training (Meister, Techniker), aca-
demic degree (Universität, Fachhochschule), reference category
is no vocational training
East Germany Dummy for living in East Germany
. . .
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Table 1.C.1: Description of variables based on PASS (continuation)
Variable Description
Subjective indicators
Attitudes to work Index ranging from 1 (low work attitude) to 4 (high work attitude)
(construction similar to the construction of the self-efficacy index)
Health satisfaction Categorical variable measuring satisfaction with health from 0
(completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied)
Household characteristics
Household income Dummies for net household income per month in e: 1000 - 1499,
1500 - 1999, 2000 - 2999, ≥ 3000, reference category is ≤ 999
Couple with children aged < 16
years
Dummy for couple with children younger than 16 years
Number of own children Dummies for number of own children (living in and outside the
household): 1, 2, > 2, reference category is 0
Homeowner Dummy for being a homeowner
Partner characteristics
Partner in PASS Dummy for identification of partner in PASS
Professional qualification of partner Dummies for highest professional education level: vocational
training, advanced vocational training/academic degree, informa-
tion is missing, reference category is no vocational training
Employment status of partner Dummies for being employed and information is missing
Employment status
Permanent contract Dummies for permanent contract and information is missing
Wave Dummies indicating the wave of the interview, ranging from wave
2 to 8, reference category is wave 1
Notes: The variables married, professional qualification and number of own children are supplemented by information from the IEB
if missing. The variables migrant, religious community, professional qualification, attitudes to work are treated as time-constant
and filled with previous or subsequent information if missing. The variables married and number of own children are filled with
previous information if missing. In 1% of cases information on household income is missing and filled with previous or subsequent
information if the composition of the household does not change.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
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Table 1.C.2: Description of variables based on IEB
Variable Description
Control variables measured in wave t0
Previous job characteristics
Employment with ssc Dummy for being employed with social security contributions
(ssc)
Employment full-time Dummy for being employed full-time
Job classifications Dummies for 5 job classifications: 1
Farmer/Production/Craftspeople/Technician, 2 White-collar
employee, 3 Salesperson, 4 Clerical workers, 5 Service workers,
reference category is 1
Tenure Dummies for employment duration: categories are spitted accord-
ing to percentiles of distribution: 25 - 50, 50 - 75, > 75, reference
category is 0 - 25
Daily wage Dummies for daily wage ine (2010 prices): categories are spitted
according to percentiles of distribution: 25 - 50, 50 - 75, > 75,
reference category is 0 - 25
Previous firm characteristics
Firm size Dummies for number of employees: 10 - 49, 50 - 249, 250 - 499,
> 500, reference category is < 10
Sector of firm Dummies for 8 sectors: 1 Agriculture/Production, 2 Consump-
tion/Food, 3 Construction, 4 Trade, 5 Transportation/Services I, 6
Services II, 7 Education/Health, 8 Public, reference category is 1
Employment history
Number of employment periods
with ssc
Number of employment periods with social security contributions
Employment duration with ssc Dummies for employment duration with social security contribu-
tions: categories are spitted according to percentiles of distribu-
tion: 25 - 50, 50 - 75, > 75, reference category is 0 - 25
Number of marginal employment
periods
Number of marginal employment periods
Marginal employment duration Dummies for marginal employment duration: categories are spit-
ted according to percentiles of distribution: 25 - 50, 50 - 75, >
75, reference category is 0 - 25
Number of unemployment periods Number of unemployment periods
Unemployment duration Dummies for unemployment duration: categories are spitted
according to percentiles of distribution: 25 - 50, 50 - 75, > 75,
reference category is 0 - 25
Number of non-employment periods Number of non-employment periods
Non-employment duration Dummies for non-employment duration: categories are spitted
according to percentiles of distribution: 25 - 50, 50 - 75, > 75,
reference category is 0 - 25
District unemployment rate District unemployment rate measured at the date of the interview
Notes: IEB: Integrated Employment Biographies, ssc: social security contributions. Periods of self-employment, civil service, and
military service are not included in the IEB. Non-employment is defined as periods without entry in the social security records if
the period lasts longer than one month. I allow for gaps of one month between periods of employment at the same firm and between
two unemployment spells.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
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1.D Additional Descriptives and Estimation Results
Table 1.D.1: Number of individuals in treatment and control group
How often in Treatment group only Control group only Both groups?
1 time 3** 1,584 0
2 times . 1,165 96
3 times 0 665 72
4 times 0 647 51
5 times 0 342 .
6 times 0 351 .
7 times 0 220 .
8 times 0 332 .
Total 351 5,306 254
Notes: There are less than 20 individuals who only appear twice in the treatment group as well as more
than four times in both the treatment and the control group. Due to data protection rules of the FDZ, these
are indicated as missing values.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
Table 1.D.2: Additional descriptive statistics
Job loss Yes No Difference
Sociodemographics
Religious community 0.50 0.60 -0.10 ***
Smoker 0.71 0.60 0.11 ***
Hospital visits in last 12 months 0.11 0.08 0.02 *
Subjective indicators
Work attitude 3.07 3.12 -0.05
Health satisfaction 6.85 7.30 -0.45 ***
Household characteristics
Household income < 1000 e per month 0.14 0.03 0.10 ***
Household income 1000 - 1499 e per month 0.22 0.11 0.11 ***
Household income 1500 - 1999 e per month 0.19 0.14 0.05 ***
Household income 2000 - 2999 e per month 0.30 0.31 -0.01
Household income > 2999 e per month 0.16 0.41 -0.25 ***
Couple with children aged < 16 years 0.24 0.31 -0.07 ***
Female * Couple with children aged < 16 years 0.10 0.14 -0.04 ***
Partner characteristics
Partner in PASS 0.55 0.71 -0.16 ***
PQ: no vocational training 0.10 0.07 0.03 ***
PQ: vocational training 0.32 0.40 -0.07 ***
PQ: advanced vocational training/academic degree 0.07 0.18 -0.11 ***
. . .
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Table 1.D.2: Additional descriptive statistics (continuation)
Job loss Yes No Difference
PQ: missing 0.51 0.36 0.16 ***
ES: employed 0.31 0.48 -0.17 ***
ES: missing 0.56 0.41 0.15 ***
Previous job characteristics
Employment with ssc 0.94 0.92 0.02 ***
Employment full-time 0.71 0.65 0.06 ***
Job class: Farmer/Production/Craftspeople/Technician 0.32 0.23 0.09 ***
Job class: White-collar employee 0.13 0.20 -0.07 ***
Job class: Salesperson 0.07 0.07 0.00
Job class: Clerical workers 0.16 0.22 -0.06 ***
Job class: Service workers 0.33 0.28 0.05
Previous firm characteristics
Firm size: < 10 employees 0.23 0.15 0.07 ***
Firm size: 10 - 49 employees 0.28 0.26 0.02
Firm size: 50 - 249 employees 0.30 0.29 0.01
Firm size: 250 - 499 employees 0.09 0.10 0.00
Firm size: > 499 employees 0.10 0.20 -0.10 ***
Wave
Wave 1 0.10 0.11 -0.01
Wave 2 0.12 0.11 0.02
Wave 3 0.15 0.10 0.05 **
Wave 4 0.09 0.11 -0.02 **
Wave 5 0.13 0.14 -0.02
Wave 6 0.15 0.14 0.00
Wave 7 0.14 0.14 -0.01
Wave 8 0.12 0.13 -0.01
Number of observations 635 17,047
Notes: PQ: Professional qualification. ssc: social security contributions. Differences are statistically
significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
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Table 1.D.3: Logit estimation of probability of job loss
Variable Coefficient Standard error
Initial outcome levels
Social integration 0.003 (0.027)
Life satisfaction: value 6 or 7 -0.352∗∗∗ (0.133)
Life satisfaction: value 8 -0.425∗∗∗ (0.156)
Life satisfaction: value 9 -0.729∗∗∗ (0.217)
Life satisfaction: value 10 -0.781∗∗∗ (0.272)
Mental health status -0.064 (0.042)
Deprivation index: 0 - 0.5 0.004 (0.122)
Deprivation index: 0.5 - 1 -0.192 (0.144)
Deprivation index: 1 - 1.5 0.025 (0.169)
Deprivation index: 1.5 - 2.5 -0.116 (0.184)
Deprivation index: > 2.5 0.285 (0.213)
Satisfaction with standard of living 0.070∗∗ (0.035)
Number of close friends -0.091∗∗ (0.041)
Social engagement -0.003 (0.070)
Social status 0.051 (0.036)
Self-efficacy: 2.8 - 3.4 0.008 (0.114)
Self-efficacy: > 3.4 0.186 (0.131)
Sociodemographics
Female -0.444∗∗∗ (0.124)
Age group: 25 - 34 years -0.339∗ (0.198)
Age group: 35 - 44 years -0.523∗∗ (0.235)
Age group: 45 - 54 years -0.613∗∗ (0.270)
Age group: > 54 years -0.102 (0.297)
Migrant 0.171 (0.192)
Married -0.277∗ (0.146)
Religious community -0.187∗ (0.103)
Smoker 0.062 (0.101)
Serious health restrictions 0.015 (0.117)
Hospital visits in last 12 months 0.181 (0.154)
PQ: vocational training -0.127 (0.128)
PQ: advanced vocational training -0.487∗∗ (0.237)
PQ: academic degree 0.204 (0.193)
East Germany -0.591∗∗∗ (0.145)
Subjective indicators
Work attitude -0.148∗∗ (0.073)
Health satisfaction -0.057∗∗ (0.027)
Household characteristics
Household income 1000 - 1499 e per month -0.542∗∗∗ (0.167)
Household income 1500 - 1999 e per month -0.501∗∗∗ (0.177)
Household income 2000 - 2999 e per month -0.689∗∗∗ (0.179)
Household income > 2999 e per month -0.775∗∗∗ (0.216)
. . .
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Table 1.D.3: Logit estimation of probability of job loss (continuation)
Variable Coefficient Standard error
Couple with children aged < 16 years -0.390∗∗ (0.176)
Female * Couple with children aged < 16 years 0.512∗∗ (0.222)
Number of own children: 1 0.093 (0.141)
Number of own children: 2 0.210 (0.155)
Number of own children: > 2 0.273 (0.179)
Home owner -0.158 (0.122)
Partner characteristics
Partner in PASS 0.190 (0.218)
PQ: vocational training 0.113 (0.170)
PQ: advanced vocational training/academic degree -0.337 (0.233)
PQ: missing -0.013 (0.303)
ES: employed -0.234 (0.158)
ES: missing -0.217 (0.248)
Previous job characteristics
Employment with ssc 0.822∗∗∗ (0.244)
Employment full-time 0.352∗∗∗ (0.121)
Permanent contract -0.696∗∗∗ (0.106)
Permanent contract missing 0.788∗∗∗ (0.251)
Job class: White-collar employee -0.063 (0.179)
Job class: Salesperson -0.123 (0.227)
Job class: Clerical workers -0.110 (0.151)
Job class: Service workers -0.107 (0.130)
Tenure: 25 - 50 %ile -0.768∗∗∗ (0.107)
Tenure: 50 - 75 %ile -1.417∗∗∗ (0.178)
Tenure: > 75 %ile -1.249∗∗∗ (0.246)
Daily wage: 25 - 50 %ile -0.335∗∗∗ (0.121)
Daily wage: 50 - 75 %ile -0.827∗∗∗ (0.159)
Daily wage: > 75 %ile -1.178∗∗∗ (0.254)
Previous firm characteristics
Firm size: 10 - 49 employees -0.301∗∗ (0.131)
Firm size: 50 - 249 employees -0.325∗∗ (0.134)
Firm size: 250 - 499 employees -0.166 (0.181)
Firm size: > 499 employees -0.313∗ (0.180)
Sector: Consumption/Food 0.056 (0.230)
Sector: Construction 0.612∗∗∗ (0.216)
Sector: Trade 0.067 (0.215)
Sector: Transportation/Services I 0.295∗ (0.170)
Sector: Services II 0.426∗∗ (0.194)
Sector: Education/Health -0.145 (0.205)
Sector: Public -0.179 (0.219)
Employment history
Number of employment periods with ssc 0.041∗∗∗ (0.014)
Employment duration with ssc: 25 - 50 %ile -0.270∗∗ (0.133)
. . .
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Table 1.D.3: Logit estimation of probability of job loss (continuation)
Variable Coefficient Standard error
Employment duration with ssc: 50 - 75 %ile -0.425∗∗ (0.178)
Employment duration with ssc: > 75 %ile -0.754∗∗∗ (0.228)
Numer of marginal employment periods 0.057∗∗ (0.029)
Marginal employment duration: 25 - 50 %ile -0.162 (0.124)
Marginal employment duration: 50 - 75 %ile -0.684∗∗∗ (0.168)
Marginal employment duration: > 75 %ile -0.999∗∗∗ (0.227)
Number of unemployment periods 0.031 (0.024)
Unemployment duration: 0 - 25 %ile -0.159 (0.261)
Unemployment duration: 25 - 50 %ile 0.497∗∗ (0.229)
Unemployment duration: 50 - 75 %ile 0.724∗∗∗ (0.235)
Unemployment duration: > 75 %ile 0.920∗∗∗ (0.255)
Number of non-employment periods 0.032 (0.023)
Non-employment duration -0.001 (0.001)
District unemployment rate 0.030∗ (0.016)
Wave
Wave 2 0.202 (0.199)
Wave 3 0.322 (0.197)
Wave 4 -0.326 (0.217)
Wave 5 -0.302 (0.214)
Wave 6 -0.154 (0.214)
Wave 7 -0.227 (0.214)
Wave 8 -0.406∗ (0.218)
Constant -0.759 (0.634)
Number of observations 17,682
Pseudo-R2 0.256
Notes: PQ: Professional qualification. ES: Employment status. ssc: social security contributions.
Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
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Table 1.D.4: Covariate balance summary after IPW
Standardized Variance ratio
differences
Initial outcome levels
Social integration -0.009 0.944
Life satisfaction 0.023 0.920
Mental health status 0.021 0.955
Deprivation index 0.011 1.010
Satisfaction with standard of living 0.036 0.909
Number of close friends -0.020 0.997
Social engagement -0.004 1.021
Social status -0.022 1.102
Self-efficacy 0.024 1.051
Sociodemographics
Female 0.011 1.004
Age 0.014 1.002
Migrant -0.023 0.929
Married 0.007 1.003
Religious community -0.009 1.000
Smoker 0.001 0.999
Serious health restrictions -0.008 0.991
Hospital visits in last 12 months -0.024 0.942
PQ: no vocational training 0.015 1.027
PQ: vocational training -0.012 1.008
PQ: advanced vocational training -0.004 0.982
PQ: academic degree 0.004 1.008
East Germany 0.014 1.012
Subjective indicators
Work attitude -0.025 1.009
Health satisfaction 0.004 1.033
Big Five
Extraversion 0.025 0.962
Extraversion missing 0.045 1.054
Tolerance -0.010 1.066
Tolerance missing 0.039 1.047
Conscientiousness -0.062 1.017
Conscientiousness missing 0.053 1.064
Neuroticism -0.082 0.942
Neuroticism missing 0.040 1.048
Openness 0.003 1.062
Openness missing 0.045 1.053
Household characteristics
Household income < 1000 e per month -0.010 0.980
Household income 1000 - 1499 e per month -0.006 0.992
. . .
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Table 1.D.4: Covariate balance summary after IPW (continuation)
Standardized Variance ratio
differences
Household income 1500 - 1999 e per month -0.010 0.984
Household income 2000 - 2999 e per month 0.021 1.020
Household income > 2999 e per month 0.001 1.001
Couple with children aged < 16 years 0.000 1.000
Female * Couple with children aged < 16 years -0.003 0.991
Number of own children -0.003 0.939
Home owner 0.005 1.007
Partner characteristics
Partner in PASS 0.012 0.998
PQ: no vocational training 0.014 1.041
PQ: vocational training 0.013 1.010
PQ: advanced vocational training/academic degree 0.000 1.001
PQ: missing -0.021 1.002
ES: employed 0.020 1.017
ES: missing -0.022 1.006
Previous job characteristics
Employment with ssc 0.009 0.968
Employment full-time -0.017 1.015
Permanent contract 0.007 0.998
Permanent contract missing -0.003 0.989
Job class: Farmer/Production/Craftspeople/Technician 0.025 1.021
Job class: White-collar employee -0.010 0.979
Job class: Salesperson -0.018 0.945
Job class: Clerical workers 0.005 1.009
Job class: Service workers -0.011 0.992
Tenure -0.026 1.030
Daily wage -0.068 0.985
Previous firm characteristics
Firm size: < 10 employees -0.042 0.949
Firm size: 10 - 49 employees 0.004 1.004
Firm size: 50 - 249 employees 0.016 1.015
Firm size: 250 - 499 employees 0.009 1.025
Firm size: > 499 employees 0.021 1.060
Sector: Agriculture/Production 0.000 1.001
Sector: Consumption/Food 0.000 1.001
Sector: Construction -0.020 0.946
Sector: Trade 0.000 1.000
Sector: Transportation/Services I 0.013 1.012
Sector: Services II -0.019 0.964
Sector: Education/Health 0.011 1.025
Sector: Public 0.011 1.036
Employment history
. . .
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Table 1.D.4: Covariate balance summary after IPW (continuation)
Standardized Variance ratio
differences
Number of employment periods with ssc 0.006 1.019
Employment duration with scc -0.042 1.064
Number of marginal employment periods 0.014 0.998
Marginal employment duration 0.002 1.041
Number of unemployment periods -0.004 1.106
Unemployment duration 0.056 1.049
Number of non-employment periods 0.013 1.041
Non-employment duration 0.017 1.018
District unemployment rate 0.005 0.993
Wave
Wave 1 -0.020 0.948
Wave 2 0.007 1.016
Wave 3 0.005 1.010
Wave 4 0.005 1.015
Wave 5 0.014 1.032
Wave 6 -0.002 0.996
Wave 7 -0.010 0.978
Wave 8 0.001 1.001
Notes: IPW: Inverse Probability Weighting. PQ: Professional qualification. ES: Employment status.
ssc: social security contributions.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
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Table 1.D.5: Results for the consequences of job loss
based on different sets of covariates
Baseline With Big Five Factor analysis
Change in outcomes Effect of job loss
Social integration -0.333∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.056)
Well-being and mental health
Life satisfaction -0.549∗∗∗ -0.564∗∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.062) (0.056)
Mental health status -0.309∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.049)
Economic resources
Deprivation index 0.608∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
Satisfaction with -0.529∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗
standard of living (0.057) (0.058) (0.059)
Psychosocial needs
Social participation
Number of close friends -0.049 -0.064 -0.041
(0.043) (0.042) (0.044)
Social engagement -0.048 -0.053 -0.084∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Social status -0.244∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.053)
Self-efficacy -0.202∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.063) (0.059)
Notes: Estimates from IPW-DID based on 635 treated and 17,047 control persons (the estimates for
self-efficacy are based on 417 treated and 10,359 control persons). The propensity of job loss is based
on a logit model with the control variables reported in Tables 1.C.1 and 1.C.2 in Appendix 1.C. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. They are calculated by taking into account that propensity scores are
estimated. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
Table 1.D.6: Summary statistics of propensity scores
Quantiles
N Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Treated 635 0.1743 0.1652 0.0005 0.0502 0.1200 0.2495 0.9180
Control 17,047 0.0308 0.0584 0.0002 0.0032 0.0089 0.0301 0.8405
Notes: SD: Standard deviation.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
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Notes: Changes in the outcome variables are measured as differences in levels in two consecutive waves t0
and t1.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
Figure 1.D.1: Distribution of changes in outcome variables
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Table 1.D.7: Heterogeneous effects by previous job characteristics
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm size: < 50 Firm size: ≥ 50 Job class: Job class: Full-time Part-time
employees employees Farmer/Production White-collar
Change in outcomes Effect of job loss
Social integration -0.368∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.394∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.076) (0.099) (0.067) (0.067) (0.087)
Well-being and mental health
Life satisfaction -0.528∗∗∗ -0.598∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗ -0.520∗∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.078) (0.100) (0.076) (0.069) (0.103)
Mental health status -0.408∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.067) (0.087) (0.056) (0.057) (0.080)
Economic resources
Deprivation index 0.465∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.110) (0.125) (0.090) (0.083) (0.130)
Satisfaction with -0.471∗∗∗ -0.612∗∗∗ -0.371∗∗∗ -0.604∗∗∗ -0.551∗∗∗ -0.485∗∗∗
standard of living (0.075) (0.083) (0.102) (0.069) (0.068) (0.092)
Psychosocial needs
Social participation
Number of close friends -0.028 -0.089 0.009 -0.096∗ -0.039 -0.082
(0.074) (0.067) (0.088) (0.052) (0.050) (0.077)
Social engagement -0.020 -0.052 -0.207∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.051 -0.043
(0.054) (0.050) (0.072) (0.045) (0.045) (0.066)
Social status -0.332∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗ -0.200∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗
(0.071) (0.073) (0.085) (0.058) (0.058) (0.085)
Self-efficacy -0.376∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.202 -0.211∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗ -0.256∗∗
(0.084) (0.087) (0.153) (0.075) (0.076) (0.107)
Notes: Estimates from IPW-DID are based on 324 treated and 7,052 control persons in specification (1), on 311 and 9,995 in (2),
on 201 and 3,891 in (3), on 434 and 13,156 in (4), on 448 and 10,996 in (5) and on 187 and 6,051 in (6). The propensity of job
loss is based on a logit model with the control variables reported in Tables 1.C.1 and 1.C.2 in Appendix 1.C. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. They are calculated by taking into account that propensity scores are estimated. Coefficients are statistically
significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level. Differences in the effects of job loss between subgroups that are significantly
different from zero at the 10% level are indicated by bold numbers. Standard errors of the differences are obtained by bootstrapping
(2,500 replications).
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
49 of 235
CHAPTER 1. Unemployment and Social Exclusion
Table 1.D.8: Placebo results for the consequences of job loss
Change in outcomes Effect of Standard Standard
between t−1 and t0 job loss error deviation
Social integration -0.055 (0.063) 1.526
Well-being and mental health
Life satisfaction -0.064 (0.063) 1.277
Mental health status 0.020 (0.051) 1.136
Economic resources
Deprivation index -0.122 (0.089) 0.459
Satisfaction with standard of living 0.026 (0.064) 1.383
Psychosocial needs
Social participation
Number of close friends -0.038 (0.051) 1.054
Social engagement 0.030 (0.040) 0.641
Social status -0.004 (0.067) 1.293
Self-efficacy -0.018 (0.084) 0.362
Notes: Estimates from IPW-DID are based on 448 treated and 13,075 control persons (the estimates for
self-efficacy are based on 207 treated and 5,319 control persons). The propensity of job loss is based on a
logit model with the control variables reported in Tables 1.C.1 and 1.C.2 in Appendix 1.C. The differences
in the outcome variables are standardized. Standard errors are robust and calculated by taking into account
that propensity scores are estimated. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗
1% level.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
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Notes: Means of the outcome variables are measured in levels in the consecutive waves t−3, t−2, t−1, t0
and t1 separately for treated and control individuals before and after inverse propensity score weighting
(IPW). The difference in outcome levels between treatment and control group before IPW is significant at
the 1%-level for each outcome variable in the time periods before job loss. The difference in outcome
levels between treatment and control group after IPW is insignificant for each outcome variable in the time
periods before job loss, except for mental health status in t−2 and deprivation index in t−1 (significant at
10%-level) and number of close friends in t−2 (significant at 5%-level).
Number of observations: t−3: 190 treated and 7,027 control persons, t−2: 303 treated and 9,690 control
persons, t−1: 448 treated and 13,075 control persons, t0 and t1: 635 treated and 17,047 control persons.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
Figure 1.D.2: Placebo tests on outcome levels
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Participation in Job
Creation Schemes in Turbulent Times∗
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the impact of participation in job creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaf-
fungsmaßnahmen, JCSs) on job search outcomes in the context of the turbulent East
German labor market in the aftermath of the German reunification. The East German
economy plunged into a deep recession immediately after the German reunification in
1990. The transition from a centrally planned to a market-based economic system led to
plant closures and mass layoffs, leading to a sharp increase in the unemployment rate
from virtually zero in 1990 to about 10% in 1991. Active labor market policies (ALMPs)
were implemented on a large scale to fight the unemployment crisis. Hereby, JCSs that
offer temporary work opportunities for the unemployed in the public and nonprofit sector
played a prominent role. These schemes reached an all-time high in 1992 when on
average 388,000 individuals were employed in JCSs and expenditures of the German
Federal Government and the German Federal Employment Agency amounted to 10.4
billion DM (7.8 billione in 2015 prices) in East Germany (Spitznagel, 1992). This sum
is equivalent to 4.4% of the East German GDP.1
∗This chapter is joint work with Annette Bergemann (University of Bristol, IFAU, IZA) and Arne
Uhlendorff (CREST, CNRS, Unversité Paris-Saclay, IAB, IZA, DIW). A similar version of this chapter is
published in Labour Economics 47, 2017, pp. 182-201 which corresponds to the latest discussion paper
version (IFAU Working Paper 2017:7, for earlier versions see IZA Discussion Paper No. 10369 and ZEW
Discussion Paper No. 17-021). This chapter is based on, but substantially exceeds, my master thesis
(Pohlan, 2013) and my dissertation proposal (Pohlan, 2015) submitted at the University of Mannheim in
2013 and 2015, respectively. This chapter has benefited from comments and suggestions by Gerard van
den Berg, Bernd Fitzenberger, Stephen Kastoryano and Konrad Stahl.
1Federal Employment Agency (1993) and Federal Statistical Office (1993).
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The main official objective of providing these JCSs was to improve the employment
prospects of the participants. There are at least two potential channels how JCSs might
accomplish this. To fix ideas, we are arguing in the framework of a labor market with
search frictions (for a more formal analysis see the Supplemental Material of Crépon
and van den Berg, 2016). By providing work experience JCSs can increase participants’
attachment to the labor market. This stronger bond might motivate the participants to
intensify their search effort for a regular job. At the same time JCSs can provide the
participants with the ability to signal their positive work attitude. Both, increased search
effort and the signaling ability have a positive impact on the job offer arrival rate and
the ability to stay on a regular job. The second channel consists of the potential ability
of JCSs to shift the wage offer distribution for the participants. Naturally, job seekers
become more attractive for employers if their human capital is raised and JCSs offer a
number of possibilities to achieve this. Participants acquire cognitive skills by learning–
on–the–job, work experience and short training courses, which are sometimes offered
in the context of JCSs. Being placed in a work context by way of JCS participation can
also foster soft skills.
As Crépon and van den Berg (2016) show both, an increased job offer arrival rate and
a shift in the wage offer distribution due to participation in ALMP programs, increases
the exit rate from unemployment compared to the situation before participation.
The effectiveness of participation in ALMPs might depend on the state of the econ-
omy. In periods with low job destruction rates and relatively high job offer arrival rates
the opportunity costs of participating in an ALMP might be relatively high, i.e., searching
for a job could be more beneficial because the probability of finding a regular job is high.
In contrast to that, in periods with low job offer arrival rates positive effects of ALMPs
will carry more weight, as a continued job search is less rewarding. The role of the state
of the economy is probably more relevant for longer programs like JCSs and training.
They offer the possibility to keep in contact to the labor market as it needs time until the
economy is back to a higher level of employment. For evidence of more positive effects
of training programs in periods of high unemployment rates see for example Lechner and
Wunsch (2009a) and Heinrich and Mueser (2014). In line with this, Forslund et al. (2011)
argue that programs with strong locking-in effects should be rather used in an economic
downturn, because the cost of forgoing search time is lower than in an economic upturn.
These considerations are particularly relevant if the economy is not only characterized
by high job destruction rates but also undergoes a major structural change. Structural
change often involves depreciation of human capital. For the unemployed who are not
able to use, for example, learning-on-the-job to stop the depreciation, JCSs might be a
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particularly helpful instrument. Consequently, JCSs have quite some leverage to improve
the situation of the participants. This leverage might depend on the level of the human
capital. Dynamic complementarities in human capital on which the recent literature
focuses (see for example Almlund et al., 2011) mean in this context that high skilled
individuals might be particularly affected by depreciation and in turn might be able to
benefit most from participation in JCSs.
There exist a number of empirical studies evaluating the employment effects of JCSs
for stable, rather matured market economies.2 The general notion is that JCSs do not
have positive effects. However, there are some signs for effect heterogeneity. Some
papers conclude that long-term unemployed gain from participation in JCSs, whereas
others not (see for example Caliendo et al., 2008a vs. Hujer and Thomsen, 2010). Quite
stable results exist with respect to positive effects for hard-to-place3 women in West
Germany (Caliendo et al., 2008b and Hohmeyer and Wolff, 2012). Note that only a small
number of these studies investigate whether there is effect heterogeneity with respect to
educational level. Those who do distinguish by education level do not find significant
differences between different educational levels (see for example Caliendo et al., 2008b).
The state of evidence is different for economies that underwent a major shock, as it
was the case during the transformation process. There exist only few studies that evaluate
the employment effects of JCSs and those come to rather diverse results. Concerning the
impact of JCSs in East Germany for the period after the reunification, Hübler (1997) and
Kraus et al. (2000) conclude that JCSs have a rather negative impact on the employment
probability of the participants, while Eichler and Lechner (2002) find a substantial decline
in the unemployment probability due to participation in JCSs in the period after program
end.
The evidence is similarly scarce when considering other transformation countries.
One exception is Lubyova and van Ours (1999), who evaluate JCSs for the time from
1991 to 1996 in Slovakia. They find positive effects on the job finding probability for
JCSs in the public sector, while JCSs in the private sector that typically had a longer
duration seem to reduce the exit rate to regular work. In a related paper, van Ours (2004)
finds evidence that part of the difference in the effects are driven by locking-in effects
of JCSs, and that those are stronger for men than for women. Kluve et al. (1999) study
2See for example Cockx and Ridder (2001) for Belgium, Bonnal et al. (1997) for France, Lalive et al.
(2008) for Switzerland and for Germany Hohmeyer and Wolff (2012) and Lechner and Wunsch (2009b) as
well as the series of papers using an administrative sample of unemployed in 2000 (see Hujer et al., 2004;
Caliendo et al., 2006; Hujer and Zeiss, 2007; Caliendo et al., 2008a; Caliendo et al., 2008b and Hujer and
Thomsen, 2010). For overview studies see for example Bergemann and van den Berg (2008) and Card
et al. (2010).
3Measured for example by a high number of unsuccessful placement propositions or dependency on
welfare benefits.
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the effects of different ALMPs in the period from 1992 to 1996 in Poland and they find
evidence for reduced employment rates mainly among male participants in JCSs.4 None
of these studies investigates whether the effects differ by level of human capital.
A remarkable result of many studies on JCSs, independent of whether JCSs are taking
place in stable or turbulent economies, is that women benefit more than men. This seems
to be particularly the case in countries with a high female labor force participation. In
their overview article, Bergemann and van den Berg (2008) argue that participation in
JCSs might help to overcome statistical discrimination.
As mentioned, our study, in line with the focus of the existing literature, concentrates
on the main official objective of JCSs namely to evaluate whether participation increases
the employment prospects of its participants. It should however be pointed out that
with the provision of JCSs additional objectives were pursued. Firstly, JCSs should
also provide immediate employment opportunities and income for the unemployed
individuals during this period of massive job destruction and a persistent deficit of
productive employment opportunities. In this way it was used as a tool for raising the
overall number of jobs in the economy. A further claim of at least part of the JCSs in East
Germany was to invest in the East German infrastructure. Therewith, the program might
have stabilized the income of a large number of individuals and their families during the
transformation process, while participants carried out work which is potentially valuable
for the society. An exhaustive evaluation of this kind of programs should take these
aspects into account.
Our analysis is based on the Labor Market Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt (LMM–SA),
which is a survey on the working age population of the East German state of Sachsen–
Anhalt. We use the last three waves (1997, 1998, 1999) of the survey, which include
retrospective monthly calendars on the complete labor market history, including participa-
tion in ALMP programs since the reunification. This calendar offers unique possibilities
for the empirical analysis of program participation in the years after the German reunifi-
cation. Our observation period starts in 1990, shortly before the reunification, and ends
in 1999.
The program was in place in all regions in the state of Sachsen–Anhalt, and the data
does not contain instrumental variables which could be used to identify causal effects.
We therefore estimate discrete time duration models following the timing-of-events
approach (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003). This approach allows to control for dynamic
4Based on Polish data Puhani (2002) presents similar findings applying matching estimators. His
findings based on duration models indicate significantly negative effects for men and women. However,
the estimated specifications are very restrictive. For example, he does not control for selection into the
treatment and the models assume a homogenous treatment effect over time spent in unemployment.
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selection into the treatment based on both observed and unobserved characteristics. We
estimate the impact of JCSs on the probability of finding a job and on the probability of
retaining employment. This approach has two major advantages in particular in view of
evaluating a program in an unstable economy. Firstly, the way we allow for unobserved
heterogeneity does not require controlling for past employment outcomes or using past
employment outcomes in order to estimate differences-in-differences (as e.g. Caliendo
et al., 2008a or Eichler and Lechner, 2002). Besides a lack of availability of detailed
data on employment histories before 1990, this type of data might contain relatively
little information for the prediction of future outcomes in our observation period. The
unemployment rate in the socialistic German Democratic Republic (GDR) was close
to zero and a large share of the human capital lost its value during the transformation
process. Therefore, our application using the timing-of-events approach delivers new
insights into the effectiveness of JCSs.
The second major advantage of our approach is the focus on transition rates. This
takes automatically into account that the program does not take place in a stationary
environment. Bergemann et al. (2009) show for the case of training in East Germany that
using transition rates as success indicator is more appropriate in such a nonstationary
environment as compared to the use of unconditional employment rates as it is often
done in the literature. Furthermore, estimating the effects on transition rates is more
informative because they deliver detailed information about the functioning of JCSs;
notably, whether the program helps participants to find a regular job and whether the
program helps to stay in a regular job. This is particularly interesting for the German case,
as the regulatory framework sets down that JCSs should help to improve the employment
situation notably in these two dimensions.
The studies closest to ours are van Ours (2004) and Eichler and Lechner (2002).
Eichler and Lechner (2002) evaluate the effectiveness of JCSs in Sachsen-Anhalt for the
time period 1992 to 1996 based, as the present analysis, on data of the LMM-SA. The
authors do not exploit the monthly retrospective calendar but the panel structure of the
data using the waves from 1992 to 1997. In this way they can only identify labor market
states at the time of the interviews. Eichler and Lechner (2002) apply a conditional
difference–in–differences approach with the unemployment probability as the outcome
variable of interest. The estimator is aligned on the labor market state observed directly
before the participation. This can affect their estimates if the employment situation is
characterized by a temporary (random) deterioration (a phenomenon that is also captured
under the heading Ashenfelter’s Dip following Ashenfelter, 1978); this randomness in the
employment situation is automatically captured in our transition rate model. Moreover,
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our timing-of-events approach is able to take into account that individuals might enter the
programs at a later point in time. An additional innovation constitutes our focus on effect
heterogeneity beyond gender, which is able to deliver new insides on the functioning of
JCSs.
The evaluation of van Ours (2004) also builds upon the timing-of-events approach,
but he solely focuses on the transition rate to work. Moreover, he investigates effect
heterogeneity only with respect to gender. We investigate effect heterogeneity with
respect to selected further characteristics like education, and estimate models allowing for
effect heterogeneity with respect to unobserved characteristics following Richardson and
van den Berg (2013). Additionally, we estimate specifications controlling for endogenous
participation in training programs and investigate the effects of multiple treatments.
Our results suggest strong negative locking-in effects during program participation.
These effects are in line with the intention to provide job opportunities for the unem-
ployed, and might at least partly reflect a rearrangement of the job queue. In a model
with homogeneous treatment effects, the negative treatment effect vanishes one year after
the program start. Furthermore, we show that women and highly skilled participants
leave unemployment quicker than other groups, which results in highly skilled women
benefiting from participation. Additional results suggest that JCSs do not influence
employment stability.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the East German
labor market situation and the institutional settings of JCSs. Section 2.3 presents the data
and descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 specifies the empirical model and discusses the
underlying assumptions. Section 2.5 presents the results of the empirical analysis and
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
2.2.1 Economic Development in East Germany
On the eve of the German reunification in 1990, the economic situation in East Germany
was quite desolate. The centrally planned economy of the GDR was characterized by
inefficient production processes, obsolete technologies and over-staffing. Following
a policy of full employment, the GDR had a labor force of about 10 million in 1989
and unemployment was almost nonexistent. In contrast, the modern market-oriented
economy of the Federal Republic of Germany had a labor force of about 28 million and a
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rate of registered unemployment of 7.9% in 1989 (Federal Employment Agency, 1990).5
In this new environment existing East German firms faced enormous difficulties to
compete. They could rarely cover their variable costs at the prevailing market prizes. In
addition, their former home market broke away as East Germans diverted their spending
towards West German products. Production in 1991 only reached two-thirds of its 1989
level. Four years of high growth rates followed in East Germany. However, since 1996
the economy was basically stagnating again.
The government reacted with setting up large labor market programs in order to
cushion the effects of economic restructuring. Shortly after the reunification the main
emphasis was put on instruments that were easy to implement. Short-time work and
early retirement schemes were predominant. However, already in 1991, a substantial
part of the East German labor force participated in active labor market programs to keep
the official unemployment rate - which does not include program participants - from
skyrocketing. By correcting the number of unemployed by the number of participants
in ALMP programs, adjusted unemployment rates (also called underemployment rates)
in East Germany amounted to 25.3% in 1991, peaked at 35.3% in 1992 and decreased
to a value of 23.7% in 1999 (see Table 2.1). In 1991, 209,000 individuals participated
in JCSs and 280,000 in training programs. Participation in ALMP measures peaked
in 1992 with over 800,000 individuals participating on average in full-time programs.
From 1993 onwards, the number of participants began to shrink due to policy changes
and financial restrictions. However, training and JCSs remain important components of
policy interventions in East Germany until the early 2000s.
Despite the heavy use of ALMPs, unemployment increased drastically. During the
period 1990-1992, regular employment was reduced from a yearly average of over 9
million jobs down to just under 6 million jobs and the unemployment rate rose from
virtually zero in 1990 to more than 10% in 1991. From 1991 onwards, it exceeded the
average unemployment rate for Germany as a whole (see Figure 2.1).
Our analysis is based on data gathered in the new federal state of Sachen-Anhalt. In
1999, 2.7 million individuals lived in Sachsen-Anhalt which corresponds to 3% of the
population in Germany and to 22% of the population of the new federal states without
Berlin (Federal Statistical Office, 2015). Figure 2.1 shows that the unemployment rate
in Sachsen-Anhalt exceeded the average of East Germany over the whole observation
period. These figures were mainly driven by the high concentration of sectors like
agriculture, electrical industry, trade, mining and chemical industry. After reunification,
many companies in these fields had to close down due to the loss of trading partners in
5For more detailed information on the economic development of East Germany see von Hagen et al.
(2002), Burda and Hunt (2001) and Wunsch (2005).
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the East and inefficient production processes.
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Figure 2.1: Unemployment rate in Germany 1991–1999
A factor that should not be neglected when discussing the economic situation in
East Germany is the emigration that set in after the fall of the wall. In 1989 and 1990
almost 400,000 individuals, which is about 2% of the East German population, migrated
from East to West Germany each year (Kröhnert and Skipper, 2010). The threat of mass
emigration was a popular argument for a quick catch-up of East German wages and for
an implementation of large ALMP programs among both politicians and union leaders.
Indeed, the migration situation changed after 1990. Emigration reduced substantially and
was increasingly matched by immigrating West Germans. In 1997, East-West migration
reached a minimum with 13,000 individuals. Since then, emigration from the new federal
states has increased again.
2.2.2 Background and Aims of JCSs
When the West German Employment Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, AFG)
was transferred to East Germany a number of additional regulations were introduced to
take into account the special situation of the East German economy. Those exceptions
meant, among others, less restrictive rules for participation in ALMP programs shortly
after reunification. In the following section, we describe the eligibility rules and some
important implementation details of the two different job creation programs which were
realized in East Germany. We focus on the institutional regulations in force during the
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time before the Employment Promotion Act was replaced by the new Social Law Book
III in 1998. This time period covers the main part of our observation period.6
In this study, the phrase job creation scheme includes two different types of programs
which were realized in East Germany after the reunification: traditional JCSs (Allgemeine
Maßnahmen zur Arbeitsbeschaffung, see §§91-96 AFG) and Productive Wage Subsidies
East (Produktive Lohnkostenzuschüsse Ost, see §249h AFG).7 The latter were introduced
in January 1993 and offered temporary employment opportunities in activity areas like
social services or environmental redevelopment. Both job creation programs intended to
create additional temporary jobs primarily in the public or nonprofit sector for the time
of the subsidy and were similarly handled by the labor offices. They differed, however,
with respect to the level of the subsidy, the program duration and the activity areas.
The government pursued several objectives by implementing JCSs in East Germany
in the period after reunification. First, in the course of the transformation process, JCSs
should simply provide jobs and income for unemployed individuals and those who
were at risk of becoming unemployed. In this way the threat of social hardship could
be reduced and the official unemployment rate could be lowered. Second, they were
used as means to invest in the East German industrial infrastructure. Especially in the
time of 1993–1996, this aim was emphasized by the large scale provision of ordinary
productive wage subsidies with their restricted activity areas. The third objective, which
constituted the main official aim (Wolfinger and Brinkmann, 1996), was in accordance
with the traditional role of ALMP measures: the employment subsidies should help the
participants to find regular jobs. Indeed, over time the focus nearly completely shifted
towards this goal. In addition, the AFG emphasized that especially those JCSs should be
supported which help creating stable employment relationships. This chapter evaluates
whether JCSs help to find and retain regular employment. Hereby, traditional JCSs and
ordinary subsidies will be jointly evaluated. Unfortunately, data limitations make it
impossible to distinguish between these two different program types (see Section 2.3.1).
2.2.3 Institutional Provisions of JCSs
The implementation of the two types of JCSs involved the following steps. A project
organizing institution, which could be a firm, a public authority or a charity, had to create
at least one job within a project. This project needed to be beneficial for the community
6Further information and data on JCSs in East Germany in the early 1990s can be found for example
in Brinkmann and Völkel (1992) and Spitznagel (1992). Only few additional changes concerning JCSs
took place with the introduction of SGB III, see for example Wunsch (2005).
7In 1998 these subsidies were renamed to Structural Adjustment Measures (Strukturanpassungsmaß-
nahmen).
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and had to be additional in the sense that it would not be carried out without the subsidy.
Formally, after approval of a project, the local labor office should choose the participants.
Surveys in labor offices showed that the time elapsing between the application of a
project organizing institution and the actual program start was on average three months
(Völkel, 1994). In East Germany so-called “Societies for Employment Promotion and
Structural Development” (ABS-Gesellschaften) often acted as large scale organizers of
JCSs. In the early 90s these societies had a significant influence on the selection of
participants. They had a preference for young educated men (Brinkmann and Völkel,
1992).
Participation in a JCS was often financially attractive for unemployed individuals. The
wage paid during program participation had to be equal to the wage set by collective wage
agreements between the unions and employers organizations for similar but unsubsidized
work (Tariflohn). The subsidy given to the employer covered part of (or fully) the wage
costs. Participants received a fixed-term work contract, which induced regular social
security contributions. As a consequence the participant renewed or prolonged his or her
eligibility period for unemployment benefits. During participation the local labor office
and the participant should continue their search for a regular job. The program ended
in case a regular job or a suitable training program was found. More recently, JCSs can
be used to test the willingness to work of unemployed jobseekers in Germany, see for
example Hohmeyer and Wolff (2012), who study the impact of JCSs on German welfare
recipients based on a sample from 2005. In our context, with high job destruction rates
and low job offer arrival rates, the test of willingness to work was, however, neither an
explicit nor implicit goal of JCSs (see for example Spitznagel (1992)). Moreover, the
increased income compared to unemployment benefit payments made participation in
JCSs for most of the unemployed job seekers attractive.
The length of traditional JCSs was typically 12 months. In some cases extensions of
up to 24 months or even of up to 36 months were possible if a permanent job was offered
subsequently by the organizer of JCSs. Productive Wage Subsidies East could be granted
even longer. It can be granted up to 48 months for employees that are older than 50,
handicapped people or in case a permanent job was offered by the program-supporting
employer. The subsidy is not transferable to other employers. It is exclusively paid to the
employer who set up the JCS.
The implementation details depended on the type of the subsidy program and the
point in time it took place. Formally, participation in traditional JCSs required that the
person was unemployed and entitled to some kind of unemployment payment just prior to
participation. In addition, a person needed to have been unemployed for at least 6 months
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within the last 12 months. The eligibility criteria for Productive Wage Subsidies East
were less strict. Besides being eligible for some kind of allowance, a participant needed
to have been unemployed for 3 months, or needed to have had finished a traditional JCS,
or enter from short-time work.
The local labor offices could depart from the above mentioned participation criteria.
In particular, the rules with respect to the previous unemployment duration have not
been applied strictly in East Germany. This is especially true for the period directly
after the unification. Also shortly after the unification, it was common practice after
plant’s closure to collectively put the work force of the plant into a so-called Mega-JCS.
This program involved, for example, closing down the obsolete plant or cleaning-up
the environmental damage produced by the plant. We do not consider participation in
Mega-JCSs in our main specification as these programs are not primarily aiming at the
integration into regular employment.
This practice and the influence of the large scale ABS-Societies on the selection of
participants were the main reasons for the deviations from the target group of traditional
JCSs. Unemployed older than 50 or younger than 25 and without professional education,
long-term unemployed and, as a special regulation for East Germany, also women
belonged to the target group. It should be mentioned that for older participants an
additional small scale job creation program existed. Albeit being similar to traditional
JCSs this program solely intended to bridge the time until retirement (Maßnahmen zur
Arbeitsbeschaffung für ältere Arbeitslose §§97-99 AFG). In order to avoid the analysis
of pre-retirement effects, we will exclude elderly from our analysis (see Section 2.3.1).
In the mid 90s, the allocation of JCSs became more in line with the predefined target
groups.
In April 1997 an additional productive wage subsidies program was implemented:
Productive Wage Subsidy for Business Enterprises (Lohnkostenzuschüsse Ost für
Wirtschaftsunternehmen, see §249h AFG) which was designed to subsidize temporar-
ily regular jobs. This program of ALMP will not be considered here as it might have
qualitatively different effects from JCSs.
2.2.4 Participation and Costs of JCSs
Table 2.1 shows that the number of program participants peaked in 1992 when 388,000
individuals were employed in traditional JCSs in the new federal states (NFS). In this
time period high participation rates were mainly realized by Mega-JCSs, where the
workforce of closing firms were collectively put into a job creation program. Thereafter,
policy changes and financial restrictions led to decreasing yearly stocks. Between 1993
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and 1997 the stock of participants in traditional JCSs fluctuated around 200,000 while
the stock of participants in Productive Wage Subsidies East fluctuated around 90,000 per
year in East Germany. From 1998 onwards, the number of jobs created via traditional
JCSs was lower than the number created via Productive Wage Subsidies East. This
development was mainly driven by the introduction of the Productive Wage Subsidies
for Business Enterprises in April 1997.
Table 2.1: Participants in JCSs (in thousands), 1991-1999
Year Traditional JCSs Productive Wage Underemployment rates
Subsidies East in %
NFS SA SANFS(in%) NFS SA
SA
NFS(in%) NFS SA
1991 208.7 35.7 17.1 . . . 25.3 24.8
1992 388.1 88.0 22.7 . . . 35.3 37.3
1993 237.5 56.4 23.7 22.5 . . 32.3 34.4
1994 192.5 40.0 20.8 87.7 21.0 24.0 29.7 30.3
1995 205.8 41.0 19.9 106.5 23.2 21.8 26.4 27.6
1996 191.5 40.0 20.9 86.2 17.6 20.4 24.2 27.2
1997 154.5 33.0 21.4 80.1 17.1 21.4 24.0 27.0
1998 151.8 27.0 17.8 162.4 29.5 18.2 24.1 26.7
1999 168.0 30.0 17.9 180.0 29.0 16.1 23.7 26.6
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. SA: Sachsen-Anhalt. NFS: New federal states including East Berlin.
Underemployment = unemployed + full-time equivalents of short-time work + training participants + JCS
participants + early retirement participants. Underemployment rate = underemployment in % of labor
force (employed and unemployed) + training participants + early retirement participants (see the official
definitions of the underemployment rate of the Federal Employment Agency (1992-2000)).
Source: Federal Employment Agency (1992-2000), Institute for Employment Research (IAB) (2003).
The relatively high unemployment rate in Sachsen-Anhalt compared to the other new
federal states (see Figure 2.1) did not result in a higher share of participants in JCSs in
the 90s. The number of participants in JCSs in Sachsen-Anhalt amounted to 20% of the
total number of participants in all new federal states in the time period considered for
both kinds of job creation measures.
Table 2.2 shows that the expenditures on JCSs by the German Federal Employment
Agency for both kinds of programs fluctuate around 5 billion DM (3.7 billione in 2015
prices) and reached an all-time high in 1996 when costs amounted to more than 8 billion
DM (6.0 billione in 2015 prices) in East Germany. In total, JCSs counted more than
2.5 million participants and produced expenditures of more than 52 billion DM (39.0
billione in 2015 prices) in the period 1991-1999 in East Germany.
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Table 2.2: Expenditures on JCSs by the German Federal Employment Agency
(in million DM), 1991-1999
Year NFS SA SANFS(in%)
1991 3075 612 20
1992 5083 1664 33
1993 6905 1388 20
1994 4722 1680 36
1995 7109 1734 24
1996 8156 1701 21
1997 6703 1422 21
1998 5453 1054 19
1999 5681 1117 20
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. SA: Sachsen-Anhalt. NFS: New federal states including East Berlin.
Source: Federal Employment Agency (1992-2000).
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1 Data Set and Sample Selection
The data used stem from the last three years (1997-1999) of the Labor Market Monitor
Sachsen-Anhalt (LMM-SA). The LMM-SA is a survey of the working-age population
living in the new federal state of Sachsen-Anhalt with around 6.000 survey participants
each year.8
Similar to other surveys, the LMM-SA provides individual information on socio-
economic characteristics like age and professional education. As an important innovation,
the LMM–SA introduced in the years 1997-1999 a retrospective monthly employment
calendar that goes back until 1990, enabling us to analyze JCSs over a long time period
after the reunification.
Recall data over such a long time span can suffer from recall errors. Paull (2002)
documents the international evidence. Due to recall error she notes a tendency to
report too many labor market transitions and at the same time to underreport short
unemployment spells. However, Bachmann and Schaffner (2009) find on the basis of
retrospective surveys going back at most two years that this is less of a problem for the
German survey GSOEP.
Although our survey covers a longer time span, we argue that the set-up of the
8The response rate of 32% (Ketzmerik and Wiener, 1999) is in line with other innovative surveys.
For example the response rate of the German Internet Panel amounts to 19% (Blom et al., 2015), and the
response rate of the GSOEP innovation refreshment sample F to 51% (Däubler, 2002).
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questionnaire is such that our data also suffers less from recall error compared to other
data recording similarly long time periods. Firstly, the survey participants are asked to
remember their employment history starting with the historic year of 1990, in which the
political and economic system of East Germany changed drastically. The accuracy of
recall can be strongly improved by such a combination of biographic and historic events
(Loftus and Marburger, 1983). Second, the data is collected in a chronological order,
which is regarded as the best technique for collecting life history data in a single survey
(Sudman and Bradburn, 1973). Furthermore, we try to use broadly defined labor market
states, such that recall errors can cancel out. This is particularly relevant for the definition
of the ‘out of the labor market’ state and ‘unemployment’. Paull (2002) for example
finds that women tend to redefine unemployment to being ‘out of the labor force’. In our
main analysis we aggregate these two states to being ‘unemployed’. The aggregation is
supported by the observation that being ‘out of the labor force’ is a rare event in East
Germany for prime aged individuals. Labor force participation is historically very high
in East Germany. However, we also present a sensitivity analysis where the ‘out of the
labor force’ state is treated as a censoring event. One potential problem with our data
could be that some JCSs are reported as regular employment. This is comparable to the
tendency that private training programs are reported as ALMP training programs, see
Ketzmerik (2001). However, we do not have a benchmark data set with which we can
investigate this issue. As long as this is not systematically related to the success of the
program this should not bias our results.
Our data source allows us to distinguish the following combined categories of the
labor market status on a monthly basis: in education, employed (including full-time
employed, part-time employed and self-employed), unemployed (combined with out of
the labor force), in training, in JCS, in maternal leave and in retirement.9
Our sample focuses on individuals that are between 25 and 50 years old in January
1990 and that had been employed before the Monetary, Economic and Social Union went
into effect in June 1990. This allows us to analyze the effect of JCSs for individuals who
belonged to the active labor force of the GDR and who were hence fully affected by the
transformation process and subsequent introduction of ALMP programs.10 At the same
time, this sampling criteria allows us to exclude individuals who are close to retirement
and might use ALMP programs as a bridge to retirement.
9For more details on the data set and its use see for example Bergemann et al. (2009) and Ketzmerik
(2001) as well as Eichler and Lechner (2002) on earlier waves.
10See Table 2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A for the number of observations dropped by each sample selection
step. Note that the data collecting institute provided us with a retrospective questionnaire data set, where
already only those were selected who gave a full account of their employment history; these were about
95% of all interviewees, see Ketzmerik and Wiener (1999).
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Table 2.A.2 in Appendix 2.A presents an overview of the variables used in this
study. Based on these data we construct a sample of inflows into unemployment based
on individuals whose labor market history is observable until at least September 1997
without interruption. We consider unemployment spells starting in January 1991 or later
only if there exists a prior employment spell of at least one month.11
This analysis exploits information on 2,235 individuals who experience at least one
unemployment spell between January 1991 and the end of the observation period, which
can be September 1997, October 1998 or December 1999.12 In total, the data include
3,864 unemployment spells. Thus, several individuals experience multiple spells and the
average number of spells per individual amounts to 1.7. Transitions to other destinations
than to employment are treated as right censored. Thus, if an individual enters an
alternative ALMP program like training before finding regular employment, the spell
is also considered as censored at the point in time the individual enters the alternative
program. As a sensitivity analysis, we estimate a model with endogenous right-censoring.
In this specification, we model transitions to other states than employment as a competing
risk. We additionally estimate specifications in which we define periods of training
participation as unemployment and models in which we consider participation in training
programs as an alternative treatment. For these specifications, unemployment continues
during training participation. Moreover, unemployment spells are right censored in case
the observation period ends before an exit out of unemployment can be observed.
In case of treatment, we observe the exact moment of the entry into the program and
the actual program duration. However, we do not have any information on the planned
participation duration in a JCS. In our model specifications, the time spent in a JCS is
assumed to contribute to the unemployment duration. Although program participants
may search for a job with reduced effort, they still do search, hence they should be treated
as unemployed. In our main specification, an unemployment spell is defined as right
censored at the moment a second entry into JCSs is observed. We additionally estimate
specifications which model the selection into the second treatment and which estimate a
corresponding additional treatment effect.
The phrase job creation schemes (JCSs) includes all variants of public employment
programs, although they are partly conceptually different, as mentioned in Section 2.2.2.
As it is unclear whether programs starting after April 1997 are JCSs or productive wage
subsidies for regular jobs, we will only use information on program participation that
11Due to data restrictions on the local unemployment rates that are included as controls in the analysis,
we have to exclude unemployment spells starting before January 1991.
12We also consider persons as unemployed if they indicated to be in a training program for at most 1
month.
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started before April 1997 and treat entries after April 1997 as right censored. The
baseline specification of the analysis excludes participants in Mega-JCSs, identified as
those individuals who enter the program directly after employment. We find a high
concentration of Mega-JCSs in Sachsen-Anhalt in the early 90s. In 193 cases a direct
transition from employment to a JCS can be observed. In a sensitivity analysis we are
going to investigate the effects of both traditional and Mega-JCSs.
2.3.2 Labor Market Transitions and Durations
We observe that around 11% of the unemployment spells include a period of participation
in a JCS (see Table 2.A.3 in Appendix 2.A). About half of the spells without treatment
and 26% of the spells with treatment end in a transition into regular employment. 23% of
the unemployment spells that are observed to include participation in a JCS are followed
by a period of participation in a training program and 16% are followed by a second
participation in JCSs. For 23% no transition can be observed within the observation
period.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 present non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard
rates based on information of the first unemployment spell. Figure 2.2 Panel (A) contains
the empirical exit rate from unemployment into regular employment which is highest at
the beginning of the unemployment spell and then starts to decline. After a second peak
at an unemployment duration of 12 months which could be caused by the expiration of
unemployment benefits, the exit rate circulates around 1.5%. The conditional probability
of entering a JCS (Panel (B)) increases to a level of around 2.3% after one year of
unemployment. In the subsequent period the hazard rate has a slight positive trend.
Figure 2.3 shows the empirical exit rate from the program to unemployment (Panel (A))
and employment (Panel (B)), respectively. Both plots reveal strong peaks at 12 and 24
months indicating that a substantial share of participants re-enters unemployment and
some participants enter employment directly after the program has expired.13 Moreover,
Panel (A) in Figure 2.3 shows that the transition rate to employment during program
participation is - especially during the first 11 months - rather low, which suggests that a
vast majority stays in the JCS until the end of the contract.
A JCS typically lasts 12 months. Panel (A) in Figure 2.4 shows that around 40% of
all JCSs end after one year and only a few last longer than 24 months. The peaks at
12 and 24 months indicate that many individuals exploit the program to the full extent
13Table 2.A.4 in Appendix 2.A presents summary statistics of the duration of unemployment, of
subsequent employment and of JCSs separately for spells that end with a transition to employment, spells
that end with a transition to another labor market state and right censored spells due to the end of the
observation period.
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(B) Transition from unemployment to JCSs
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. Empirical exit rates are based on the first unemployment spell.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Figure 2.2: Transition from unemployment to employment and to JCSs
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Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. Empirical exit rates are based on the first unemployment spell.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Figure 2.3: Transition from JCS to (un)employment
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which can be interpreted as a sign of locking-in effects. Panel (B) in Figure 2.4 displays
the distribution of the moment of the program start in the sample of treated individuals.
While the largest share of individuals enters the program after exactly 12 months in
unemployment (around 8% of all program participants), we have rather equal shares
of entries ranging from 3% to 6% in the first 11 months. The distribution of program
timing and the transition probabilities from unemployment to JCSs over time shown in
Figure 2 underline that we face a dynamic treatment setting with possible entries over
the full unemployment spell.
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Notes: The distribution of program durations (Panel (A)) is based on treated individuals for whom the duration is completely
observable.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Figure 2.4: Distribution of program duration and unemployment duration before pro-
gram start
2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics of Observable Characteristics
Table 2.3 shows descriptive statistics of the observed covariates for all individuals and
separately for program participants and nonparticipants. The values of these variables
are constant over the observation period. They are measured at the date of the interview
with the exception of age which refers to the year 1990.
About half of the unemployed in our sample are women. 60% of the unemployed
that participate in a JCS during their first unemployment spell are female. In total, the
largest fraction of unemployed individuals is between 45 and 50 years old in 1990. One
third of the program participants are 45 to 50 years old.
Furthermore, we include a set of dummy variables indicating the professional ed-
ucation of the unemployed. The comparatively small number of individuals without
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of covariates in %
All Participants Nonparticipants
Ages 25-29 18.1 11.1 19.1
Ages 30-34 19.8 20.6 19.7
Ages 35-39 21.5 18.1 22.0
Ages 40-44 15.7 17.1 15.5
Ages 45-50 24.9 33.1 23.7
Female 52.3 59.6 51.2
Male 47.7 40.4 48.8
No Vocational Training 1.7 4.2 1.3
Partly vocational training 2.2 3.1 2.1
Vocational training 50.9 49.8 51.1
Advanced vocational training 7.3 4.9 7.6
Technical college 15.7 16.0 15.7
University degree 22.2 22.0 22.2
Total 2,235 287 1,948
Notes: Descriptive statistics are based on the first unemployment spell. The highest professional education
level is measured at the interview date. Age is measured in January 1990.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
or with partly vocational training arises from the obligation to perform a vocational
training (Berufsbildungspflicht) in the former GDR. Table 2.3 shows that about half of
the unemployed individuals have achieved a vocational training and one-fifth exhibit a
university degree. The share of unemployed with a high professional education is similar
for participants and for nonparticipants.14
In addition, the list of covariates included in our estimations contains year and quarter
dummies, regional dummies, monthly unemployment rates by labor market district, and
a time-varying variable capturing the distance from the expiration date of unemployment
benefit claims.15
14The highest professional education level is measured at the day of the interview. For 14 individuals
in our sample we observe an unemployment spell before individuals reenter the educational system. For
those individuals we adjust the educational level measured at the time of the interview by the time spent in
the educational system since the corresponding unemployment spell. In a robustness check we exclude
those individuals from the estimation sample. The results do not change.
15The unemployment rates are corrected for the number of participants in ALMP programs and hence
are larger than the official numbers.
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2.4 Empirical Model
We are interested in the causal impact of entering a JCS on the unemployment duration
and subsequent employment stability. Individuals are defined to be treated if they enter a
JCS in month t of the unemployment spell, from the corresponding month t onwards. In
this section we start with the presentation of a bivariate duration model for the duration
until leaving unemployment for a job and the duration until the treatment following
the timing-of-events approach (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003).16 We have monthly
information about different employment states and estimate discrete time duration models.
Abbring and van den Berg (2003) provide a proof for continuous time models (for
identification in dynamic discrete models see Heckman and Navarro, 2007). In a second
step we investigate the subsequent employment stability of program participants and
nonparticipants by introducing a third transition process similar to van den Berg and
Vikström (2014). In addition, we estimate models allowing for a random treatment effect
following Richardson and van den Berg (2013) and models with two treatments (JCSs
and training), whereby we allow the probability of entering one treatment to depend on
the participation in another treatment. None of these model extensions leads to different
results. Therefore, in the following we focus on the description of our main econometric
model.
Our data set contains multiple unemployment spells for some individuals, which
facilitates identification and estimation of the joint distribution of the unobserved hetero-
geneity variables (Honoré, 1993). Moreover, our data set includes time-varying variables
such as the local unemployment rate which provide a more robust source of identification
than time-invariant covariates (Gaure et al., 2007). Lagged time-varying variables act as
exclusion restrictions. They have an impact on the survival probability until a time t, but
conditional on observed and unobserved characteristics lagged values do not have any
impact on the transition probabilities in t. Intuitively, individuals with the same observed
characteristics x in period t but different values of lagged time-varying variables should
only have a different transition probability if the composition with respect to unobserved
heterogeneity is different. This has been pointed out earlier by for example Eberwein
et al. (1997), and Brinch (2007) provides a theoretical discussion of identification. Brinch
(2007) shows that in the presence of time-varying covariates mixed hazard rate models
are identified without the proportional hazard rate assumption.
16For a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the approach, see van den Berg and
Vikström (2014).
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2.4.1 Durations until Employment and until Treatment
The transition probability of leaving unemployment for a job θu(t) and the probability of
entering a JCS θp(t) are assumed to vary with observed characteristics xt , the unobserved
heterogeneity terms vu and vp, respectively and the elapsed unemployment duration t.
Additionally, the probability of leaving unemployment depends on the treatment status in
period t. We assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time, i.e. across
repeated spells of unemployed individuals, and uncorrelated with observed characteristics.
θu(t) and θp(t) can be expressed by complementary log log specifications:
θu(t|x′t ,vu, tp) = 1− exp(−exp(λu(t)+ x′tβu+1(t ≥ tp)δu+ vu) (2.1)
θp(t|x′t ,vp) = 1− exp(−exp(λp(t)+ x′tβp+ vp)) (2.2)
λu(t) and λp(t) capture the duration dependencies and the vectors βu and βp capture
the influence of observed covariates. δu corresponds to the effect of being treated on the
probability of finding a job. The treatment effect might vary depending on the time since
the treatment. In our baseline model, we allow for a time-varying treatment effect by
specifying two intervals following the start of the treatment in period tp: (tp≤ t ≤ tp+c1)
and (t > tp+ c1). The hazard rate is shifted by δu1 in the first c1 months after program
start. After a program duration of c1 months, the hazard rate is shifted by δu2 . We
additionally estimate models with more than two time intervals for the treatment effect,
models allowing for effect heterogeneity with respect to selected observed characteristics,
and models with treatment effects depending on the point in time the treatment starts.
As described in Subsection 2.2.3, eligibility for program participation requires in
principle at least 3-6 months of unemployment experience. These rules have not been
applied strictly in East Germany, and, consequently, we observe in our data quite some
transitions into the JCS although individuals have not been eligible with respect to the
criterion based on the previous unemployment duration (53 cases). Nonetheless, these
rules might introduce shifts in the hazard rates depending on the eligibility. Therefore,
we include two additional dummy variables indicating the non-eligibility according to
these rules. The first dummy variable is relevant for the years 1991 and 1992. From
1993 onwards, depending on the program scheme, individuals should have been at least
6 months unemployed in the previous 12 months or their current unemployment spell
should have lasted for at least 3 months. We include a second dummy variable for this
period which is one if the stricter criterion of 6 months is not fulfilled.17
17We additionally estimate models with two dummies for the period from 1993 onwards, to capture the
differential rules for the two programs, and we allow for some observed characteristics to have differential
effects on the transition probability to JCSs if individuals are not eligible based on the unemployment
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For identification – similar to alternative micro-econometric approaches like matching
– it is important that the unemployed job seekers do not anticipate the exact moment a
JCS starts. This no-anticipation assumption implies that the future realization of the
moment of entry into treatment does not affect the probability of leaving unemployment
for a job before the moment the treatment starts.18 It is likely that this assumption
holds in our context. As discussed in Subsection 2.2.3, the case worker decides about
participation. He or she has to place his candidates as early as possible and has to
check potential alternative job offers. Moreover, the gap between program admission
and actual start of the program is rather small. Surveys among caseworkers indicate
that the time span between the application of an employer for funding of the JCS and
the actual program start was on average three months (Völkel, 1994). Hence, the time
span between the point in time the individuals are informed about program start and
actual program start should be on average less than three months. The no-anticipation
assumption implies that individuals do not adjust their behavior once they received this
information. Richardson and van den Berg (2013) argue that in a context such as ours
where the potential anticipation span is relatively short compared to the duration of the
program (or if the anticipation effects are small) the estimates are relatively insensitive
to this assumption. Note that our framework allows for ex-ante effects that is ex ante
knowledge of the existence of the program and ex ante knowledge of the individual
distribution of time to treatment. One important determinant of the program participation
might be the expiration date of benefit entitlements, since benefit claims can be prolonged
by participation in a JCS. We are able to account for this mechanism by constructing
a variable capturing the distance until the individual expiration date. Moreover, our
approach takes into account that the treatment could be given at a later point in time.
It should be pointed out that the treatment effect is defined within an environment
where the ALMP is present. Consequently, as a common shortcoming of microecono-
metric ALMP evaluation studies, we cannot capture equilibrium effects (see Crépon and
van den Berg, 2016), i.e. we do not focus on how nonparticipants are affected by the
program (for example spillover effects) and how the effect of participants is influenced
by the existence of the program. This partial approach is motivated by the idea that only
if we find positive long-run effects in this framework, the program can potentially pass a
criterion. The latter specification captures potential non-proportionalities due to the eligibility rules in a
flexible way. These alternative specifications do not change our main results (see Tables 2.C.3 and 2.C.4 in
Appendix 2.C).
18It is important to note that the no-anticipation assumption does not exclude that individuals know
the probability distribution of future events conditional on observable and unobservable characteristics.
Individuals may change their optimal behavior to determinants of the treatment process, but not to the
realizations of future treatments.
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cost-benefit analysis where also equilibrium effects are considered.
2.4.2 Employment Stability
We additionally investigate the impact of the treatment on the subsequent employment
stability. The transition probability from employment to unemployment θe(t) can be
expressed by:
θe(t|x′t ,ve, tu, tp) = 1− exp(−exp(λe(t)+ x′tβe+1(tu ≥ tp)δe+ γ1tu+ γ2t2u + ve)) (2.3)
λe(t) captures the duration dependence in employment. The probability of reentering
unemployment depends on observed characteristics xt , unobserved heterogeneity ve, and
on the realized unemployment duration tu. The unobserved characteristics are allowed to
be correlated with the unobserved factors vp and vu. The treatment effect δe captures the
impact of program participation during the previous unemployment spell.
2.4.3 Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity and Likelihood
Function
We specify the joint distribution G of the unobserved heterogeneity terms vu, vp and ve
to be discrete with M support points. The associated probabilities are given by:
Pr(vu = vmu ,vp = v
m
p ,ve = v
m
e ) = pm, f or m = 1, ...,M. (2.4)
To force the class probabilities to be between zero and one and to sum up to one, we
use a multinomial logit parameterization of the class probabilities
pm =
exp(ωm)
exp(∑Mm=1ωm)
with ω1 = 0, f or m = 1, ...,M. (2.5)
For a model with M = 2, G would be described by 4 parameters, for M = 3 we
estimate 8 parameters, etc. This approach allows for a flexible covariance matrix for the
unobserved heterogeneity. For similar strategies for modeling the unobserved hetero-
geneity, see for example Murray (1999), Crépon et al. (2010) and Caliendo et al. (2016).
Our model selection with respect to the number of mass points is based on the bivariate
duration model. We increase the number of mass points until we cannot improve the
model fit anymore. The evaluation of the model fit is based on the Akaike Criterion
(AIC). The likelihood contribution of individual i for given vmu ,v
m
p ,v
m
e in period t can be
expressed by lit(xit ,vmu ,v
m
p ,v
m
e ) and the Log-likelihood for the sample with N individuals
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is given by:19
lnL =
N
∑
i=1
ln
( M
∑
m=1
pm
T
∏
t=1
[lit |xit ,vmu ,vmp ,vme ]
)
(2.6)
2.5 Results
We start with presenting the results based on a bivariate duration model consisting of
the duration until entry into a JCS and the duration until entry into employment. In the
baseline specification, we specify a treatment effect for the first 11 months after the start
of the JCS and for the period from 12 months onwards after the start of the JCS. The
choice of this cut-off value is motivated by the typical program duration of 12 months
and allows us to investigate potential locking-in effects.20
In a second step we introduce effect heterogeneity with respect to the point in time
the treatment starts, the elapsed treatment duration and selected observed characteristics.
In a third step we present results for a model with three equations: the transition rate
from unemployment into the program, from unemployment into employment and from
employment back into unemployment. Fourth, we estimate models with a second
treatment, the participation in training programs. Next, we allow for effect heterogeneity
with respect to unobserved heterogeneity (random treatment effects) and investigate
the sensitivity of our results with respect to different choices about the definition of
the sample, the unemployment state and about the way we deal with repeated spells of
unemployment and shared unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, we investigate whether a
model allowing for endogenous right-censoring leads to different results.
2.5.1 Baseline Results
We start with a discussion of the model selection in terms of the number of mass
points for the heterogeneity components. This selection is based on a comparison of
the model fit. We increase successively the number of mass points until we cannot
19For the models allowing for random treatment effects we introduce an additional unobserved term
vmjcs. For models taking a second treatment (training participation) into account the model is extended by
an additional transition rate from unemployment to training, which depends on the unobserved term vmt .
20This choice is linked to the construction of our dependent variable. The dependent variable for a
transition from unemployment to employment equals one in the last month of the unemployment spell if
an individual starts working in the next month. In this way, we are able to estimate the probability for a
transition from unemployment to employment in every month of the unemployment spell. This means if a
direct transition to regular employment occurs after 12 months of participation in a JCS, the dependent
variable equals one in month 12 after program start. Hence, the specification of the treatment effect for the
first 11 months and after 11 months after program start captures the potential locking-in effects of a JCS
with a typical duration of 12 months.
75 of 235
CHAPTER 2. The Impact of Participation in JCSs in Turbulent Times
improve the model fit, evaluated on basis of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), anymore. In our application, the smallest
value of the AIC and the BIC is reached in the specification with three unobserved
mass points (see Table 2.B.1 in Appendix 2.B). In comparison to the model without
unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate in this specification six additional parameters for
the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.21 For the different transition processes we
choose a flexible specification of the duration dependence based on eight time intervals.
In Table 2.4 we present the parameter estimates for the baseline model. The cor-
relation between the unobserved heterogeneity terms vp and vu is -0.43. This negative
correlation implies that we have a negative selection into treatment based on unobserv-
ables: individuals that are more likely to participate in a JCS, are in general less likely
to find a job. However, with a standard error of 0.49 this negative correlation is not
statistically significant from zero.
The main parameters of interest are the treatment effects of entering a JCS depending
on the time since program start. In the first 11 months since start of the program, the
estimated coefficient is with -1.23 negative and significant. This effect states that the
transition rate to employment is reduced by 71% (exp(−1.23)−1) in the first 11 months
after start of participation. From month 12 after program start onwards, the treatment
effect vanishes. This result indicates that locking-in effects seem to be important. During
program participation, the job finding probability is significantly reduced and after a
typical program duration of 12 months the effect becomes positive but insignificant. This
positive but insignificant effect after 12 months might capture both the post-program
effect and the negative locking-in effect for those whose contract has not been expired
yet. It points into the direction that JCSs can be beneficial for the participants.
As laid out in Section 2.4.1 our approach does not take into account equilibrium
effects. Recent papers have shown that spillover effects can for example be important
in the context of job search and training programs, see Crépon et al. (2013), Ferraci
et al. (2014) and Gautier et al. (2017). Helping some job seekers in their search for jobs
through specific programs might decrease the probabilities of those unemployed who do
not participate in the program. Crépon et al. (2013) provide evidence that these spillover
effects are larger in weak labor markets with high unemployment rates. Given the scale
of the JCSs and the state of the economy during our observation period, the estimated
effects might at least partly reflect spillover effects. This might be especially relevant
21Figure 2.B.1 in Appendix 2.B presents the empirical exit rate from unemployment to work during
the first unemployment spell jointly for program participants and nonparticipants and additionally the
predicted monthly transition rates based on the estimated parameters. The predicted hazard rate fits well
with the average of the empirical hazard rate and does a good job of describing the duration dependence.
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Table 2.4: Baseline estimation results
Transition Transition
U→ E U→ JCS
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.23∗∗∗ (0.21)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.23 (0.23)
Not eligible for JCS 1991-1992 0.36 (0.28)
Not eligible for JCS 1993-1999 -0.65∗∗ (0.26)
Unobserved heterogeneity:
v1 -4.81∗∗∗ (0.62) -7.46∗∗∗ (1.16)
v2− v1 1.67∗∗∗ (0.19) -0.44 (0.30)
v3− v1 3.26∗∗∗ (0.26) -0.12 (0.37)
ω2 0.34 (0.30)
ω3 -0.62∗∗ (0.27)
p2 0.48
p3 0.18
corr(vu,vp) -0.43 (0.49)
Duration dependence:
4-6 months 0.03 (0.08) 0.18 (0.20)
7-9 months -0.04 (0.10) 0.39 (0.25)
10-12 months -0.03 (0.12) 0.69∗∗∗ (0.25)
13-18 months -0.08 (0.13) 0.43 (0.27)
19-24 months -0.39∗∗ (0.16) 0.31 (0.31)
25-36 months -0.52∗∗∗ (0.20) 0.24 (0.31)
> 36 months -0.66∗∗∗ (0.23) -0.70∗ (0.38)
Individual characteristics:
Ages 30-34 0.07 (0.16) 0.20 (0.32)
Ages 35-39 0.09 (0.17) 0.50 (0.31)
Ages 40-44 -0.14 (0.18) 0.44 (0.31)
Ages 45-50 -0.40∗∗ (0.19) 0.67∗∗ (0.32)
Ages > 50 -1.16∗∗∗ (0.20) 0.89∗∗∗ (0.34)
Female -1.10∗∗∗ (0.08) -0.08 (0.11)
Partly vocational training -0.41 (0.39) -0.23 (0.47)
Vocational training 1.01∗∗∗ (0.30) -0.02 (0.35)
Advanced vocational training 1.00∗∗∗ (0.34) -0.13 (0.42)
Technical college 0.97∗∗∗ (0.32) 0.12 (0.37)
University degree 1.17∗∗∗ (0.31) 0.37 (0.36)
Dummy for remaining unemployment benefit claims -0.23∗∗ (0.09) -0.66∗∗∗ (0.17)
Remaining unemployment benefit claims -0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Unemployment rate -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.03)
N 2,235
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, U: Unemployment, E: Employment. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Current year, quarter dummies and regional dummies are not reported. Coefficients are statistically
significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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during participation in the JCSs, i.e. when the locking-in effects appear. In contrast to
the spillover effects of job search programs, the spillover effects during participation in
JCSs are positive for the nonparticipants. As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, participation in
JCSs was attractive, not only due to the human capital accumulation but also due to the
high wages. This attractiveness leads to a reduction in the job search effort. The resulting
reduced job finding probability during program participation might then go along with
increasing employment prospects on the regular labor market for nonparticipants. These
potential effects are not captured by our econometric approach. But we have to keep
in mind that the locking-in effects can at least partly reflect a rearrangement of the job
queue. As a consequence these looking-in effects do not necessarily reflect a negative
effect of JCSs.
2.5.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
We now consider a more flexible time-varying specification of the treatment effect.
In line with the typical program durations of 12 and 24 months and inspired by the
peaks in the transition rate from the program participation into employment (see Figure
2.3), we allow for five different treatment effects dependent on the elapsed treatment
duration. δu1 measures the effect of JCSs for the period tp ≤ t ≤ tp + 11, δu2 for the
period tp+12≤ t ≤ tp+13, δu3 for the period tp+14≤ t ≤ tp+23, δu4 for the period
tp+24≤ t ≤ tp+25 and finally δu5 for the period t > tp+25.
Very similar to the baseline model, the estimated treatment effects indicate that the
hazard rate is significantly lower by 70% in the first 11 months after start of participation
(Panel A in Table 2.5). In month 12 and 13, the point estimate is positive but insignificant,
followed by an estimated effect close to zero in months 14 to 23 after program start.
The hazard rate increases significantly by 271% 24 to 25 months after entering a JCS.
After 25 months, the effect is still positive but not statistically significant. These results
confirm the presence of locking-in effects: individuals have a significantly reduced job
finding probability during participation. The treatment effect becomes positive and partly
significant after the JCS has finished, which is typically after 12 or 24 months. However,
this positive impact on the transition rate to work is not long-lasting.
In an alternative specification, we estimate treatment effects depending on whether
program entry occurs in the years 1991-1992 or in 1993-1997. The results in Table 2.5
Panel B show that the effects of participating in a JCS are stable over time.
We additionally allow the treatment effect to depend on the elapsed unemployment
duration at the moment of the program entry. We distinguish between program start in
the first 12 months of unemployment and after 12 months of unemployment. Table 2.5
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Panel C presents the corresponding treatment effects. The point estimates indicate strong
locking-in effects independent of the elapsed unemployment duration. These effects are
stronger for participants who enter a JCS after month 12 of their unemployment spell.
Unemployed who start participating after one year of unemployment seem to benefit
from participation: after a treatment duration of 12 months, they are significantly more
likely to find a job compared to nonparticipants.
A potential explanation for this finding is that especially long-term unemployed
workers are affected by human capital depreciation and that for them being (re-)attached
to the labor market has a relatively large value, while for individuals who just entered
unemployment these channels are less relevant, yet.
Table 2.5: Time dependent effect of JCS
Coefficient Standard error
Panel A. Effect of JCS dependent on time since program start
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.22∗∗∗ (0.21)
Effect of JCS in months 12 - 13 after program start 0.34 (0.32)
Effect of JCS in months 14 - 23 after program start -0.06 (0.27)
Effect of JCS in months 24 - 25 after program start 1.31∗∗∗ (0.38)
Effect of JCS in months > 25 after program start 0.47 (0.36)
Panel B. Effect of JCS dependent on year of program start
Start occurs in year 1991 - 1992
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.16∗∗∗ (0.34)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.32 (0.32)
Start occurs in year 1993 - 1997
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.25∗∗∗ (0.26)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.18 (0.25)
Panel C. Effect of JCS dependent on elapsed unemployment duration at time of program start
Start occurs in months 1 - 12 of unemployment
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.17∗∗∗ (0.25)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.01 (0.27)
Start occurs in months > 12 of unemployment
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.48∗∗∗ (0.40)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.59∗∗ (0.28)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. This specification includes the same list of covariates as the baseline
specification (see Table 2.4) and includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). The number of units
making a transition from JCS to employment in the corresponding specification can be found in Table
2.C.1 and 2.C.2 in Appendix 2.C. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1%
level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
In a next step we investigate effect heterogeneity with respect to selected observed
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characteristics. We estimate the treatment effect in the first 11 months after start of
the JCS and the subsequent period and allow for a common shift of both treatment
effects depending on the age, the gender and the skill level. For women and high skilled
participants we find a significantly positive shift in the treatment effect indicating that
these individuals seem to suffer less from locking-in effects and are more likely to find
a job after a typical program duration of 12 months than male and low/medium skilled
participants (see Table 2.6), whereby the effect for females is statistically significant only
at the 10% level. We find no evidence for effect heterogeneity with respect to the age
of the participants. A joint test suggests that the effect of JCSs in the first 11 months is
significantly negative while the effect 11 months after the start of the program becomes
significantly positive for high skilled women. We additionally estimate a model allowing
for an interaction effect of being high skilled and being a female. The results are reported
in Table 2.B.2 in Appendix 2.B and joint tests based on this specification lead to similar
conclusions. High skilled women seem to benefit from the participation in JCSs, while
a JCS increases the unemployment duration especially for low- and medium-skilled
men. We additionally estimate a model in which we interact the observed characteristics
with both time-varying treatment indicators. The results are reported in Table 2.B.3 in
Appendix 2.B. For none of the observed characteristics we find significantly different
coefficients for the two periods. In line with that, a comparison of the Log-likelihood
values suggests that the restricted model is the preferred specification. For females,
both coefficients are very similar (0.56 and 0.51). For the high skilled group we find
a relatively large and significant coefficient for the first 11 months after program start
(1.10). The second coefficient for this group is still positive (0.49), but with a p-value
of 0.11 not statistically significant anymore. Similar to the restricted model, a joint test
still suggests that the effect of a JCS is significantly positive for high skilled women 11
months after the start of the program.
These results are in line with the theoretical idea that high skilled individuals are
particularly affected by depreciation and in turn are able to benefit most from participation
in JCSs. Moreover, the results confirm the previous finding in the literature that women
might benefit more from participation in JCSs than men.
2.5.3 Subsequent Employment Stability
In this section we report estimation results based on a model with three transition rates:
the transition rate from unemployment to employment, from unemployment into the
program and from employment back to unemployment. Table 2.7 presents the estimation
results for the baseline specification. The estimated treatment effects on the exit rate to
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Table 2.6: Effect of JCS dependent on observed characteristics
Coefficient Standard error
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.80∗∗∗ (0.34)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.31 (0.35)
Effect of JCS × Female 0.52∗ (0.27)
Effect of JCS × Age > 45 0.01 (0.26)
Effect of JCS × High skilled 0.68∗∗∗ (0.26)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. This specification includes the same list of covariates as the baseline
specification (see Table 2.4) and includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). The number of units
making a transition from JCS to employment in the corresponding specification can be found in Table
2.C.1 and 2.C.2 in Appendix 2.C. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1%
level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
work are quite similar to the results we obtain with the baseline specification with two
transition rates. We do not find any evidence for an impact on the employment stability.
We also do not find evidence for effect heterogeneity.22 However, it is important to note
that some subgroups become rather small because only around 50% of the spells end in
employment. Therefore, the results with respect to the effect heterogeneity have to be
interpreted with caution.
Table 2.7: Effect of JCS for model with subsequent employment stability
Transition Transition
U → E E→U
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.20∗∗∗ (0.21) 0.28 (0.25)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.17 (0.21) 0.00 (0.27)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, U: Unemployment, E: Employment, Coef.: Coefficient, SE: Standard
error. This specification includes the same list of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 2.4) and
includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). Additionally, we control for the previous unemployment
duration and the previous unemployment duration squared for the transition rate from employment to
unemployment. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
22Results of the models with effect heterogeneity are reported in Appendix 2.C (see Tables 2.C.5 and
2.C.6).
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2.5.4 Multiple Treatment Effects
In this subsection we present estimation results of a model specification which allows for
multiple treatment effects: we investigate the impacts of two treatments, participation
in a JCS and participation in training. To be precise, we estimate three transition
rates: the transition rate from unemployment to employment, the transition rate from
unemployment to a JCS and the transition rate from unemployment to training. We allow
for correlations between these three transition processes. With this specification we are
able to test whether our previous results change when we take into account that some
unemployed might participate in a training program before or after participation in a JCS.
Our data suggests that 8% of all unemployment spells include treatment only in terms
of participation in a JCS and 19% only in terms of participation in training. For 2% of
all unemployment spells we observe a participation in a JCS followed by a period of
training and 3% had a period of training before entering a JCS.
Table 2.8 presents the estimation results for this model. Panel A shows the results for
a specification where we only allow for a direct treatment effect of training and JCSs,
separately in the first 11 months and in more than 11 months after start of participation,
for the transition rate from unemployment to employment. Panel B presents the results for
a specification where we allow for a direct treatment effect of training (JCSs), separately
in the first 11 months and in more than 11 months after start of participation, for the
transition rate from unemployment to employment and for the transition rate from
unemployment into JCSs (training). Our findings indicate that our estimated effects of
participating in a JCS do not change when taking participation in training into account.
For both programs we observe a reduced impact on the probability of entering the other
program during the first 11 months after program start. For the training program, we
observe an increased probability for entering the JCS after this period. Moreover, the
training program seems to have first a negative and after some time a significantly positive
impact on the transition rate to work.23
In our main specification, we treat an unemployment spell as right censored at
the moment a second participation in a JCS is observed. We additionally estimate a
specification where we model the selection into a second JCS and allow for an impact
of a second JCS within the same unemployment spell. The estimated treatment effects
are not affected by taking multiple treatments into account (see Table 2.C.7 in Appendix
2.C).
23This result is in accordance with the results found by Bergemann et al. (2009).
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Table 2.8: Multiple treatment effects
Transition Transition Transition
U → E U → JCS U → training
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Panel A. Specification 1
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 -1.10∗∗∗ (0.20)
after program start
Effect of JCS in months > 11 0.19 (0.19)
after program start
Effect of training in months 1 - 11 -0.71∗∗∗ (0.14)
after program start
Effect of training in months > 11 0.89∗∗∗ (0.15)
after program start
Panel B. Specification 2
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 -1.22∗∗∗ (0.21) -2.02∗∗∗ (0.37)
after program start
Effect of JCS in months > 11 0.05 (0.21) 0.31 (0.20)
after program start
Effect of training in months 1 - 11 -0.83∗∗∗ (0.15) -1.88∗∗∗ (0.36)
after program start
Effect of training in months > 11 0.68∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.47∗∗ (0.20)
after program start
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, U: Unemployment, E: Employment, Coef.: Coefficient, SE: Standard
error. These specifications include the same list of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 2.4).
The first specification (Panel A) includes four unobserved mass points (M=4) and the second (Panel B)
three (M=3). Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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2.5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In a first sensitivity analysis we extend on the analysis with respect to the heterogeneity of
treatment effects. We additionally allow for a random coefficient for the treatment effect
similar to Richardson and van den Berg (2013). In this model, we allow both treatment
effects to vary with respect to unobserved heterogeneity. For simplicity, we assume that
the random coefficient is the same for the two treatment effects. The random component
is allowed to be correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity in the transition rates
from unemployment to employment and from unemployment into the treatment. For
the model with M=3 we estimate two additional parameters, i.e., we estimate treatment
effects which are specific for each of the three latent groups. It turns out that the model
fit, evaluated on the basis of the AIC and the BIC, does not improve compared to a model
with a homogenous treatment effect. This implies that the model not allowing for random
treatment effects is the preferred specification.24
We perform several modifications of the unemployment and treatment definition to
check the robustness of our results. An overview of the estimated treatment effects for
the different specifications can be found in Table 2.9. All these sensitivity analyses are
conducted for the bivariate duration model consisting of the duration until treatment and
duration until transition to work.
First, we include participants in Mega-JCSs in our analysis. This type of JCS is de-
scribed in Section 2.2.3. These cases are defined by a direct transition from employment
into the program. The data reveal 193 participations in Mega-JCSs. We estimate two
different specifications: first, we include an "artificial" month of unemployment only for
Mega-JCS participants and second, we extend each unemployment spell by an "artificial"
month of unemployment. In both cases, the optimal model specification is based on four
mass points and we find a significant negative treatment effect in the first 11 months
after program entry. After 11 months after program entry, the effect is still negative but
insignificant in the first specification and negative and significant at the 10% level in
the second specification. The negative point estimate might stem from longer program
durations of Mega-JCSs compared to other types of JCSs: the mean program duration
amounts to 25 months and the median to 22 months.
In a further specification we treat unemployment spells that end in a transition into
nonemployment as right censored. We observe 17 transitions to nonemployment in
our observation period. Again, our results are robust. Moreover, we define periods
in training with previous and subsequent unemployment as periods in unemployment.
24Results of the model with a random coefficient for the treatment effect are reported in Appendix 2.B
(see Table 2.B.4). The Log-likelihood of this model specification amounts to -9,161.2.
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As a consequence the number of unemployment spells decreases and the length of
unemployment spells increases. The estimated effect of participating in a JCS are very
similar to our main specification.
Table 2.9: Sensitivity analysis
Coefficient Standard error
Panel A. Inclusion of Mega-JCS specification 1
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.00∗∗∗ (0.17)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.12 (0.20)
Panel B. Inclusion of Mega-JCS specification 2
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.09∗∗∗ (0.17)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.37∗ (0.20)
Panel C. Transition to nonemployment treated as right censored
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.25∗∗∗ (0.21)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.23 (0.23)
Panel D. Periods in training defined as periods in unemployment
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.07∗∗∗ (0.21)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.14 (0.22)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. These specifications include the same list of covariates as the baseline
specification (see Table 2.4). The first and the second specification (Panel A and B) include four unobserved
mass points (M=4) and the third and the fourth (Panel C and D) three (M=3). Coefficients are statistically
significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Next, we investigate how the results change if we control for previous unemployment
experience and if we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is not constant over the
different unemployment spells. For this we allow for an impact of the previous number
of unemployment spells and the cumulated lagged unemployment duration in a flexible
way. We include two dummies for the number of previous unemployment spells, one if
we observe one previous unemployment spell and another dummy variable indicating
whether we observe more than one previous unemployment spell. Additionally, we
include four dummy variables for the cumulated lagged time spent in unemployment. In
the first model where we assume independent unobserved heterogeneity the model with
two discrete groups (M=2) is the preferred specification (see Table 2.C.8 in Appendix
2.C). While we get a slightly more positive view of the treatment effects based on this
specification, the overall picture is rather stable. Once we allow for common unobserved
heterogeneity across different spells of the same individuals, all dummy variables captur-
ing previous unemployment experience are much smaller and not statistically significant
anymore (see Table 2.C.9 in Appendix 2.C). Moreover, the treatment effects are very
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similar compared to the main specification. Comparing the model fit with the model
assuming independent unobserved heterogeneity clearly suggests that the model using
multiple unemployment spells is the preferred specification.
The final sensitivity analysis deals with potentially endogenous right-censoring.
See for example Cockx and Picchio (2012) for a transition model taking endogenous
right-censoring into account. Our main specification is based on the assumption that
right-censoring is – conditional on observed characteristics – random. We investigate
whether a model allowing for endogenous right-censoring leads to different results. In
this specification, we define a residual and absorbing state which includes transitions to
training, JCS after April 1997 and to a second JCS in the same unemployment spell, and
transitions to education, maternity leave and retirement. We jointly estimate our main
specification with the transition process to this residual state. The results are reported in
Table 2.B.5 in Appendix 2.B. The estimated treatment effects are stable. Moreover, we
do not find evidence that the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the transition process
from unemployment to the absorbing state are statistically significant. This suggests that
endogenous right-censoring is not a problem for our specification.
2.6 Conclusions
JCSs are used in many countries in order to fight high unemployment. This chapter
focuses on JCSs in East Germany during very turbulent economic times, notably the
aftermath of the German reunification in 1990. We provide a comprehensive empirical
analysis of the employment prospects of participants in JCSs based on data of an inflow
sample of unemployed workers in one East German state (Sachsen-Anhalt). We use
the timing-of-events approach that is very well suited, particularly given the economic
environment of our evaluation. Firstly, we do not need to rely on the informational content
of the employment history of individuals in order to be able to control of unobserved
heterogeneity and secondly, the focus on transition rates might be more appropriate given
the economy is not in a stable equilibrium.
We analyze whether participation in JCSs has an impact on both the probability of
finding a job and the subsequent employment stability. The econometric analysis is based
on multivariate duration models. We estimate bivariate models based on the transition
rates from unemployment to JCSs and from unemployment to work. We also estimate
models with three transition processes taking additionally into account the transition rate
from employment back to unemployment. Our approach allows to control for selection
into treatment based on observable and on unobservable characteristics.
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In this study, we focus on individual employment outcomes under the assumption
of existence of the program. This is a common approach in the literature on evaluating
ALMPs. In the context of JCSs it is important to keep in mind that this approach does
not capture the potential value of the work carried out within JCSs. Moreover, this
implies that we ignore potential spillover effects on the employment probabilities of the
workers who are not participating in JCSs. However, especially in times of massive job
destruction and high unemployment rates, the locking-in effects of JCSs might at least
partly reflect a rearrangement of the job queue. If participation of some job-seekers has
an impact on the job queue in the short run and increases or stabilizes the human capital
of the participants in the medium run, negative locking-in effects have to be interpreted
with caution. Analyzing these potential spillover effects in combination with locking-in
effects is an interesting topic for future research.
In parts our findings are in accordance with results in more stable economies. During
the typical participation period of 12 months we find the expected negative effect on
the probability of finding a regular job. This effect vanishes thereafter and becomes
insignificantly positive. However, in contrast to findings in more stable economies our
results suggest that female and highly skilled participants leave unemployment quicker
than other groups. This is in line with the idea that high skilled workers might be more
strongly affected by human capital depreciation and therefore participation in JCSs has a
stronger impact on them. Moreover, it confirms previous findings that women seem to
benefit more from JCSs. Another important result which is new to the literature concerns
the stability of jobs after participation. We do not find that the job retention rates are
influenced by JCSs; not on average and also not if effect heterogeneity is taken into
account. Additionally, we find weak evidence that long-term unemployed also gain from
participation in JCSs.
These results add to the so far scarce evidence on the effectiveness of JCSs in
transformation economies. The findings show that it is important to not transfer the
negative evaluation results on JCSs that are found for stable and rather matured economies
to situations that are more turbulent. In situations with high job destruction rates other
and/or additional labor market groups might benefit from participation in JCSs. It seems
likely that this conclusion transfers to other economic crises than the transformation
process.
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2.Appendix
2.A Data and Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.A.1: Sample selection
Selection criteria Resulting number of observations
Fully observed labor market history and year of birth 10,715
Aged between 25 and 50 years in January 1990 6,088
Employed in June 1990 5,529
No missings in education variable 5,466
Final sample on individual level:
Having at least one unemployment spell starting since 1991 2,235
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Table 2.A.2: Description of variables
Variable Description Time-
varying?
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after
program start
Dummy for participating in a JCS in months 1
- 11 after program start
Yes
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after
program start
Dummy for participating in a JCS in months >
11 after program start
Yes
Not eligible for JCS 1991-1992 Dummy for not being eligible for participating
in a JCS in 1991-1992 according to the Em-
ployment Promotion Act (less than 6 months
unemployed in last 12 months)
Yes
Not eligible for JCS 1993-1997 Dummy for not being eligible for participating
in a JCS in 1993-1997 according to the Em-
ployment Promotion Act (less than 6 months
unemployed in last 12 months)
Yes
Individual characteristics:
Age groups Dummies for being in corresponding age
group during observation period
Yes
Ages 25-29 Aged between 25 and 29 Yes
Ages 30-34 Aged between 30 and 34 Yes
Ages 35-39 Aged between 35 and 39 Yes
Ages 40-44 Aged between 40 and 44 Yes
. . .
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Table 2.A.2: Description of variables (continuation)
Variable Definition Time-
varying?
Ages 45-50 Aged between 45 and 50 Yes
Ages >50 Aged 50 and older Yes
Female Dummy for being female No
Professional education Dummies for highest professional education
level
No
No vocational training No vocational training No
Partly vocational training Partly vocational training (Teilfacherbeiter) No
Vocational training Vocational training (Facharbeiter) No
Advanced vocational training Advanced vocational training (Meister, Tech-
niker)
No
Technical college Technical college (Fachschule) No
University degree University degree (Universität, Fach-
hochschule)
No
Regions: Dummies for living in one of eight labor mar-
ket districts of Sachsen-Anhalt
No
Dessau Dessau No
Halberstadt Halberstadt No
Halle Halle No
Magdeburg Magdeburg No
Merseburg Merseburg No
Sangerhausen Sangerhausen No
Stendal Stendal No
Wittenberg Wittenberg No
Year dummies Dummies indicating the current year, ranging
from 1991-1998
Yes
Quarter dummies Dummies indicating the current quarter of the
year
Yes
Unemployment rate Monthly unemployment rates by labor market
districts
Yes
Dummy for remaining unemploy-
ment benefit claims
Dummy for months of remaining unemploy-
ment benefit claims
Yes
Remaining unemployment benefit
claims
Months of remaining unemployment benefit
claims
Yes
Notes: JCS: Job Creation Scheme. The time constant explanatory variables are measured at the date of
the interview.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Table 2.A.3: Labor market transitions in %
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
⇒ JCS 10.7 ⇒ Employment 26.3(415) (109)
2nd JCS
15.9
(66)
Training
22.9
(95)
JCS after April 1997
9.2
(38)
Education
0.5
(2)
3,864
Maternal leave
1.2
unemployment (5)
spells
Retirement
0.7
(3)
RC (September 1997)
13.7
(57)
RC (October 1998)
3.9
(16)
RC (December 1999)
5.8
(24)
Employment
47.6
(1,643)
Training
23.9
(825)
⇒ JCS after April 1997 3.7
(128)
Education
0.3
(12)
Maternal leave
0.3
(11)
Retirement
1.0
(36)
RC (September 1997)
7.1
(245)
RC (October 1998)
3.6
(124)
RC (December 1999)
12.3
(425)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. RC: Right-censoring due to end of observation period which can be
September 1997, October 1998 or December 1999 depending on the wave of the survey. Absolute values
are in parentheses. Transitions to training and to JCSs that started after April 1997 are treated as right
censored.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Table 2.A.4: Summary statistics of unemployment spells
Quantiles
N Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max
No. of spells per individual 2,235 1.7 1.0 1 1 1 2 7
Transition U→ E
Unemployment duration 1,752 9.1 10.3 1 2 5 12 85
JCS duration 109 13 9 1 7 12 13 60
Subsequent employment duration
(complete spell) 863 17 17 1 5 12 23 104
Subsequent employment duration
(right censored spell) 889 38 28 1 13 33 60 107
Transition U→ Other LMS
Unemployment duration 1,221 16 15 1 5 12 22 95
JCS duration 209 15 9 2 12 12 16 59
RC due to end of observation period
Unemployment duration 891 22 23 1 6 14 31 107
JCS duration 97 17 13 1 12 12 22 60
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, U: Unemployment, E: Employment, LMS: Labor Market State. RC:
Right-censoring. SD: Standard deviation. Complete employment spells end with a transition to another
labor market state within the observation period.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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2.B Estimation Results
Table 2.B.1: Model fit depending on the specification of the
unobserved heterogeneity
Unobserved heterogeneity (UH) No UH 2 mass points 3 mass points 4 mass points
Log-likelihood -9,300.4 -9,178.8 -9,161.3 -9,160.2
AIC 18,764.9 18,527.5 18,498.6 18,502.3
BIC 19,233.3 19,013.0 19,001.3 19,022.1
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Figure 2.B.1: Empirical and predicted transition rate to employment
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Table 2.B.2: Effect of JCS for high skilled women
Coefficient Standard error
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.80∗∗∗ (0.37)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.33 (0.36)
Effect of JCS × Female 0.63 (0.39)
Effect of JCS × High skilled 0.81∗∗ (0.41)
Effect of JCS × Female × High skilled -0.34 (0.52)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. This specification includes the same list of covariates as the baseline
specification (see Table 2.4) and includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). Coefficients are statistically
significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Table 2.B.3: Effect of JCS dependent on observed characteristics
Coef. SE
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -2.20∗∗∗ (0.49)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.19 (0.37)
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start × Female 0.56 (0.44)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start × Female 0.51 (0.32)
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start × Age > 45 0.36 (0.44)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start × Age > 45 -0.12 (0.31)
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start × High skilled 1.10∗∗∗ (0.42)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start × High skilled 0.49 (0.30)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, Coef.: Coefficient, SE: Standard error. This specification includes the
same list of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 2.4) and includes three unobserved mass
points (M=3). Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Table 2.B.4: Effect of JCS dependent on unobserved characteristics
Coefficient Standard error
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 1.44∗∗∗ (0.28)
Effect of JCS -1.03∗ (0.53)
Unobserved heterogeneity in treatment effect:
v2− v1 0.32 (0.30)
v3− v1 -0.64∗∗ (0.27)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. This specification includes the same list of covariates as the baseline
specification (see Table 2.4) and includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). Coefficients are statistically
significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Table 2.B.5: Effect of JCS for model with endogenous right-censoring
Transition Transition
U → E U → other LMS
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.16∗∗∗ (0.21) -1.42∗∗∗ (0.23)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.30 (0.22) 0.72∗∗∗ (0.13)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, U: Unemployment, LMS: Labor market state, Coef.: Coefficient, SE:
Standard error. This specification includes the same list of covariates as the baseline specification (see
Table 2.4) and includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). Coefficients are statistically significant at the
∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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2.C Additional Descriptives and Estimation Results
Table 2.C.1: Transitions to employment of JCS participants
In months 1 - 11 In months > 11
after program start after program start
All JCS participants 32 77
Female 19 47
Age > 45 13 32
High skilled 20 31
Dependent on year of program start
Start occurs in year 1991 - 1992 11 29
Start occurs in year 1993 - 1997 21 48
Dependent on elapsed unemployment duration at time of program start
Start occurs in months 1 - 12 of unemployment 24 44
Start occurs in months > 12 of unemployment 8 33
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Table 2.C.2: Transitions to employment of JCS participants dependent on
time since program start
In months 1 - 11 after program start 32
In months 12 - 13 after program start 15
In months 14 - 23 after program start 30
In months 24 - 25 after program start 12
In months > 25 after program start 20
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Table 2.C.3: Effect of JCS with three not eligible dummies
Transition Transition
U → E U → JCS
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.24∗∗∗ (0.21)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.21 (0.23)
Not eligible for JCS period 1991-1992 (strict criteria) 0.29 (0.28)
Not eligible for JCS period 1993-1999 (loose criteria) -1.02∗∗ (0.48)
Not eligible for JCS period 1993-1999 (strict criteria) -0.38 (0.28)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, Coef.: Coefficient, SE: Standard error. This specification includes the
same list of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4) and includes three unobserved mass
points (M=3). The strict eligibility criteria is defined as being unemployed for at least 6 months within
the last 12 months. The loose eligibility criteria is defined as being unemployed for at least 3 months.
Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Table 2.C.4: Effect of JCS with not eligible dummies dependent on
observed characteristics
Transition Transition
U → E U → JCS
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.22∗∗∗ (0.21)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.24 (0.23)
Not eligible for JCS 1991-1992 0.53 (0.35)
Not eligible for JCS 1993-1999 -0.44 (0.37)
Not eligible for JCS × Female -0.08 (0.29)
Not eligible for JCS × High skilled -0.14 (0.30)
Not eligible for JCS × Age > 45 -0.22 (0.33)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, Coef.: Coefficient, SE: Standard error. This specification includes the
same list of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4) and includes three unobserved mass
points (M=3). Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Table 2.C.5: Time dependent effect of JCS for model with
subsequent employment stability
Transition Transition
U → E E→U
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Panel A. Effect of JCS dependent on time since program start
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.19∗∗∗ (0.21) 0.28 (0.25)
Effect of JCS in months 12 - 13 after program start 0.29 (0.31) -0.82 (0.74)
Effect of JCS in months 14 - 23 after program start -0.12 (0.25) 0.24 (0.34)
Effect of JCS in months 24 - 25 after program start 1.22∗∗∗ (0.38) -0.19 (0.65)
Effect of JCS in months > 25 after program start 0.39 (0.35) 0.13 (0.48)
Panel B. Effect of JCS dependent on year of program start
Start occurs in year 1991 - 1992
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.13∗∗∗ (0.34) -0.10 (0.43)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.25 (0.32) 0.16 (0.35)
Start occurs in year 1993 - 1997
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.22∗∗∗ (0.26) 0.51∗ (0.30)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.13 (0.23) -0.16 (0.35)
Panel C. Effect of JCS dependent on elapsed unemployment duration at time of program start
Start occurs in months 1 - 12 of unemployment
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.13∗∗∗ (0.24) 0.22 (0.30)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.06 (0.26) 0.00 (0.33)
Start occurs in months > 12 of unemployment
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.45∗∗∗ (0.41) 0.48 (0.49)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.54∗∗ (0.27) -0.04 (0.38)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, U: Unemployment, E: Employment, Coef.: Coefficient, SE: Standard
error. These specifications include the same list of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4)
and include three unobserved mass points (M=3). Additionally, we control for the previous unemployment
duration and the previous unemployment duration squared for the transition rate from employment to
unemployment. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Table 2.C.6: Effect of JCS dependent on observed characteristics for model with
subsequent employment stability
Transition Transition
U → E E→U
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.77∗∗∗ (0.34) 0.37 (0.43)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.39 (0.34) 0.05 (0.38)
Effect of JCS × Female 0.51∗ (0.27) 0.03 (0.36)
Effect of JCS × Age > 45 0.05 (0.26) -0.08 (0.35)
Effect of JCS × High skilled 0.60∗∗ (0.26) -0.11 (0.38)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, U: Unemployment, E: Employment, Coef.: Coefficient, SE: Standard
error. This specification includes the same list of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4) and
includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). Additionally, we control for the previous unemployment
duration and the previous unemployment duration squared for the transition rate from employment to
unemployment. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Table 2.C.7: Effect of JCS with 2nd participation in JCS
Transition Transition
U → E U → JCS
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.22∗∗∗ (0.21)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.25 (0.22)
2nd participation in JCS -0.52 (0.45)
In JCS before 0.91∗∗∗ (0.19)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, Coef.: Coefficient, SE: Standard error. This specification includes the
same list of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4) and includes three unobserved mass
points (M=3). Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Table 2.C.8: Effect of JCS controlling for unemployment history
(independent unobserved heterogeneity)
Coefficient Standard error
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -0.89∗∗∗ (0.29)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.52∗ (0.27)
Number of previous unemployment spells:
2nd unemployment spell 0.22∗∗∗ (0.04)
3rd - 7th unemployment spell 0.33∗∗∗ (0.04)
Cumulated lagged unemployment duration:
13-24 months -0.41∗∗∗ (0.10)
25-36 months -0.81∗∗∗ (0.14)
37-48 months -1.16∗∗∗ (0.19)
> 48 months -1.63∗∗∗ (0.24)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. This specification includes the same list of covariates as the baseline
specification (see Table 4) and includes two unobserved mass points (M=2). Coefficients are statistically
significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Table 2.C.9: Effect of JCS controlling for unemployment history
(dependent unobserved heterogeneity)
Coefficient Standard error
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.23∗∗∗ (0.22)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.22 (0.23)
Number of previous unemployment spells:
2nd unemployment spell 0.06 (0.05)
3rd - 7th unemployment spell 0.03 (0.05)
Cumulated lagged unemployment duration:
13-24 months 0.02 (0.11)
25-36 months -0.03 (0.17)
37-48 months -0.02 (0.21)
> 48 months -0.26 (0.28)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. This specification includes the same list of covariates as the baseline
specification (see Table 4) and includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). Coefficients are statistically
significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Chapter 3
Unemployment Effects of the German
Minimum Wage in an Equilibrium Job
Search Model∗
3.1 Introduction
Equilibrium job search models have long been used to study labor markets in the presence
of search frictions. These frictions create a certain amount of market power for employers,
giving them some influence over wages. Understanding the empirical relevance of search
frictions therefore provides important insights into which of the two fundamentally
different frameworks, the neoclassical or the monopsonistic case, represent the more
appropriate view of the labor market. From a policy perspective, knowledge about the
“true” labor market structure is of key importance, as the predicted consequences of certain
economic policies may substantially differ from those derived from the neoclassical
competitive case (Manning, 2003).
In this chapter, we estimate an equilibrium job search model for the German labor
market. The German labor market is particularly interesting as it saw the introduction
of a statutory uniform minimum wage of 8.50 euros an hour in 2015.1 Before this
∗This chapter is joint work with Maximilian Blömer (ifo), Nicole Gürtzgen (IAB and University
of Regensburg), Holger Stichnoth (ZEW) and Gerard van den Berg (University of Bristol, IFAU, IZA,
ZEW and CEPR). We thank Andrew Shepard for sharing part of his programming routines with us. This
chapter has benefited from comments and suggestions by Richard Blundell, Philipp Dörrenberg, Bernd
Fitzenberger, Mario Meier, Fabien Postel-Vinay and Carsten Trenkler. Financial support from the State of
Baden-Württemberg (SEEK project 2014) and access to administrative data provided by the IAB are also
gratefully acknowledged. Finally, we would like to thank Paul König, Julius Koll, and Pierre Poulon for
their excellent research assistance.
1While a number of transitional measures respected existing collective agreements and those signed
in the meantime, the uniform minimum wage applied to all industries by 2017 at the latest. A further
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date, minimum wages had been implemented only in selected industries. Even though
monopsonistic labor market structures have frequently been invoked by policy-makers
to justify a wage floor, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on the relevance of
search frictions. Given the importance of frictions for the size and even the sign of the
(un)employment effects of a minimum wage, this clearly constitutes a major research
gap that our study aims to address. By estimating an equilibrium job search model,
our analysis not only seeks to gain a better understanding about the relevance of search
frictions, but also aims at quantifying the expected labor market effects of a uniform
minimum wage.
To assess search frictions and the unemployment effects of a minimum wage, we
estimate the wage-posting model by Bontemps et al. (1999), extended to allow for
different job offer arrival rates for the employed and the unemployed. The model is
well-suited for our purposes: by accounting for heterogeneity in both firms’ productivity
and workers’ reservation wages, it does not restrict the sign of unemployment effects a
priori.2
Our estimation uses a large administrative data set, the IAB Sample of Integrated Em-
ployment Biographies (SIAB). The SIAB is a two per cent random sample of individuals
subject to social security contributions during the time period 1975 to 2010. To guarantee
a consistent coverage of unemployment spells, we focus on the period 2007–2010. The
SIAB data provide an ideal basis for estimating a structural equilibrium search model for
several reasons. First and most importantly, the data allow us to precisely measure the
duration of different labor market states and transitions between them, notably job-to-job
as well as employment-to-unemployment transitions. These transitions are crucial to
the identification of the model’s central parameters, such as job arrival and destruction
rates. Second, as the data are based on employers’ notifications to the social security
authorities, they are less prone to measurement error than comparable information from
survey data. Additional advantages over survey data include the larger sample size and a
much lower level of panel attrition. We focus on low- and medium-skilled individuals, as
for these groups the assumption of wage posting is most convincing.
In addressing the unemployment market effects of the recent introduction of a uniform
minimum wage, our study contributes to the empirical literature on the labor market
transitory exemption was given to those industries where industry-specific minimum wages had already
been introduced prior to 2015 via the Posting of Workers Act (Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz). The bargaining
parties in an industry subject to this legislation may request that the Federal Ministry of Labour declares
its (minimum wage) agreement to be generally binding for the entire industry.
2Engbom and Moser (2017) use a similiar wage-posting model, extended for heterogeneity in workers’
ability, to study the role of the minimum wage in the decline of earnings inequality in Brazil. A closely
related literature assumes wage bargaining instead of wage posting; applications of these models to analyze
minimum wage effects include Flinn (2006) and Breda et al. (2016).
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effects of minimum wages in Germany. Most studies so far have evaluated the industry-
specific minimum wages, typically based on difference-in-differences designs. In what
is probably the first quasi-experimental study for Germany, König and Möller (2009)
analyze the introduction of a minimum wage in the construction industry. The authors
find no significant employment effects in West Germany and small negative effects in the
East, where the minimum wage has greater bite. In 2011, the German Federal Ministry of
Labour commissioned an evaluation of minimum wages in several industries. In general,
these studies also tend to find limited employment effects (e.g., Boockmann et al., 2013
and Frings, 2013), with the exception of the roofing industry (Aretz et al., 2013). While
these reduced-form approaches provide valuable insights into the labor market effects of
industry-specific policies, they are neither informative about the underlying transmission
mechanisms nor are they able to assess the economic impacts of different minimum
wage levels. The few available structural studies for Germany have relied on estimates
of labor demand functions under the assumption of perfect competition (Ragnitz and
Thum, 2008; Bauer et al., 2009 and Knabe and Schöb, 2009). In this framework, the
effects of a minimum wage can by construction only be zero (if the minimum wage is not
binding) or negative (see the critique by Fitzenberger, 2009). The strong negative effects
reported by some of these studies appear at odds with the quasi-experimental evidence,
which underscores the need for a richer structural model that allows for a wide range of
employment effects.
Our own simulations show that unemployment is a non-monotonic and non-linear
function of the minimum wage level. A minimum wage equivalent in real terms to the
one actually introduced in 2015 raises the unemployment rate by two percentage points,
a sizeable increase of 18% in relation to the old steady-state value. We also document
significant heterogeneity in search frictions and in reservation wages across labor markets
differentiated by region and type of occupation.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Sections 3.2 and 3.3 start
by giving a brief overview of the model. Section 3.4 provides a description of the
data set and the construction of our main variables of interest, and Section 3.5 presents
descriptive statistics. Section 3.6 outlines the estimation procedure. Section 3.7 presents
the estimation results and graphical representations of the key steady-state relationships.
Section 3.8 shows simulation results for the counterfactual introduction of different
minimum wage levels. Section 3.9 concludes.
102 of 235
CHAPTER 3. Unemployment Effects of the German Minimum Wage
3.2 Theoretical Overview
Equilibrium job search models provide a framework in which the wage offer distribution
that workers face in their search emerges as the equilibrium of a non-cooperative wage
search and wage posting game between workers and employers. A minimum wage policy
alters the wage offer distribution, thereby affecting the number of firms that continue
to operate in the market and increasing the average wage offer that an unemployed
person can expect to receive. A number of studies have estimated different variants
of equilibrium job search models building on the Burdett-Mortensen framework with
on-the-job search ( e.g. Bowlus et al., 1995; Bowlus et al., 2001 and van den Berg and
Ridder, 1998).
A drawback of the Burdett-Mortensen model is that it generates a strictly increasing
wage offer density. This has led researchers to shift the emphasis towards models
incorporating heterogeneity in firm productivity. Firm heterogeneity has been shown to
improve the fit of the wage distribution and has been modelled in different ways in the
literature. While Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) assume a log-normal distribution, Bowlus
et al. (1995), Bowlus et al. (2001) and Bunzel et al. (2001) allow for a discrete number
of firm types. Bontemps et al. (2000) allow for a continuous distribution but estimate
it non-parametrically. In the context of a minimum wage policy, heterogeneity in firm
productivity is of key importance, as in the case of homogeneous firms a minimum wage
would create a “knife-edge” impact on employment, with all firms either leaving or
staying in the market. In addition to incorporating heterogeneity in firm productivity, the
model by Bontemps et al. (1999) also allows for heterogeneity in workers’ reservation
wages. This creates more flexibility in terms of the predicted employment effects. In
particular, it implies that the minimum wage can, in principle, even have a positive effect
on employment. This may be driven by a higher acceptance rate of job offers because the
minimum wage precludes low wage offers, it draws more unemployed workers with high
reservation wages into the market. In the absence of a minimum wage, these workers
have to wait longer for a wage offer that is acceptable to them, as firms by assumption
cannot make wage offers conditional on individuals’ reservation wages.
3.3 Model Description
In this section, we provide a brief description of the model by Bontemps et al. (1999),
which we will extend by allowing the job offer arrival rate to differ across employed
and unemployed individuals, as in Shephard (2017) and Engbom and Moser (2017).
We start by describing firms’ and individuals’ strategies. Individuals maximize their
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expected steady-state discounted future income. They are characterized by heterogeneous
opportunity costs of employment denoted by b, which may include search costs and
unemployment benefits. The distribution of b is denoted by H, assumed to be continuous
over its support [b,b]. Job offers arrive at constant rate λ0 > 0 (λ1 > 0) for the unemployed
(employed) and are characterized by a draw from a wage offer distribution F with support
[w,w]. Layoffs arrive at constant rate δ . Unemployed individuals searching for a job face
an optimal stopping problem, the solution to which consists in accepting any wage offer
w such that w > φ . Employed individuals, in contrast, accept any wage offers strictly
greater than their present wage contract. As in Bontemps et al. (2000), the reservation
wage is implicitly defined as
φ = b+(κ0−κ1)
w∫
φ
F(x)
1+ ρδ +κ1F(x)
dx, (3.1)
where ρ denotes individuals’ discount rate, F(x) = 1−F(x), and κi = λiδ , i = 0,1. The
distribution of reservation wages, A, is then given by
A(φ) = H
φ − (κ0−κ1) w∫
φ
F(x)
1+ ρδ +κ1F(x)
dx
 . (3.2)
Equating equilibrium flows into and out of unemployment, the fraction of unemployed
with a reservation wage no larger than φ for φ ≤ w is represented by
uAu(φ) =
1
1+κ0
A(w). (3.3)
For φ > w, the fraction is given by
uAu(φ) =
1
1+κ0
A(w)+
φ∫
w
dA(x)
(1+κ0F(x))
. (3.4)
From this, one can derive the steady-state equilibrium unemployment rate as
u =
1
1+κ0
A(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1) UE who accept any job offer
+
w∫
w
dA(b)
(1+κ0F(b))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2) UE who accept/reject offers
+ (1−A(w))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3) UE who accept no offer
(3.5)
Moreover, similar to Bontemps et al. (1999) one can show that in steady-state there
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exists a unique relationship between the unobserved offer and the observed earnings
distribution functions. Equating the flow of layoffs and upgraded wages of those with a
wage lower than or equal to w and the flow of unemployed individuals accepting w, the
distribution of earnings G(w) is derived as
G(w) =
A(w)− [1+κ0F(w)]
[
1
1+κ0 A(w)+
w∫
w
1
1+κ0F(x)
dA(x)
]
[
1+κ1F(w)
]
(1−u) . (3.6)
Each firm offers only one wage and incurs a flow p of marginal revenue per worker. A
firm seeks to maximize its steady-state profit flow, pi(p,w) = (p−w) · l(w), with l(w)
denoting the size of a firm’s labor force. The number of workers, l, attracted by a firm
that offers wage w solves
l(w) =
d(1−u)G(w)
dF(w)
,
and therefore
l(w) =
κ1A(w)
(1+κ1F(w))
2 +
κ0−κ1
(1+κ1F(w))
2
 1
1+κ0
A(w)+
w∫
w
1
1+κ0F(x)
dA(x)
 . (3.7)
It can be shown that l(w) is an increasing function of the offered wage. Note that the
last term distinguishes l(w) from the original model by Bontemps et al. (1999), where
λ0 = λ1. The term reflects that if λ0 6= λ1, the number of employed and unemployed
individuals that are attracted by the firm at a wage w may differ from each other.
Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity p. The distribution of p across active
firms is denoted by Γ(p), and is assumed to be continuous over its support [p, p]. With
w = K(p) denoting the function that maps the support of the productivity distribution
Γ into the support of the wage offer distribution F , we have F(w) = Γ(K−1(w)). The
solution to the optimal wage setting problem of a p-type firm is represented by
K(p) = p−
 κ0(p−w)(1+κ0)(1+κ1)A(w)+
p∫
p
l(K(x))dx
 1l(K(p)) , (3.8)
which completes the steady-state solution of the model.
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3.4 Data
Our empirical analysis uses German register data, the IAB Sample of Integrated Em-
ployment Biographies (SIAB). This administrative data set, which is described in more
detail by vom Berge et al. (2013), is a two per cent random sample of all individuals
who have at least one entry in their social security records between 1975 and 2010 in
West Germany and between 1992 and 2010 in East Germany, respectively. The SIAB
data cover approximately 80 per cent of the German workforce, providing longitudinal
information on the employment biographies of 1,594,466 individuals. Self-employed
workers, civil servants, and individuals doing military service are not included in the
SIAB.
The data provide an ideal basis for estimating a structural equilibrium search model
for several reasons. First and most importantly, the data contain daily information on
employment records subject to social security contributions, unemployment records of
benefit recipients as well as of registered job seekers. This permits us to precisely measure
the duration of different labor market states and the transitions between them, notably
job-to-job transitions as well as transitions between employment and unemployment
(while receiving or not receiving benefits). Second, due to their administrative nature the
data are less prone to measurement error than comparable information from survey data.
Additional advantages over survey data include the larger sample size and a much more
limited degree of panel attrition.
Sample selection proceeds in several steps. Before restricting the sample to a specific
time span and population, we fill in missing values using all the information available
in the full dataset (see Appendix 3.A.1). We then disregard employment spells where
individuals receive Hartz IV benefits while working, because for this group the wage
alone is not a useful metric for work incentives.
We construct a stock sample by keeping only those employment and unemployment
spells including the set date 1 January 2007. Restricting the sample to the period 2007 to
2010 has the advantage that it permits us to include unemployment spells for individuals
receiving means-tested welfare benefits, which were not recorded in the data prior to
2007. While this comes at the cost of including left-censored unemployment spells,
it enables us to adopt a consistent definition of unemployment throughout the sample
period.3 This leads to a sample of 682,581 individuals.
From this sample we select only individuals who are part of the workforce. The data
do not make it possible to distinguish between involuntarily unemployed individuals not
receiving benefits and individuals who voluntarily left the labor force or who became
3Details on the definition of the different labor market states are given in Appendix 3.A.2.
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self-employed or civil servants. To distinguish more precisely between voluntary and
involuntary unemployment, we follow the assumptions proposed by Sokbae and Wilke
(2009) (see Appendix 3.A.2). To focus on individuals in the workforce, we restrict the
sample to individuals who are at least 20 years old and younger than 63 years. The sample
is further restricted to low- and medium-skilled individuals. We exclude highly skilled
individuals because this group is less likely to be in a labor market that is characterized
by a wage-posting mechanism. We then drop individuals who still have missing values
in the relevant observables, such as daily wages, the educational and occupational status
as well as the regional affiliation. This leads to a new sample size of 370,104 individuals.
The SIAB data do not include information on hours worked. We therefore focus
on full-time employment spells and disregard individuals who are employed part-time
during the time period under consideration.
To calculate hourly wages for full-time employment spells, we impute the number
of hours worked based on information from the German Microcensus. The imputation
is done separately by region, sex, sector, job classification, and educational degree. For
details, see Appendix 3.A.3.
In the model, each job is characterized by a single, time-invariant wage. For indi-
viduals who were employed on 1 January 2007, we compute this wage as the weighted
average of the wages earned over the past year in the same job, where the weights are
given by the length of time over which a particular wage was received. Likewise, the
wage after an unemployment-to-employment spell is based on the weighted average
over the first year after the transition.4 To reduce the influence of outliers, we discount
observations with implausibly low hourly wages (wages below 3 euros or below the
existing sectoral minimum wages). The resulting final sample contains information on
235,706 individuals.
The wage information in the IAB data is censored since there is an upper contribution
limit in the social security system. We do not inlude observations with censored wages.5
The model assumes that worker productivity is homogenous. Following Bontemps
et al. (1999), we therefore estimate the model separately for different labor market
segments. We assume that both the employed and the unemployed receive job offers only
within their segment. We define the segments based on six job classifications (occupation
types, see Appendix 3.A.6) and two regions (East Germany and West Germany including
Berlin). These two dimensions allow us to define segmented labor markets fairly well
(though not perfectly). As Table 3.A.1 shows, 95.9% of employment-to-employment
4For details, see Appendix 3.A.4.
5For details, see Appendix 3.A.5. In a robustness check, we address this issue by replacing censored
observations with imputed wages, following Gartner (2005).
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transitions remain in the same region, 83.4% remain in the same job classification, and
80.1% remain in the same region and job classification, i.e. the same labor market
according to our definition. As for unemployment-to-employment transitions, 95.3%
occur within the same region, 73.7% within the same job classification, and 70.7% within
both the same region and the same job classification (see Table 3.A.2).
3.5 Descriptives
3.5.1 Transitions
Tables 3.B.1 and 3.B.2 in Appendix 3.B report the type, number, and share of transitions
for our stock sample of individuals who were either unemployed (7.6%) or employed
(92.4%) on 1 January 2007. Of the 217,733 individuals who were employed on this
date, 68% stayed in their job for the next four years while 20% moved to another job
and 13% became unemployed. Transitions in the other direction are much more frequent
in relative terms: 45% of the 17,973 unemployment spells ended with a transition into
regular employment during the four-year period after 1 January 2007. At the same
time, 55% of individuals who were unemployed on this date remained without a job
over the entire period. Left-censoring is relatively frequent for the unemployment spells
(22%) because in some of the data sources for unemployment benefit histories, recording
starts at a fixed date which does not necessarily coincide with the beginning of the
unemployment spell (see Appendix 3.A.2).
The table also breaks down these statistics by labor market, as defined by region and
job classification. About 84% of the individuals in the sample worked or searched for
a job in West Germany (including Berlin), the remaining 16% in East Germany. On 1
January 2007, the unemployment rate was higher in East Germany (11%) than in West
Germany (7%). However, the fraction of unemployed individuals finding a new job over
the four-year observation window was almost identical in East and West Germany (44%).
Looking at transitions of employed individuals, we find that most individuals stayed
in their current job, while around 20% of the employed individuals in West Germany
and 19% in East Germany changed their employer within the four years. The relative
frequency of transitions into unemployment was higher in East Germany (17%) than in
West Germany (12%).
As for the six job classifications, note the large number of observations for “pro-
duction, craft” sectors which are still fairly important in Germany and especially in our
sample of low- and medium-skilled individuals. The unemployment rate on 1 January
2007 varied between 5% in white-collar jobs and 20% in agriculture, partially reflect-
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ing the varying importance of seasonal unemployment. Consistent with this seasonal
influence, the share of unemployment-to-employment transitions was particularly high
in agriculture (65%). At the other end of the spectrum, only 31% of the unemployed
individuals in sales found work within the next four years.
In our administrative data set, the number of observations is large even when inter-
acting job classifications with regions; sample sizes range from 1,225 (agriculture, East
Germany) to 76,723 (production/craft, West Germany). Both the unemployment rates
and the transitions reflect the differences already discussed; i.e., unemployment rates are
lower in the West for all job classifications, and the differences across classifications also
hold within the two regions.
3.5.2 Durations
Figure 3.B.1 in Appendix 3.B shows non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the
survival function for remaining in the initial state (employment or unemployment) for the
whole sample. The survival functions are also shown for the twelve different sub-samples
defined by region and job classification (Figures 3.B.2 to 3.B.7 in Appendix 3.B). In
our data, the maximum duration of an unemployment spell is six years.6 Employment
spells can in principle last over the whole observation period: 35 years in West Germany
(1975–2010) and 19 years in East Germany (1991–2010).7
Transitions out of unemployment. The chance of transitioning into employment is
particularly high within the first year – only about 60% of the unemployed were still
without a job after twelve months (cf. panel (a) in Figure 3.B.1). By the third year,
about 40% of the unemployed had not found employment, and after the third year the
survival function flattens out. As can be seen in panel (a) of Figures 3.B.2 to 3.B.7, the
pattern is very similar for East and West Germany, but there is substantial variation
across job classifications. Most notably, jobs in agriculture (Figure 3.B.2) as well as
6“Unemployment benefit I” (ALG I), a non means-tested transfer which is part of the unemployment
insurance system, is typically paid for only one year (two years for older workers). Once ALG I runs out,
the unemployed are entitled to the much lower and means-tested “unemployment benefit II” (ALG II),
which was introduced on 1 January 2005. Before 2005, ALG I was followed by “Arbeitslosenhilfe” instead
of ALG II. This means that individuals receiving “Arbeitslosenhilfe” before 2005 were entitled to ALG
II afterwards. However, spells of receiving ALG II are only recorded in the data from 1 January 2007
onwards. This makes 1 January 2005 the earliest starting point for unemployment spells in our data. These
spells refer to those individuals who received ALG I benefits during 2005 and 2006 and who were entitled
to ALG II afterwards (starting from 2007). As our sample covers the period 2007–2010, the maximum
duration of an unemployment spell is six years.
71.29% of the employment spells are left-censored which means employment without interruption at
the same firm since 1 January 1975 in West Germany or since 1991 in East Germany.
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production/craft jobs (Figure 3.B.3) are characterized by short unemployment durations.
Around 75% of the unemployment spells in agriculture were shorter than one year (the
share is even higher in West Germany and lower in East Germany). In production/craft
jobs (the largest group), more than half of the unemployment spells were shorter than
one year. At the other end of the spectrum, unemployed individuals who formerly had
sales and service jobs tend to have long unemployment durations (Figures 3.B.5 and
3.B.7).
Transitions out of employment. For individuals who were initially employed, transitions
can be either into another job (panel(b) in Figures 3.B.1 to 3.B.7) or into unemployment
(panel (c)). The durations of employment spells that end because of unemployment are
in general longer than employment spells that end in a job-to-job transition. With regard
to employment-to-employment transitions, the probability of still being employed at the
current employer is typically around 75% after fifteen years. This holds for both East
and West Germany. However, employment spells that end into unemployment tend to be
longer in the West than in the East.
Regarding job classifications, sales jobs stand out both for transitions into other jobs
and for transitions into unemployment; at each point in time, the share of the employed
who have left their initial job for one of these destinations is particularly high. Agriculture
is inconspicuous for employment-to-employment transitions, but features a high share
of transitions into short durations of unemployment especially in East Germany. White-
collar employees tend to have the longest employment durations, with a large fraction of
employment spells being right-censored.
3.5.3 Wage Distributions
Figure 3.B.8 in Appendix 3.B shows the distribution of wages before and after a labor
market transition for the whole sample. As part of the descriptives, we include all three
types of transitions (e→ e, e→ u, u→ e) and also document the wage distributions for
right- and left-censored spells. In the estimation, only the wages in the initial employment
spell or after a transition from unemployment to employment will be used.
As expected, wages of individuals who change their job tend to be higher than wages
before a transition into unemployment. Comparing wages before and after a job-to-job
transition, we find that wages earned in the new job are on average slightly higher than
the wages earned in the old position. Also in line with expectations, wages after an
unemployment-to-employment transition tend to be relatively low. A sizeable fraction of
the unemployed move to jobs paying less than 8.50 euros an hour, the statutory minimum
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wage introduced in 2015, i.e. after our sampling period 2007–2010. This also holds
within the different labor market segments defined by region and job classification (see
Figures 3.B.9 to 3.B.14 in Appendix 3.B).
These figures confirm the well-known fact that wages tend to be lower in East
Germany and also document variation in hourly wages across job classifications. In
both East and West Germany, we find that on average wages are higher for white-collar
employees (Figure 3.B.11) as well as for office workers (Figure 3.B.13) while wages are
lower in agricultural professions (Figure 3.B.9), among service workers (Figure 3.B.14),
and for individuals working in sales (Figure 3.B.12).
3.6 Estimation
We begin this section by deriving the likelihood contributions of unemployed and
employed workers, taking into account stock sampling as well as left- and right-censoring.
We then outline the estimation procedure, which combines the likelihood function with a
non-parametric estimate of the wage distribution.
Likelihood – unemployed workers. As seen in Equation (3.5), the steady-state unemploy-
ment rate has three components. For individuals with low enough opportunity costs of
employment, unemployment is purely frictional. In a second group, unemployment is
driven by both search frictions and the opportunity cost of employment; these individuals
will accept some job offers, but reject others. Finally, there is a third group for whom
unemployment is permanent given the wage offer distribution F , as any wage offer is
below their reservation wage. As a result, the likelihood contribution of an individual
who is initially unemployed is a mixture distribution:
λ 2−db−d f0 · e−λ0(t0b+t0 f ) ·
A(w)
1+κ0
· f (w0)1−d f
+
d f w+(1−d f )w0∫
w
(
λ0F(x)
)2−db−d f · e−λ0·F(x)·(t0b+t0 f ) · f (w0)
F(x)
1−d f
· dA(x)
1+κ0F(x)
+ [1−A(w)]db·d f . (3.9)
The first term of the sum corresponds to purely frictional unemployment. As job
offers arrive with Poisson rate λ0, unemployment durations are exponentially distributed.
In a flow sample, where the elapsed (“backward") duration t0b is zero by definition, the
density of the residual (“forward") duration t0 f is given as h(t0 f ) = λ0 exp(−λ0t0 f ). In a
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stock sample, we need to consider the total duration t0b+ t0 f , conditional on the elapsed
duration t0b. The latter has the density h(t0b) = λ0 exp(−λ0t0b). It can be shown (e.g.
Lancaster, 1990) that the conditional density h(t0 f |t0b) is given as λ0 exp(−λ0t0 f ). For
the joint density we then obtain h(t0b, t0 f ) = h(t0 f |t0b)h(t0b) = λ 20 exp
(−λ0(t0b+ t0 f )),
which is the term that figures in the likelihood expression above. The term in front
of the exponential function is adjusted if either the elapsed or the residual duration is
censored (db = 1 or d f = 1). f (w0) is the density function of wage offers evaluated at the
offer that we observe as the initially unobserved person transits into employment. If the
unemployment duration is right-censored (d0 f = 1), this term drops out of the likelihood
function.
The second term of the sum has the same basic structure, but with some adjustments
for the fact that individuals in this group are sometimes faced with wage offers that are
below their reservation wage. The unemployment spell hazard rate is therefore given
not by λ0, but by the product λ0F(b). The second adjustment concerns the wage offer
density, which is now truncated at b, so we have f (w0)/F(b).8
Finally, the third term applied to individuals who, given F , are permanently
unemployed. This implies that the observed unemployment spell must be both left- and
right-censored, hence the db ·d f in the exponent.
Likelihood – employed workers. For individuals who are initially employed, the likeli-
hood contribution is
κ0
1+κ0
·g(w1) ·
[
δ +λ1F(w1)
]1−d1b · e−[δ+λ1F(w1)](t1b+t1 f ) [δ v (λ1F(w1))1−v]1−d1 f .
(3.10)
In steady state, a fraction κ0/(1+κ0) of all individuals is employed. g is the density of
wages in the initial job. Unlike for the unemployed, the reservation wage of a worker
is observed and equals his or her current wage, so there is no mixing distribution for
the durations. However, there are now two competing reasons for why a spell may end:
layoff (at rate δ ) or a better job offer (at rate λ1F(w)). The indicator v equals 1 in the
first case and 0 in the second. t1b denotes the elapsed duration, and t1 f the residual
duration of the current job. d1b equals 1 if the elapsed duration is left-censored, while
d1 f = 1 means that the residual duration is right-censored, i.e. the individual does not
change his or her job during the observation period.
8Note that as F(b) = 1 for b < w, the first term of the sum could be integrated into the second term.
We choose to present them separately here to better reflect the conceptual difference between the three
components behind the unemployment rate.
112 of 235
CHAPTER 3. Unemployment Effects of the German Minimum Wage
Estimation procedure. Maximum likelihood estimation of the model requires functional
form assumptions for H and Γ. The estimation is numerically cumbersome as f , g, and
F are highly non-linear functions of Γ. In particular, optimization involves the numerical
computation of the inverse K−1, further complicated by the fact that K contains an
integral that has to be evaluated numerically as well. Beyond these numerical concerns,
there is the issue that most distributions for Γ imply wage distributions that do not fit the
data well.
As an alternative, Bontemps et al. (2000) therefore propose a three-step procedure in
which the wage distribution is estimated non-parametrically:
1. In a first step, we estimate G and g (the cdf and pdf of the wage distribution) using
a kernel density estimator, and estimate w and w as the sample minimum and
maximum of the wages of workers who are employed on 1 January 2007. Based
on these non-parametric estimates and a parametric assumption for the opportunity
cost distribution, namely H ∼ N (µb, σ2b ), we obtain consistent estimates for
F and f (conditional on µb,σb,λ0,λ1,δ and the assumption that ρ = 0.004) by
numerically solving the following expressions (recall that u is a function of F):
F̂(w) =
A(w)−uAu(w)− (1−u)Ĝ(w)
κ1 · Ĝ(w) · (1−u)+κ0 ·u ·Au(w)
(3.11)
and
f̂ (w) =
(1−u) · ĝ(w) · (1+κ1Fˆ(w))
κ0 ·u ·Au(w)+κ1 · (1−u) · Ĝ(w)
. (3.12)
2. The estimates from Step 1 are plugged into the likelihood function, which is then
maximized with respect to µb, σb, λ0, λ1, and δ .
3. Once these parameters are known, the productivity of a firm can be inferred from
the wage that it offers:
p = K−1(w)
=w+
(
κ0 ·A′(w) · (1+κ1 · F̂(w))
(1+κ0 · F̂(w)) · (κ1A(w)+(κ0−κ1)) ·u ·Au(w)
+
2 ·κ1 · f̂ (w)
1+κ1 · F̂(w))
)−1
(3.13)
Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping the three-step procedure with 100 replica-
tions.
113 of 235
CHAPTER 3. Unemployment Effects of the German Minimum Wage
3.7 Estimation Results
3.7.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 3.1 reports the estimated parameters and the associated bootstrap standard errors.
The large sample size of almost a quarter of a million observations allows for fairly
precise estimates.
For the whole sample, we estimate a monthly job destruction rate δ of 0.0063.
Looking at twelve sub-samples defined by region and job classification, we find that job
destruction rates are higher in East Germany than in the West, and higher for agricultural
and sales jobs than for white-collar employees or office workers. Our estimates range
from 0.0054 (white-collar, West) to 0.0118 (agriculture, East). These orders of magnitude
are similar to existing studies. For France in the 1990s, Bontemps et al. (1999) find a
δ between 0.0032 and 0.0069, depending on the sector. Using SIAB data for an earlier
period (1995–2000), Nanos and Schluter (2014) estimate the monthly layoff rate to be
between 0.0032 and 0.0243 in Germany. Holzner and Launov (2010), who use data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984–2001, estimate a δ of 0.0047.
The estimated κ , i.e., the ratio of the job arrival over the job destruction rate, is greater
for the unemployed than for the employed. We find κ0 to be 13.72 and κ1 to be 8.18.
Holzner and Launov find a κ1 of 2.2, while their three values of κ for the unemployed
(they assume that individuals search on skill-specific labor markets) range between 5.6
and 17.1. In their study for France, Bontemps et al. 2000 also estimate a much higher
job arrival rate for the unemployed than for the employed. In all cases, this reflects
that continental European labor markets are characterized by relatively little job-to-job
mobility compared with the United States.
The differences between regions and job classifications are potentially relevant for
the design of the new statutory minimum wage in Germany. After a transition period,
the minimum wage became uniform for all workers by 2017 at the latest. Our results
suggest that the uniform rate applies to labor market segments that differ in the extent of
search frictions and thus in firms’ monopsony power on the labor market.
According to our estimates, the distribution of the opportunity costs of employment
has a mean µb close to 0 euros per hour, both in the whole sample and for the different
subsamples. The standard deviation σb is estimated to be 1.85 for the whole sample.
However, unlike in the model of Bontemps et al. (1999), the reservation wages are
not identical to the opportunity costs of employment. This is because job offer arrival
rates are higher when unemployed, so it is optimal for the unemployed to reject certain
wage offers in the hope of getting a higher offer in the future (cf. Equation (3.1)). Based
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Table 3.1: Estimation results
N δ κ1 κ0 µφ µb σb β u
Whole sample 235706 0.0063 8.18 13.72 4.74 0.00 1.85 0.63 0.1081
(0.0000) (0.09) (0.17) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.0004)
West Germany
Agriculture 2685 0.0087 7.50 14.48 4.69 0.00 2.34 0.46 0.1303
(0.0002) (0.58) (1.23) (0.19) (0.00) (0.20) (0.01) (0.0040)
Production, Craft 76723 0.0058 12.06 22.71 6.17 0.00 3.11 0.68 0.0856
(0.0000) (0.39) (0.83) (0.06) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.0007)
White-collar 16943 0.0054 10.77 17.84 5.91 0.00 2.97 0.74 0.0964
(0.0000) (0.56) (1.05) (0.12) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.0014)
Sales 10080 0.0079 4.79 8.47 4.15 0.00 1.52 0.50 0.1557
(0.0001) (0.22) (0.42) (0.09) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) (0.0021)
Office 46978 0.0057 8.04 12.54 4.68 0.00 2.06 0.70 0.1101
(0.0000) (0.13) (0.24) (0.06) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.0009)
Service 45250 0.0069 7.36 12.56 4.28 0.00 1.56 0.58 0.1104
(0.0000) (0.15) (0.36) (0.09) (0.02) (0.11) (0.00) (0.0010)
East Germany
Agriculture 1225 0.0118 3.55 14.06 5.32 0.00 3.13 0.34 0.1893
(0.0016) (0.42) (2.58) (0.27) (0.00) (0.24) (0.02) (0.0119)
Production, Craft 15099 0.0090 7.16 18.73 5.73 0.00 2.67 0.45 0.1256
(0.0023) (0.90) (2.39) (0.51) (0.00) (0.12) (0.04) (0.0179)
White-collar 3081 0.0063 10.57 19.74 5.32 0.00 2.18 0.63 0.1002
(0.0001) (3.60) (7.29) (0.19) (0.00) (0.18) (0.01) (0.0033)
Sales 1932 0.0091 4.90 10.70 3.85 0.00 1.09 0.44 0.1704
(0.0002) (0.64) (1.64) (0.14) (0.08) (0.26) (0.01) (0.0148)
Office 6655 0.0061 7.89 13.67 4.47 0.00 1.42 0.66 0.1103
(0.0001) (0.70) (1.19) (0.12) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.0023)
Service 9055 0.0075 6.20 12.03 3.95 0.00 1.29 0.54 0.1263
(0.0001) (1.44) (2.45) (0.09) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.0122)
Notes: Calibrated parameters: ρ = 0.004. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (100 runs).
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
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on the estimated parameters, we find that the distribution of reservation wages is centered
around a µφ of about 4.74 euros per hour. The reservation wages tend to be higher and
more widely dispersed in the West, with the sole exception of agricultural jobs. Among
job classifications, sales jobs stand out for having both the smallest mean (3.85 euros in
East Germany and 4.15 euros in West Germany) and the smallest standard deviation of
the reservation wage. White-collar workers and workers in production and craft have the
highest reservation wages when unemployed.
The differences in µφ between the subsamples are almost exclusively driven not by
inherent differences in opportunity costs (recall that µb is close to zero everywhere),
but by differences in the frictional parameters. For instance, the difference between
κ0 and κ1 is particularly large for production/craft jobs in the West and particularly
small for sales jobs in the East, which is reflected in a much higher µφ in the first case.
Differences in φ also arise because of different layoff rates. The higher the layoff rate,
the smaller the expression β ≡ ρ/δ in Equation (3.1), and thus the larger the incentive
for the unemployed to be picky when accepting a wage offer – after all, accepting a job
already means giving up a higher job arrival rate, and if, in addition, the job has a higher
probability of ending, there is less of an incentive to accept it.
Finally, based on Equation (3.5) we can compute the steady-state unemployed rate u
implied by our estimates. For the entire sample, we find a rate of 10.85%, which is higher
than the rate of 7.6% observed in our stock sample. The variation across regions and job
classifications is in line with the patterns documented for the sample, i.e. steady-state
unemployment is higher in the East and in agricultural and sales jobs.
3.7.2 Distribution of Wages, Opportunity Costs, Markups, Produc-
tivity
Figure 3.1 shows key plots for the whole sample summarizing the steady-state equi-
librium. Panel (a) depicts our non-parametric estimate for G, the cdf of the wage
distribution. The pdf g, which is not shown here, is similarly estimated using a kernel
density estimator.
To find the wage offer distribution F (panel (b)), the estimate for G is combined with
the maximum likelihood estimates for the frictional parameters and the opportunity cost
distribution, as outlined in Section 3.6 above. Note that the location and the shape of the
wage offer distributions differ from the wage distribution. For instance, more than 70%
of the wage offers but only 20% of observed wages are below 10 euros.
Panel (c) shows the estimated distribution of reservation wages. This is a normal
distribution centered around µφ = 4.74 euros and truncated at 3 euros, the lowest admis-
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Figure 3.1: Main equilibrium functions (whole sample)
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sible hourly wage. Note that there is hardly any mass left beyond 10 euros. This means
that the positive effect of higher minimum wages operating through a lower rate of job
offer rejections will be mostly limited to minimum wage levels below 10 euros.
Panel (d) presents the optimal wage offer as a function of firm productivity p. For
example, a firm with a value product of 20 euros per hour will optimally set a wage of
about 15 euros per hour. The absolute markup, which is shown in a log-log-scale in
panel (e), grows monotonically and at a roughly constant rate with a firm’s productivity.
Expressed as a percentage of productivity (panel (f)), the relationship becomes non-
monotonic, although the pattern of a general increase is preserved; while the lowest-
productivity firm has a markup of about 15%, the markup is over 80% for the firm
with the highest productivity. Put differently, workers obtain less than 20% of the value
product in these high-productivity firms. However, as the estimate of the productivity
distribution Γ in panel (g) makes clear, such cases are fairly rare, with the bulk of firms
having a value product of less than 20 euros per hour. Finally, panel (h) shows that our
three-stage estimate of firm productivity results in a (non-parametric) distribution that
is not too dissimilar from a Pareto distribution in that the density γ is a straight line in
log-log-coordinates over a wide range of p.
The main equilibrium functions for the twelve different labor markets defined by
region and job classification can be found in Appendix 3.C.1.
3.7.3 Robustness Checks
Table 3.C.1 in Appendix 3.C.2 reports results from a number of robustness checks for
the whole sample. First, instead of disregarding individuals with wages right-censored
at the upper limit for social security contributions (SSC), we use a Tobit regression to
impute wages above this limit. Second, we replace the imputation of working hours
with the assumption that all full-time employees work 40 hours per week. Third, we
experimented with different ways of assigning a single wage to employment spells that
last over several years, during which time individuals typically experience wage increases.
In the theoretical model, this cannot happen as each job is characterized by a single,
time-invariant wage. In our main specification, we use the average wage in the same
job over the past year. In a robustness check, we use the last observed wage only. The
two measures differ to the extent that individuals experience wage changes within the
last year. Fourth, we truncated the wage distribution at different levels. In our main
specification, wages below 3.00 euros per hour are discounted. We changed this threshold
to 2.00 euros and 4.00 euros, respectively. Moreover, when replacing the right-censoring
at the upper limit for SSC with an imputation procedure, we tried two variants in which
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we truncated the imputed wages at the 95th or 99th percentile. Finally, we set ρ , which
is assumed to be 0.004 in our main specification, to alternative values (0.002 or 0.006).
We also combined the robustness checks along the different dimensions.
The estimation results are fairly unaffected by these variations. The same is true
for the comparative statics results (not shown here for the robustness checks). Only
for the different truncation levels (2.00 euros/4.00 euros instead of 3.00 euros) is there
a slightly stronger reaction of some of the parameters, though the comparative statics
results remain qualitatively very similar.
3.8 Unemployment Effects of Different Minimum Wage
Levels
Due to the heterogeneity in both the opportunity cost of employment and firms’
productivity, the unemployment rate is a non-linear and non-monotonic function of the
minimum wage level.
Decomposition of the unemployment rate. Unemployment can be of three types, as
shown by the decomposition in Equation (3.5). Group (1) consists of individuals whose
reservation wage is below w, i.e., who will accept any job offer. This purely frictional
unemployment decreases in κ0, the ratio of the job arrival rate of the unemployed over
the job destruction rate. For Group (2), unemployment is partly frictional (through
κ0) and partly driven by the interplay between the reservation wage and the wage
offer distribution. Unemployed individuals in this group accept some job offers but
reject others, depending on the wage offer. Finally, individuals in Group (3) are perma-
nently unemployed because their reservation wage is higher than the highest wage offer w.
Effects through the wage offer distribution. For minimum wage levels below the lowest
productivity level p, the model predicts that a minimum wage reduces unemployment,
as long as the minimum wage shifts up firms’ optimal wage offers. The reason is that
in this case unemployed individuals are now more likely to receive acceptable wage
offers. With w= 3.00 euros and our estimate for the wage offer function, this cutoff level
is pˆ = Kˆ−1(3.00) = 3.42 euros for the whole sample. The introduction of a minimum
wage of, say, 3.10 euros limits firms’ power to set wages below productivity. The lowest
wage is now 3.10 euros instead of 3.00 euros and, via Equation (3.8), this increase has
repercussions throughout the entire wage offer distribution. This is illustrated in Panel (a)
of Figure 3.2 for the whole sample: the higher the minimum wage level, the smaller
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium functions for different minimum wage levels (whole sample)
the workforce l that a firm attracts for a given wage offer w. Moreover, the relationship
between l and w becomes less steep for higher minimum wages.
As a result of these interactions operating through l(w), different minimum wage
levels lead to different optimal wage offer functions KˆMW , and therefore to different wage
offer distributions FˆMW . Increasing the minimum wage generally shifts KˆMW upwards
and FˆMW to the right (cf. panels (b) and (c)). While the biggest changes occur for low
wages and productivities, even high-productivity firms adjust their wage offer slightly in
response to an increase in the minimum wage.
These changes in the wage offer distribution affect the steady-state unemployment
rate. A minimum wage below p leads to an increase in w, which in turn means that some
individuals shift from Group (2) to Group (1) in Equation (3.5). As 1+κ0 > 1+κ0F(b)
for all b ∈ ]w,w], this leads to a reduction in the unemployment rate. For individuals
staying in Group (2), unemployment goes down as F(w) decreases for all w. Moreover,
the highest wage offer w increases, which reduces the number of individuals who reject
all job offers (Group 3).
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Effects through the job arrival rates. For minimum wage levels above the lowest
productivity level p, the sign of the minimum wage effect on unemployment becomes
ambiguous a priori. The minimum wage now affects the lowest productivity level pMW
that guarantees non-negative profits. As a result, the fraction of operating firms Γ(pMW )
decreases. Following Bontemps et al. (1999) and Bontemps et al. (2000), we assume that
κ0 and κ1 are proportional to this fraction. This means that a minimum wage above p
reduces the ratio of the job arrival rate over the job destruction rate. The unemployment
effect of a minimum wage is now the result of two countervailing forces: the reduction in
unemployment as higher wage offers lead to less frequent rejections of job offers, and the
negative effect arising from the fact that job offers now arrive at a slower rate. Formally,
the second effect reduces the denominators in Equation (3.5), thereby increasing the
frictional component of unemployment in Groups 1 and 2.
Effects through reservation wages. So far, we have discussed the channels operating
through the wage offer distribution and the job offer arrival rates. Both channels are
already present in the Bontemps et al. (1999) model with homogenous λ . In our
extension of the model with λ0 6= λ1, there is an additional channel operating through A,
the distribution of reservation wages φ . This channel is present regardless of whether the
minimum wage is below or above p. As shown in Equation (3.1), the reservation wage φ
depends on κ0, κ1, F and w, all of which are functions of the minimum wage. While an
increase in w raises the reservation wage, a proportional reduction in κ0 and κ1 lowers it.
F has a double effect on φ , operating both through the numerator and the denominator
of the second term in Equation (3.1). Empirically, the resulting net influence on A turns
out to be relatively small in our application. In fact, the different density plots of A are
identical to the status-quo plot for the range of minimum wage levels considered here,
and are therefore not shown. As a result, the minimum wage effects in the richer model
with λ0 6= λ1 prove to be very close to the ones in the model with homogenous λ .
Total effect on unemployment. Figure 3.3 shows the effect of different minimum wage
levels on the unemployment rate and the average unemployment duration, based on the
estimation results for the whole sample. The solid line in the upper panel is the effect
that is actually predicted by the model. The dotted line allows for heterogeneity in b, but
switches off the channel operating through the reduction in job offer arrival rates; these
are held constant at their estimated status-quo levels. The dashed line shows the ratio
1/(1+ κˆ0). In this case, the positive effect working through the wage offer distribution is
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switched off. All unemployment is purely frictional from the start, and higher minimum
wages increase search frictions and thereby unemployment through the reduction in κ0
and κ1.
In our actual model (solid line), the relationship between u and the minimum wage
level is non-monotonic; from a status-quo level (with no minimum wage) of about
11%, unemployment falls for very low levels of wMW and reaches its minimum at
wMW = 3.45 euros. From there on, unemployment increases with the level of the
minimum wage. The status-quo unemployment rate is again reached at 3.51 euros; this is
the highest value of the minimum wage that does not lead to an increase in unemployment
in relation to the status quo. For higher values, the increase in unemployment is relatively
modest at first but becomes more significant above 8.00 euros. The positive effect
working through higher wage offers is nearly exhausted by this point, i.e. there is little
mass left in the reservation wage density. This is illustrated by the dotted line. The
line shows what happens to the unemployment rate as the frictional component gains
more and more in importance. Since the opportunity cost distribution H is unbounded,
purely frictional unemployment (corresponding to a situation in which all unemployed
individuals are in Group (1)) is reached only asymptotically. However, at a minimum
wage level of 8.00 euros the dotted line is already very close to its limit as wmin approaches
infinity (6.96% vs. 100× 11+κ̂0 = 6.8%). For higher values of the minimum wage, the
increase in unemployment resulting from the reduction in job offer arrival rates is
therefore the (almost) exclusive driver of the changes in u. In Figure 3.3, this is reflected
by the near convergence of the solid line and the dotted line at about 8.00 euros.
The actual minimum wage introduced in January 2015 was 8.50 euros per hour.
Adjusted to 2010 prices, this corresponds to a level of around 8.00 euros, which according
to our model would have increased the unemployment rate by two percentage points. In
relative terms, this amounts to an increase of about 18% compared to the old steady-state
value observed on 1 January 2007.
The mean unemployment duration (panel (b) of Figure 3.3) is given by
∫ w
w
Au(b)
λ0F(b)
db. (3.14)
The three effects mentioned above in the context of the unemployment rate are
again at play here. In fact, each item in the expression depends on the minimum wage
level. The effect on the numerator Au is ambiguous a priori and, given that A changes
little, probably fairly small. The main change is likely to take place in the denominator,
where λ0 decreases in the minimum wage while F increases, again giving an ambiguous
122 of 235
CHAPTER 3. Unemployment Effects of the German Minimum Wage
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
(a) Unemployment rate u
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
(b) Mean unemployment duration
Key: Preferred model ( ); frictional component of u ( );
model without change in job offer arrival rates ( ). Notes: Grey area indicates 95% confidence bands.
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
Figure 3.3: Change in minimum wage: unemployment (whole sample)
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effect. The influence of the change in the integral limits w and w is also an empirical
question. Our simulations show that the mean unemployment duration stays fairly
constant at 20 weeks until a minimum wage level of about 5.00 euros, and then grows at
an increasing rate.
Heterogeneity between labor markets. The simulation results discussed so far have been
for the whole sample, i.e. they are based on an estimation in which observations from
all twelve labor markets have been pooled (first row of Table 3.1). Figure 3.D.1 in
Appendix 3.D shows the effect of different minimum wage levels on the unemployment
rate for the twelve labor markets defined by region and job classification. The simulations
are based on separate estimations for each labor market (cf. Table 3.1). We find that the
same minimum wage level can have very different effects on unemployment depending
on the labor market segment. Focusing on West Germany first, we find that even low
minimum wage levels lead to an increase in unemployment in the agricultural and
sales sectors, as well as for service workers and office workers, while for workers in
production and craft and especially for white-collar employees the negative effects set
in at much higher levels only. Importantly, there are strong differences between East
and West Germany even for the same type of jobs. For agricultural workers, white-
collar employees, and production/craft occupations, the minimum wage effects in East
Germany tend to be similar to the West at first (albeit at a considerably higher level of
unemployment). At minimum wage levels between 6 and 8 euros per hour, however, the
two graphs clearly diverge. For sales occupations, for service workers, and for office
workers, the divergence begins at even lower levels. Our simulations indicate that the
critical level at which the negative unemployment effects of the minimum wage set in
differ strongly by region and by job classification. If the minimum wage were to be
increased above its actual level in real terms (8.50 euros in 2015, i.e. 8.00 euros in 2010
prices), the East-West difference in the unemployment effect would likely become much
larger.
The simulations for the different labor markets can be aggregated in order to derive
the overall unemployment rate as a function of the minimum wage level (Figure 3.D.2).
The aggregated rate is very similar to the rate from Figure 3.3, where we simulated the
effect on overall unemployment based on an estimation and a simulation for the sample
as a whole. Figure 3.D.3 shows the share of the different labor market segments in the
overall unemployment rate.
To explore to what extent the different unemployment effects across labor market
segments are driven by differences in the productivity distributions and by differences in
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search frictions or the opportunity cost of employment, we ran two types of counterfactual
simulations. In the first one, we combine the estimated productivity distribution for each
segment with the parameters estimated for the sample as a whole.9 As Figure 3.D.4
shows, the unemployment rate as a function of the minimum wage level is clearly
different across labor market segments even if the estimated parameters are assumed to
be identical.
In a second counterfactual experiment, we combined the productivity distribution of
the whole sample with the parameters that we estimated for the different labor market
segments (Figure 3.D.5). For office and service workers, and for agriculture (in West
Germany), the parameters are close to those for the whole sample (Table 3.1), and the
graph for the unemployment rate is therefore also similar to the simulation for the whole
sample (Figure 3.3 and reproduced in each panel of Figure 3.D.5). For production/craft
workers and white-collar employees, the counterfactual graphs are below the graph for
the actual specification. These labor market segments stand out both for a high rate of job
arrivals over job destructions (and therefore relatively low frictional unemployment) and
for a high mean and variance of the reservation wage distribution (Table 3.1). Our second
counterfactual experiment shows that if the entire labor market were characterized by
these parameters, the unemployment rate would be lower, so the effect of the lower
frictional unemployment dominates the effect of the higher reservation wages. For
agriculture in East Germany and for sales we see the inverse picture in which the
counterfactual graph for the unemployment rate based on the parameters for these labor
market segments is above the graph based on the parameters that were actually estimated
for the whole sample.
3.9 Conclusion
In this article we estimate the equilibrium job search model by Bontemps et al. (1999),
extended to allow for different job offer arrival rates for the employed and the unemployed
based on German administrative data. We use the model to simulate the effects of
different minimum wage levels, with a focus on unemployment. Our study is the first
assessment of the new German minimum wage based on a structural model allowing
for search frictions. Previous ex ante studies have relied on the assumption of perfect
9The productivity distribution of each labor market segment is implied by the non-parametric esti-
mation of the wage distribution in combination with the estimated model parameters (cf. Equation 3.13)
for each segment. In the counterfactual combinations, we combine these segment-specific productivity
distributions with the parameters that we estimated for the whole sample. In other words, while productivity
is allowed to differ, search frictions and the opportunity cost of employment are constrained to be the same
in each labor market segment.
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competition (Ragnitz and Thum, 2008; Bauer et al., 2009 and Knabe and Schöb, 2009),
i.e. on a model that by construction does not allow for positive employment effects of
a minimum wage. There have also been a small number of quasi-experimental studies
on the actual introduction of the minimum wage. Bossler and Gerner (2016) compare
firms with employees affected by the minimum wage with a control group of firms that
are not directly affected. They estimate losses of about 40,000 to 60,000 jobs because of
the 2015 minimum wage introduction. In line with our simulations, they find that this
employment effect is mainly driven by plants in East Germany. The other two studies
use variation in the regional bite of the minimum wage. While Garloff (2016) computes
the bite among full-time employees only, Caliendo et al. (2017) include part-time and
marginal employment as well. Both studies find either small or no negative effects
of the minimum wage on full-time employment, and a significantly negative effect on
marginal employment (a decrease of 180,000 jobs in the study by Caliendo et al.). In
our simulations, a minimum wage equivalent in real terms to the one actually introduced
in 2015 raises the unemployment rate by two percentage points, an increase of 18%
compared to the old steady-state value. Comparing the predictions of the present study
with the quasi-experimental evidence is difficult for a number of reasons. First, we focus
on labor markets where a wage posting model is a good approximation and therefore
exclude highly skilled individuals, i.e. the group of individuals who are least likely
to be affected by the minimum wage. Second, our model assumes that prices and the
productivity of firms are unaffected by the minimum wage, and we do not consider
non-compliance. Based on the extent to which firms can react to the minimum wage
along these margins, the unemployment effects of the minimum wage will be dampened.
Finally, these studies assess the short-run effects of the minimum wage (within one year),
while the present comparative statics exercise does not allow us to draw any conclusions
on the time horizon for the adjustment.
Our analysis has some limitations, which, nonetheless, have in them the potential for
future research. First, our dataset does not contain information on working hours, and
we have therefore excluded part-time workers from the analysis. These workers tend to
have relatively low hourly wages, which means that they are disproportionately affected
by the minimum wage. Our ability to include part-time workers, while at the same time
address the amount of heterogeneity as in the analysis presented here, is currently limited
by the availability of suitable data sets that contain reliable information on hours worked.
Second, our parameter estimates are based on the period 2007–2010, i.e. the years of
the “Great Recession” in the wake of the financial crisis. As the equilibrium relationships
are derived for a steady-state of the model, this may at first glance suggest that one
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important assumption underlying the relationship between the model’s parameters and
the endogenous variables is violated. However, the recession was actually fairly mild
and short-lived in Germany compared to other countries, and our parameter estimates
fall well within the range estimated for years before the recession in Germany (Holzner
and Launov, 2010 and Nanos and Schluter, 2014) and for France in the 1990s (Bontemps
et al., 1999). This increases our confidence that our results and conclusions are not too
far off the mark.
Third, the negative unemployment effects in our model are driven by the assumption
that the job offer arrival rates are proportional to the number of firms that manage to
achieve positive profits at a given minimum wage level. While the assumption seems
somewhat ad hoc, Bontemps et al. (1999) point out that such a relationship is consistent
with a theoretical model developed by Bontemps et al. (2000). Still, future research
should further corroborate this assumption, drawing for example on direct evidence
concerning job offers. An alternative would be to endogenize job offer arrival rates in
the model, as in Shephard (2017) and Engbom and Moser (2017).
By estimating a structural model, our study contributes to highlighting the transmis-
sion mechanisms underlying the employment effects of a uniform minimum wage. We
document significant heterogeneity in search frictions and in reservation wages across
labor markets differentiated by region and/or type of occupation. Given that the min-
imum wage is motivated by a desire to offset firms’ monopsony power, this suggests
that a uniform minimum wage is perhaps too blunt a tool. However, this conclusion
is dependent on the extent to which the minimum rate of 8.50 euros is relevant for the
different labor market segments, so differences in the search frictions alone need not be
sufficient cause for deviating from a uniform rate. There may also be practical advantages
of a single minimum wage, such as greater transparency and lower administrative costs.
Assessing these is beyond the scope of our study. In future research, it will be interesting
to study the correlates of these regional and sectoral differences in search frictions and
hence firms’ market power. For instance, to what extent are they driven by differences in
workers’ characteristics across these labor market segments, and how important is the
role of firm characteristics, market structure, and union coverage?
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3.Appendix
3.A Data Preparation
3.A.1 Data Cleaning and Imputation
Imputation of missing information To maximize the available information, we fill in
missing values using the full dataset, i.e. prior to imposing our sample selection criteria.
When imputing missing information for the variable nationality, we first use information
from parallel spells for the same individual, then information from previous spells and, if
there are still missing values, with information from later spells. In a similar manner, we
fill in missing information on region, sector, job title, position and employment status
with information of previous and following spells but only if individuals stay at the same
workplace.
Educational status Missing and inconsistent data on education are corrected according
to the imputation procedure IP1 described in Fitzenberger et al. (2006). This procedure
relies, roughly speaking, on the assumption that individuals cannot lose their educational
degrees. Information on educational status will be aggregated in three values:
• Low-skilled: High school diploma or no qualifications.
• Medium-skilled: Completed vocational training.
• High-skilled: Technical college degree or university degree.
The final sample used in the analysis consists only of low- and medium-skilled individu-
als.
3.A.2 Definition of Labor Market States
Employment Employment spells include continuous periods of employment (allowing
gaps of up to four weeks) subject to social security contributions and (after 1998)
marginal employment. For parallel spells of employment and unemployment (e.g. for
those individuals who in addition to their earnings receive supplementary benefits), we
treat employment as the dominant labor market state. Employment spells during which
individuals receive welfare benefits on top of their wage (Aufstocker) are disregarded.
It is possible that individuals have multiple employment spells at the same time. In
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this case, only the predominant employment spell is kept. The predominant spell is
determined as follows: full-time spells outrank part-time spells. When choosing between
two full-time or two part-time spells, the spell with the longest duration is kept. To break
any remaining ties, the spell with the highest wage wins.
Unemployment Unemployment spells include periods of registered job searching as
well as periods of receiving benefits. Prior to 2005, the latter include benefits such as
unemployment insurance and means-tested unemployment assistance benefits. Those
(employable) individuals who were not entitled to unemployment insurance or assistance
benefits could claim means-tested social assistance benefits. However, prior to 2005,
spells of receiving social assistance can only be observed in the data if the job seekers’
history records social assistance recipients as searching for a job. After 2004, means-
tested unemployment and social assistance benefits were merged into one unified benefit,
known as ‘unemployment benefit II’ (ALG II). Unemployment spells during which
individuals receive ALG II are recorded in the data from 2007 onwards, meaning that the
data only provide a consistent definition of unemployment for the period 2007-2010. We
therefore restrict our estimation sample to this period.
Distinction between un- and non-employment Extending the procedure proposed
by Sokbae and Wilke (2009), involuntary unemployment is defined as comprising all
continuous periods of registered job searching and/or receipt of benefits. Gaps between
such unemployment periods or gaps between receiving benefits or job searching and a new
employment spell may not exceed four weeks, otherwise these periods are considered as
non-employment spells (involving voluntary unemployment or leaving the social security
labor force). Similarly, gaps between periods of employment and receiving benefits or
job searching are treated as involuntary unemployment as long as the gap does not exceed
six weeks, otherwise the gap is treated as non-employment.
3.A.3 Weekly Hours of Work
While we observe whether an individual works full-time or part-time (defined as working
less than 30 hours per week), the data lack explicit information on the number of hours
worked. We only look at full-time employees and assign hours of work in the following
way:
Main specification: imputation We complement the administrative data using the
German Microcensus. To calculate hourly wages for full-time employment spells,
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we impute hours of work based on information from the German Microcensus. The
imputation is done separately by region, sex, sector, job classification, and educational
degree.
Alternative specification: 40 hours for everyone In a variant, we assume 40 hours
of work per week for all individuals in full-time employment.
3.A.4 Assignment of Wages
In our data, continuous employment spells may consist of a sequence of different spells
with time-varying information of daily wages. To address this issue, we adopt two
different variants to assign wages to one continuous employment spell. We also assign
part- and full-time status consistent with these rules.
Main specification: average over one year We assign the duration-weighted average
wage confined to the last observed year for employment spell before and without a
transition. For subsequent employment spells, the wage information used is an average
daily wage in the first year after the transition. An individual is considered mainly
full-time employed, if the weighted average duration of full-time spells over one year
exceeds 50%.
Alternative specification: last and first observations For employment spells before
a transition and employment spells without a transition, the last observed wage is assigned.
For subsequent employment spells, the first observed wage is assigned. The last part-/full-
time status is assigned to the previous employment spell, whereas the first part-/full-time
status is assigned to any subsequent employment spell.
3.A.5 Data Preparation – SSC threshold
Gross daily wages are right-censored at the upper limit for social security contributions.
Main specification: exclusion of censored observations We do not include observa-
tions with censored wages.
Alternative specification: imputation To analyse this problem, we construct cells
based on gender, year, region (East and West Germany), and educational degree. For
each cell, a Tobit regression is estimated with log daily wages as the dependent variable
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and age, age squared, nationality, experience, experience squared, tenure in the current
employment, tenure in the current employment squared, two skill dummies, occupational,
sectoral as well as regional (Federal State) dummies and dummies for part-time and
full-time employment as explanatory variables. As described in Gartner (2005), right-
censored observations are replaced by wages randomly drawn from a truncated normal
distribution whose moments are constructed by the predicted values from the Tobit
regressions and whose (lower) truncation point is given by the contribution limit to the
social security system. After this imputation procedure, nominal wages are deflated by
the Consumer Price Index of the Federal Statistical Office Germany, normalized to 1 in
2010.
3.A.6 Definition of Sub-Samples
Region
• East Germany: Former GDR, excluding Berlin
• West Germany, including Berlin
The labor market region of an employed individual is given by the location of the
workplace. For the unemployed, we use the region where an individual searches for a
job. Where this information is missing, we assign the region of the previous workplace.
Job classifications
• Agriculture (Landwirtschaftsberufe)
• Production, craft (Produktions-/Facharbeiter, Handwerker)
• White-collar (Höhere Angestellte)
• Sales (Vertriebs-/Verkaufstätigkeiten)
• Office (Bürotätigkeiten)
• Service (Dienstleister)
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Table 3.A.1: Employment-to-employment transitions across labor markets,
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W., Agric. 70.8 12.3 1.8 2.6 2.1 9.5 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
W., Prod. 0.3 83.9 3.6 0.9 2.6 6.3 0.0 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
W., White-c. 0.2 6.8 72.4 2.1 11.4 5.5 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.1
W., Sale 0.3 3.6 3.3 70.5 15.1 5.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.4 0.0
W., Office 0.1 1.6 4.7 3.4 85.6 2.8 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.1
W., Service 0.4 8.0 2.9 1.3 4.7 80.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 2.0
E., Agric. 7.2 1.8 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 67.6 10.8 1.8 0.9 0.9 7.2
E., Prod. 0.1 11.5 0.8 0.1 0.3 1.5 0.7 75.5 3.1 0.6 1.9 3.8
E., White-c. 0.0 2.7 9.8 0.2 2.2 1.3 0.2 5.8 65.4 1.5 7.5 3.5
E., Sale 0.0 0.9 0.9 15.4 3.0 0.9 0.3 4.8 2.1 58.9 7.3 5.4
E., Office 0.0 0.5 1.4 0.9 12.4 0.8 0.2 2.5 2.5 1.8 73.4 3.6
E., Service 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.9 16.0 0.5 6.7 1.6 1.3 2.5 69.1
Notes: Of a total of 43,396 employment-to-employment transitions, 95.9% remain in the same region, 83.4% remain in the same job
classification, and 80.1% remain in the same region and job classification (labor market).
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
Table 3.A.2: Unemployment-to-employment transitions across labor markets,
percent
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W., Prod. 0.9 82.2 2.2 1.0 2.1 8.9 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3
W., White-c. 0.7 15.2 43.5 3.2 20.8 13.8 0.0 0.7 1.1 0.0 0.4 0.7
W., Sale 0.6 17.7 3.4 43.4 15.6 15.6 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.9
W., Office 0.6 9.5 6.0 5.0 66.8 10.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 1.7 0.0
W., Service 1.1 19.7 2.7 1.7 6.7 65.1 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.9
E., Agric. 0.5 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 80.0 12.1 1.1 0.0 0.5 2.6
E., Prod. 0.0 7.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.6 2.1 76.5 1.8 0.7 1.6 7.6
E., White-c. 1.0 2.9 5.8 0.0 2.9 3.9 1.0 16.5 34.0 1.0 19.4 11.7
E., Sale 1.1 3.4 1.1 14.8 5.7 4.5 1.1 18.2 1.1 34.1 5.7 9.1
E., Office 0.0 3.6 1.8 0.6 9.6 1.8 1.2 10.8 5.4 3.6 53.9 7.8
E., Service 0.0 3.0 1.6 0.0 0.8 6.3 0.8 19.1 3.3 1.1 6.0 57.9
Notes: Of a total of 8,012 unemployment-to-employment transitions, 95.3% remain in the same region, 73.7% remain in the same job
classification, and 70.7% remain in the same region and job classification (labor market).
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
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3.B Descriptives
Table 3.B.1: Number of observations
Unemployment spells Employment spells
Sample Total Total u→ e rc lc Total e→ e e→ u rc lc
Whole sample 235,706 17,973 8,012 9,961 3,962 217,733 43,396 27,357 146,980 2,807
West Germany
Agriculture 2,685 456 306 150 58 2,229 390 382 1,457 9
Production, Craft 76,723 5,575 2,932 2,643 1,054 71,148 12,852 9,329 48,967 471
White-collar 16,943 728 283 445 144 16,215 3,277 1,362 11,576 109
Sales 10,080 1,086 327 759 276 8,994 2,239 1,376 5,379 42
Office 46,978 2,234 906 1,328 376 44,744 9,907 4,164 30,673 444
Service 45,250 3,837 1,448 2,389 1,126 41,413 8,577 5,193 27,643 164
East Germany
Agriculture 1,225 311 190 121 54 914 111 237 566 76
Production, Craft 15,099 1,806 896 910 351 13,293 2,421 2,745 8,127 529
White-collar 3,081 244 103 141 54 2,837 549 330 1,958 141
Sales 1,932 273 88 185 81 1,659 331 297 1,031 29
Office 6,655 439 167 272 97 6,216 1,157 717 4,342 367
Service 9,055 984 366 618 291 8,071 1,585 1,225 5,261 426
Notes: Arrows (→) indicate that spells end in transitions to another employment spell (e) or to unemployment (u). Spells without
an observed transition are right-censored (rc). Additionally, spells might be left-censored (lc).
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
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Table 3.B.2: Percentage of spell types
Unemployment spells Employment spells
Sample Total Total u→ e rc lc Total e→ e e→ u rc lc
Whole sample 100.0% 7.6% 44.6% 55.4% 22.0% 92.4% 19.9% 12.6% 67.5% 1.3%
West Germany
Agriculture 100.0% 17.0% 67.1% 32.9% 12.7% 83.0% 17.5% 17.1% 65.4% 0.4%
Production, Craft 100.0% 7.3% 52.6% 47.4% 18.9% 92.7% 18.1% 13.1% 68.8% 0.7%
White-collar 100.0% 4.3% 38.9% 61.1% 19.8% 95.7% 20.2% 8.4% 71.4% 0.7%
Sales 100.0% 10.8% 30.1% 69.9% 25.4% 89.2% 24.9% 15.3% 59.8% 0.5%
Office 100.0% 4.8% 40.6% 59.4% 16.8% 95.2% 22.1% 9.3% 68.6% 1.0%
Service 100.0% 8.5% 37.7% 62.3% 29.3% 91.5% 20.7% 12.5% 66.7% 0.4%
East Germany
Agriculture 100.0% 25.4% 61.1% 38.9% 17.4% 74.6% 12.1% 25.9% 61.9% 8.3%
Production, Craft 100.0% 12.0% 49.6% 50.4% 19.4% 88.0% 18.2% 20.6% 61.1% 4.0%
White-collar 100.0% 7.9% 42.2% 57.8% 22.1% 92.1% 19.4% 11.6% 69.0% 5.0%
Sales 100.0% 14.1% 32.2% 67.8% 29.7% 85.9% 20.0% 17.9% 62.1% 1.7%
Office 100.0% 6.6% 38.0% 62.0% 22.1% 93.4% 18.6% 11.5% 69.9% 5.9%
Service 100.0% 10.9% 37.2% 62.8% 29.6% 89.1% 19.6% 15.2% 65.2% 5.3%
Notes: Arrows (→) indicate that spells end in transitions to another employment spell (e) or to unemployment (u). Spells
without an observed transition are right-censored (rc). Additionally, spells might be left-censored (lc). Columns Total unem-
ployment spells and Total employment spells refer to column Total as 100%. Columns u→ e , rc and lc refer to Column Total
unemployment spells as 100%. Columns e→ e, e→ u , rc and lc refer to Column Total employment spells as 100%.
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
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(a) u→ e (b) e→ e (c) e→ u
Notes: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→) indicate that spells end in another employment
spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
Figure 3.B.1: Survival rates (whole sample)
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(a) u→ e (b) e→ e (c) e→ u
Key: West ( ); East ( ). Notes: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→) indicate that
spells end in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
Figure 3.B.2: Survival rates by region – agriculture
(a) u→ e (b) e→ e (c) e→ u
Key: West ( ); East ( ). Notes: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→) indicate that
spells end in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
Figure 3.B.3: Survival rates by region – production, craft
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(a) u→ e (b) e→ e (c) e→ u
Key: West ( ); East ( ). Notes: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→) indicate that
spells end in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
Figure 3.B.4: Survival rates by region – white-collar
(a) u→ e (b) e→ e (c) e→ u
Key: West ( ); East ( ). Notes: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→) indicate that
spells end in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
Figure 3.B.5: Survival rates by region – sales
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(a) u→ e (b) e→ e (c) e→ u
Key: West ( ); East ( ). Notes: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→) indicate that
spells end in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
Figure 3.B.6: Survival rates by region – office
(a) u→ e (b) e→ e (c) e→ u
Key: West ( ); East ( ). Notes: Plots show Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for durations in years. Arrows (→) indicate that
spells end in another employment spell (e) or unemployment (u).
Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
Figure 3.B.7: Survival rates by region – service
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Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
Figure 3.B.8: Density of hourly wages (whole sample)
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Figure 3.B.9: Density of hourly wages by region – agriculture
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Figure 3.B.10: Density of hourly wages by region – production, craft
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Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
Figure 3.B.11: Density of hourly wages by region – white-collar
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Source: SIAB 7510, own computations.
Figure 3.B.12: Density of hourly wages by region – sales
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Figure 3.B.13: Density of hourly wages by region – office
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Figure 3.B.14: Density of hourly wages by region – service
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3.C Estimation Results
3.C.1 Equilibrium Outcomes By Job Classification and Region
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Figure 3.C.1: Main equilibrium functions by region – agriculture
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Figure 3.C.2: Main equilibrium functions by region – production, craft
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Figure 3.C.3: Main equilibrium functions by region – white-collar
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Figure 3.C.4: Main equilibrium functions by region – sales
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Figure 3.C.5: Main equilibrium functions by region – office
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Figure 3.C.6: Main equilibrium functions by region – service
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3.C.3 Bootstrapping
We report bootstrapped standard errors. In very rare cases we exclude bootstrap runs
with extreme outliers according to the following criteria: a) If the likelihood does not
converge: occurs in 1 of 101 bootstrap runs in whole sample, in 1 of 101 bootstrap runs
in W. Agric., in 26 of 126 bootstrap runs in E. Agric., in 5 of 105 bootstrap runs in E.
Sale, in 1 of 101 bootstrap runs in E. Office, in 1 of 101 bootstrap runs in the robustness
check with truncation of wages at the 99th percentile, in 1 of 101 bootstrap runs in the
robustness check with ρ = 0.002, in 3 of 103 bootstrap runs in the robustness check with
ρ = 0.006. b) If the estimated job offer arrival rate λ1 is 100 times higher than the job
destruction rate δ : occurs in 1 of 101 bootstrap runs in E. Serv.
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3.D Minimum Wage Simulations: Heterogeneity Be-
tween Labor Markets
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Figure 3.D.1: Unemployment rate u by job classification and region
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Figure 3.D.2: Unemployment rate u for different minimum wages
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Figure 3.D.3: Composition of the unemployment rate u for different minimum wages
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Figure 3.D.4: Unemployment rate u for different productivity distributions by job classi-
fication and region
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Figure 3.D.5: Unemployment rate u by job classification and region given the productiv-
ity distribution of the whole sample
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Chapter 4
Does the Internet Help Unemployed
Job Seekers Find a Job? Evidence
from the Broadband Internet
Expansion in Germany∗
4.1 Introduction
The emergence of the internet as a mass medium has led to a dramatic decline in the
cost of acquiring and disseminating information. During the last two decades, this has
brought about a significant reduction in all kinds of information frictions, such as in
the areas of elections as well as insurance, goods, housing and labor markets. Against
this background, there has been a surge of empirical studies dealing with the internet’s
impact on outcomes such as product market performance (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000,
Brown and Goolsbee, 2002), voting behavior (Falck et al., 2014) and crime (Bhuller
et al., 2013) amongst others. In the context of labor markets, one of the major features
that are likely to be affected by the internet is the way how workers and employers search
for each other and eventually form a match (Autor, 2001).
The goal of this study is to identify the effect of the emergence of the internet on
job search outcomes in the German labor market. Germany provides an interesting case,
∗This chapter is joint work with Nicole Gürtzgen (IAB and University of Regensburg), André Nolte
(ZEW and IAB) and Gerard van den Berg (University of Bristol, IFAU, IZA, ZEW and CEPR). An earlier
version of this chapter is published in Nolte (2017). We are grateful to Andreas Moczall for providing
us with the figures from the IAB Job Vacancy Survey. This chapter has benefited from comments and
suggestions by Antonio Ciccone, Andreas Peichl, Stephan Thomsen, Carsten Trenkler, Johannes Voget
and Andrea Weber.
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as - even though access to the internet has been improving considerably over the recent
decade - there is still substantial regional variation in households’ access to high-speed
internet. Closing the last remaining gaps in internet coverage especially in Germany’s
rural areas is therefore currently considered a major policy goal. Against this background,
our study shall help to improve our understanding of whether and to what extent the
spread of the internet may have facilitated job search among unemployed job seekers. To
investigate the impact of the emergence of high-speed internet on job search outcomes,
we explore the effect of the introduction of the digital subscriber line (DSL) technology
on reemployment probabilities of unemployed job seekers. To do so, we will exploit
variation in DSL availability at the regional level in Germany in order to quantify the
net effect of an increase in regional internet availability on the fraction of unemployed
individuals who experience a transition into employment.
In exploring the impact of the internet expansion on search outcomes, our study
contributes to the (still small) literature that concentrates on different job search channels
- especially searching via the internet - and their impact on labor market outcomes.
Kuhn and Skuterud (2004) were the first to exploit individual variation in internet usage
and to evaluate the impact of online job search on unemployment durations for the
years 1998-2000 based on the Current Population Survey (CPS). The results from their
duration analysis suggest that after controlling for observables, unemployed workers
searching online do not become reemployed more quickly than their non-online job-
seeking counterparts. This leads the authors to conclude that either internet job search
does not reduce unemployment durations or that workers who look for jobs online are
negatively selected on unobservables. Based on the same data set, Fountain (2005)
performs logistic regressions with a job finding indicator as the dependent variable. Her
results provide evidence of a small internet advantage compared to non-online job search
in 1998. Moreover, she finds that internet searching advantages had disappeared by
2000. Kuhn and Mansour (2014) replicate the analysis by Kuhn and Skuterud (2004)
combining information from the CPS with the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY). Comparing the relationship between internet usage and unemployment durations
in 1998/2000 and 2008/2009, the authors find that while internet usage was ineffective
one decade ago, it was associated with a reduction in the duration of unemployment by
about 25% in 2008/2009. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), Thomsen
and Wittich (2010) explore the effectiveness of various job search channels for the job
finding probability among unemployed job seekers in Germany. The authors find that
internet usage does not significantly raise the reemployment probabilities for this group
of job seekers.
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By presenting new evidence on the internet’s impact on search outcomes for Germany,
our study makes several important contributions to this literature. First, other than the
studies cited above, our empirical approach explicitly accounts for the endogeneity of
job search channels. Finding exogenous variation in the availability and use of the
internet is a key challenge, as individuals - as well as employers - are likely to self-select
into different search channels. Moreover, when looking at regional variation in internet
availability, regions with high-speed internet access are likely to differ from those with
low-speed internet access along many dimensions. While much of the literature is not
able to deal with these issues, our analysis exploits exogenous variation in the availability
of high-speed internet access at the German municipality level. The source of this
variation, as put forward by Falck et al. (2014), stems from technological restrictions in
the roll-out of the first generation of DSL in the early 2000s in Germany. We concentrate
on DSL availability as this is the dominant broadband technology in Germany. More
specifically, the variation was caused by technological peculiarities of the traditional
public switched telephone network (PSTN), through which the early generations of
DSL had been implemented. As described by Falck et al. (2014), almost one-third of
West German municipalities could not readily employ the new technology as early DSL
availability relied on the copper wires between the household and the main distribution
frame (MDF) of the regional PSTN. The crucial issue causing exogenous variation in
DSL availability is that, while the length of the copper wires connecting households and
MDFs - whose distribution was determined in the 1960s - did not matter for telephone
services, it strongly affected the DSL connection. In particular, there exists a critical value
of 4,200 meters, with municipalities further than this threshold from the MDF having
no access to DSL. The only way to provide internet access was to replace copper wires
with fiber wires, which took time and was costly. This exogenous variation in internet
availability during the early DSL years allows us to use each municipality’s distance
to the next MDF as an instrument for DSL availability. This enables us to identify
an intention to treatment effect (ITT) of an expansion in internet availability on the
reemployment prospects of unemployed individuals for less agglomerated municipalities
in West Germany.
A second feature that distinguishes our study from previous work is that our analysis
relies on administrative data sources. In particular, we use German register data, the
universe of the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of the Federal Employment
Agency. The data provide an ideal basis for estimating the internet’s impact on individual
unemployment durations for several reasons: First, the data permit us to precisely
measure the duration of different labor market states and transitions between them,
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most notably transitions between unemployment and employment. Second, due to
their administrative nature, the IEB are less prone to panel attrition than comparable
information from survey data. This is especially relevant as panel attrition has been
recognized to give rise to biased estimates of the rates at which unemployed individuals
become employed (van den Berg et al., 1994). An additional advantage over survey data
is the considerably larger number of observations. The latter allows us to construct an
inflow sample into unemployment, thereby avoiding the typical length bias that may
arise in stock samples of unemployment durations.
Based on this empirical strategy, we document the following key results. Overall,
we find that the OLS estimates of the DSL expansion on the reemployment prospects
of unemployed individuals in Western German municipalities are downward biased.
After accounting for potential endogeneity, our estimates point to modest positive effects
for the pooled sample. Breaking down the analysis by socio-economic characteristics
suggests that the internet’s positive effect is particularly pronounced for males after
about a quarter in unemployment. In terms of magnitude, moving from an “unlucky”
municipality (i.e., one that could not readily be supplied with high-speed internet) to
a “lucky” counterpart increases the reemployment probability for males by about 2-3%
points.
Given that the above strategy identifies an ITT, we seek to provide more direct
evidence on the relationship between an expansion in internet availability and job seekers’
search behavior. To do so, we investigate job search strategies at the individual level,
using survey data from the Panel Study on Labour Markets and Social Security (PASS).
In particular, we address first-stage effects by looking at whether the availability of
internet at home has a causal impact on the incidence of online job search, i.e. the use
of the internet as a job search channel. To gain further insights into potential crowding
out effects, we also look at whether the availability of internet at home affects the use
of alternative job search channels. The results show that home internet access increases
online job search activities and that especially male and skilled job seekers with a
previous white-collar occupation are more likely to search online for a job. At the same
time, we find some evidence for a reduction in the use of non-online search channels for
skilled and white-collar workers. These findings suggest that the expansion in internet
availability led to better reemployment prospects especially for male job seekers by
increasing their overall search intensity, whereas the results for skilled white-collar
workers suggest modest crowding out effects.
Finally, our study is also related to the literature on the effects of the broadband
internet expansion on regional labor market performance. Looking at city-level unem-
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ployment rates, Kroft and Pope (2014) exploit geographic and temporal variation in the
availability of online search induced by the expansion of the U.S. website Craigslist. The
authors fail to detect any effects on local city-level unemployment rates. In a similar
vein, the results obtained by Czernich (2014) point to no effect of internet availability
on regional unemployment rates in Germany. The author exploits regional variation in
broadband internet availability and addresses the endogeneity of internet availability
using the same identification approach as in our study.1 Finally, a large body of empirical
research has set out to analyze the link between broadband internet and employment
as well as economic growth. Much of this literature relies on regional variation in the
broadband internet infrastructure and documents a positive relationship between broad-
band availability and economic as well as employment growth. Examples include the
study by Crandall et al. (2007), who exploit regional variation at the U.S.-state level and
find a positive association between broadband deployment and private-sector non-farm
employment. This evidence is confirmed by Whitacre et al. (2014) and Kolko (2012) for
the U.S., who also document a positive association between the expansion of broadband
infrastructure and employment growth.2 In a similar vein, using cross-country variation
in OECD countries, Czernich et al. (2011) also establish a positive association between
broadband penetration and economic growth.3
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides
descriptive evidence for the diffusion of broadband internet at the individual and employer
level and its importance for job search and recruiting behavior. Section 4.3 presents
some theoretical considerations of how online job search may be expected to affect
reemployment probabilities. While Section 4.4 deals with the sources of empirical
identification, Section 4.5 lays out the overall empirical strategy. The data sources and
the sample selection are described in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 shows descriptive statistics.
Section 4.8 presents the empirical results, while Section 4.9 provides further empirical
1The study is confined to unemployment stocks in the years 2002 and 2006 and does not take into
account inflows and outflows into unemployment. Note that a zero aggregate unemployment effect is not
necessarily informative on the internet’s effect on frictions as it may mask individual level effects because
of search externalities, or because of potential effects of the internet on job destruction rates.
2Using municipality data from Germany, Fabritz (2013) finds a moderate positive association between
broadband availability and employment. The results are based on fixed-effects regressions without
accounting for endogeneity in internet availability.
3There is evidence at the firm level that information and communication technologies have a positive
impact on firm performance (see for example a survey by Kretschmer, 2012). Using Dutch data, Polder
et al. (2010) find that broadband internet is positively correlated with product and process innovation.
Using data for Germany during the early phase of the DSL introduction between 2001 and 2003, Bertschek
et al. (2013) show that there exists a causal link between broadband internet and innovative activity.
Exploiting exogenous variation in internet expansion for Italy, Canzian et al. (2015) establishes a causal
effect of the internet on annual sales turnover and value added, whereas no effect is found on the number
of employees in corporate enterprises.
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evidence on potential mechanisms underlying individuals’ job search behavior. The final
Section 4.10 concludes.
4.2 Broadband Internet, Online Job Search and Re-
cruiting
Broadband internet diffusion. The diffusion of high-speed internet in Germany started
during the years 2000/01 and was based entirely on digital subscriber line technologies
(DSL). The fraction of non-DSL broadband technologies such as hybrid fiber coax
(HFC) cable or satellite was relatively low at 8% (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012). Prior to
the introduction of broadband internet, internet access was only feasible via low-speed
technologies such as modems or integrated services digital network (ISDN). DSL
provides an access speed that is at least 6-times faster than the old technologies and
therefore leads to a considerable reduction in waiting times for loading webpages and
downloading files. At the individual level, the fraction using the internet increased within
five years from about 37% at the beginning of the new century to 55% in 2005.
Online job search and recruiting tools. Turning to the role of the internet for online
job search and recruiting, the most important tools include (1) online job boards, which
provide websites including searchable databases for job advertisements; (2) job postings
on the companies’ websites which may (but do not necessarily) solicit online applications
as well as (3) networks such as LinkedIn or Xing permitting online search on behalf of
employers or headhunters targeting suitable candidates via their online CVs. Online job
boards in Germany are typically divided into private job boards such as Monster and
StepStone and public job boards, such as that from the Federal Employment Agency.
As of 2005, there existed more than 1,000 online job boards in Germany (Crosswaters,
2005). In terms of market shares, the Federal Employment Agency’s job board was
the most important one, with about 325,000 jobs posted in February 2005, followed by
JobScout24 and Monster with about 20,000 jobs. Regarding page views, it was also
most frequently used by job seekers, with about 201 million views per month in 2005
compared to 41 million clicks at Monster and 9.2 million clicks at JobScout24 (Grund,
2006).
Other than market shares, the efficiency of the (job board) technology is rather
difficult to measure. In December 2003, the Federal Employment Agency implemented
a new online job board with the main purpose of aggregating 25 different single systems
(BA-Einzel-Börsen) into one single portal, the “Jobbörse” (Bieber et al., 2005). By
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incorporating profile matching, this new system was explicitly designed to increase the
efficiency of the match between job seekers and employers.4
Still, there exists evidence that the new technology was characterized by a
couple of inefficiencies at the start of the DSL period. There is some evidence that
customers used to stick to the traditional Federal Employment Agency’s search
engine and did not quickly adapt to the newly established Jobbörse, which may
reflect initial limitations of its user-friendliness.5 As described by Bieber et al.
(2005), this may have been due to fact that the new job board was too complex for a
broad customer segment. This was likely to be particularly relevant for simple jobs
and tasks, such as cleaning staff or other low-wage occupations. Overall, these con-
siderations point to a quite limited usability of the Jobbörse at the start of the DSL period.
Online search among employers. While the use of online recruiting tools among employ-
ers was already widespread in the mid 2000s in Germany, its importance has continued
to increase during the last decade.6 Based upon representative data, recent evidence from
the IAB Job Vacancy Survey (Brenzel et al., 2016) supports the importance of online
recruiting tools for German employers. In 2015, over 50% of all completed hires were
preceded by job postings on the companies’ websites and 41% by advertisements on
online job boards. Looking at the success rates, however, reveals that among completed
hires only 22% (30%) of the vacancies posted on companies’ websites (job boards) were
successfully filled through these specific recruitment channels. The remaining fraction
was eventually filled through other mechanisms such as social networks, newspaper
advertisements and private and public employment agencies.
The study by Brenzel et al. (2016) also suggests that online recruiting channels
and their success rates appear to play a larger role for high-skilled than medium- and
4Related to that, Belot et al. (2016) provide experimental evidence on the effects of online advice to
job seekers by suggesting relevant occupations. Their results point to a larger number of job interviews,
which may provide some evidence in favor of an improvement in the technology to match job seekers and
employers.
5For example, the first year was characterized by frequent system crashes, long waiting times and
confusing search results. There is also evidence that already entered search criteria got deleted after
pushing the “back” button.
6At the employer level, evidence based on firm-level survey data indicates that about 94% of all firms
already had access to the internet in 2002. In 2007 the fraction increased to 98%, of whom 93% had
high-speed internet access, with 86% having access via DSL or dedicated lines (ZEW ICT-Survey, 2007).
Overall, the diffusion of high-speed internet in Germany in the early years of the 2000s suggests that any
restriction in internet access was likely to be more binding for individual job seekers than for employers.
According to a survey among 1,000 large German employers, the fraction of vacancies that were advertised
on the surveyed companies’ websites (via job boards) rose from 85% (52%) in 2005 to 90% (70%) in 2014,
respectively. Moreover, among the surveyed companies the fraction of hires that resulted from online
recruiting has increased from 50% in 2005 to over 70% in 2014 (Keim et al., 2005, Weitzel et al., 2015).
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low-skilled jobs. These figures provide some first evidence on an important selection
issue, namely the type of jobs being posted online. This is of particular relevance, as the
jobs individuals search for online might systematically differ from those job seekers
search for via alternative search channels. This, in turn, might be correlated with the
length of the unemployment period. The question which jobs are posted online is not
only relevant for selection issues, but also important when assessing the internet’s
effectiveness in helping unemployed job seekers find a job. Clearly, the intensity with
which employers use the internet for recruiting purposes is an important prerequisite
for the internet’s ability in improving job finding prospects. Unfortunately, empirical
evidence on the incidence of online recruiting for different types of occupations during
the early 2000s is lacking. For this reason, we complement the evidence with further
descriptions from the IAB Job Vacancy Survey.7 Panel (A) of Figure 4.A.1 in Appendix
4.A shows the overall fraction of jobs being posted online among all successful hirings.
Panel (B) and (C) show the respective shares broken down by selected occupational
categories. The graphs are shown for the years 2005 to 2008, which in most studies are
considered to be the DSL period in Germany. Three noteworthy facts emerge from these
graphs: First, the fraction of jobs posted online increased by about 15% points from 2005
to 2008 (Figure 4.A.1 Panel (A)). Second, in terms of levels, the fraction of jobs being
posted online is larger for more skilled white-collar occupations (Figure 4.A.1 Panel
(B)) than less skilled or blue-collar occupations (Figure 4.A.1 Panel (C)).8 Third, the
graphs also illustrate that the first group of occupations experienced an increasing trend
in online recruiting during this time period, whereas the relevance of online recruiting
for the latter group rather remained constant.
Online search among job seekers. There is also some evidence on the incidence of online
job search at the individual level in Germany. According to a survey among individual
job seekers, the share of individuals preferring online over print applications rose from
7The IAB Job Vacancy Survey is based on a repeated annual cross-section of German establishments,
whose sampling frame encompasses all German establishments that employ at least one employee paying
social security contributions. The data are available from 1989 onwards, with the most recent waves
covering about 15,000 establishments. Apart from information on various establishment attributes, such as
size, industry and regional affiliation, the surveyed establishments are asked to report information on their
most recent (randomly determined) hiring process. This information includes individual characteristics
of the hired employee and characteristics of the specific position to be filled. The data also contain
information on employers’ adopted search channels relating to the most recent hiring, such as social
networks, newspaper ads, private and public employment agencies and most notably the use of companies’
websites and online job boards.
8Skilled white-collar occupations include managers, technicians, professionals and clerical support
workers, whereas less skilled or blue-collar occupations include service and craft workers, plant and
machine operators as wells as agricultural jobs.
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48 to 88% between 2003 and 2014 (Weitzel et al., 2015). Using information from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), Grund (2006) focuses on unemployed job
seekers who were searching online in 2003. Consistent with the international evidence
(e.g. Kuhn and Skuterud, 2004), his results suggest that the incidence was higher among
younger and better qualified (unemployed) individuals. This pattern is confirmed by
Thomsen and Wittich (2010) based on the same data set, who document an increase in
the share of unemployed job seekers searching online from 37% in 2003 to 53% in 2007.
Exploiting also the GSOEP, Mang (2012) focuses on job changers. His results suggest
that the fraction of job changers who found a new job via the internet was in the year
2007 six times as high as in 2000. To date there is few evidence as to what extent an
expansion in internet availability has translated into an increase in online job search and
has given rise to potential crowding out effects of other job search channels. Against
this background, we will complement the empirical evidence by own empirical analyses
based on the PASS survey data in Section 4.9.
4.3 Theoretical Considerations
One of the major explanations for the increasing importance of the internet is its facili-
tating impact on search. First, job boards make it much easier to search for keywords
and provide more information on more jobs than comparable newspaper print advertise-
ments. Second, because job offers can be published on the internet without major time
delays, they are also more up-to-date than comparable print offers. A third advantage
for employers is that job boards involve a wider dissemination at a considerably lower
cost than print advertisements (Autor, 2001). A similar argument holds for individual
job seekers, who are also likely to get more information and to incur lower application
costs when applying on the internet, albeit probably at a somewhat lower cost advantage
than employers. Despite the importance of the internet in making the transmission of
search relevant information much cheaper, there have been barely any attempts yet to
quantify the average decline in search costs for both employers and job seekers.
The above reasoning suggests that the internet may facilitate search by lowering
search costs and by increasing the rate at which information about job offers arrives. In
standard job search models, an isolated decline in search costs unambiguously raises
individuals’ opportunity costs of employment and their reservation wages. This, in turn,
makes job seekers more selective in terms of accepted wage offers and gives rise to
longer unemployment durations. A necessary prerequisite for the internet leading to
lower unemployment durations is, therefore, an additional effect on the probability of
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receiving a job offer. In job search models, the latter is typically parametrized within
a Poisson process by the job offer arrival rate, λ , which may be either assumed to
be exogenous or may be a direct function of search effort.9 Models with endogenous
search effort generally predict a decline in marginal search costs to increase search effort
(Mortensen, 1986) and often assume the job offer arrival rate to be proportional to search
intensity (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, Christensen et al., 2005). An increase in
the job offer arrival rate may also be rationalized in a matching framework. Provided
that the internet raises the number of matches between job seekers and employers, this
will raise the job offer arrival rate as the ratio between the number of matches and job
seekers.10 Against this background, internet job search may generally be expected to
produce higher overall job offer arrival rates, either by raising the intensity of search or
by directly increasing the rate at which job offers arrive (van den Berg, 2006).
In addition to single search channel models, a decline in frictional unemployment may
also be rationalized in a framework dealing with the relative effectiveness of different
search channels. While much of the related literature typically deals with formal versus
informal job search, the results are likely to carry over to online versus traditional search
methods. For example, Holzer (1988) sets up a model with endogenous search effort
where individuals may choose between different search channels. The model predicts
that a decline in the channel-specific search costs will induce an increased use of this
channel if the methods are either substitutes or independent in the production of job
offers. van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) build up a model with two search
channels, in which each channel is associated with its own structural parameters and
search intensity. Assuming equal wage offer distributions across channels, the authors
derive relatively mild conditions under which an increase in the arrival rate of one specific
channel raises the exit rate out of unemployment.
The above considerations thus far have ignored that the internet not only reduces
search costs for the unemployed, but also for those who are engaged in on-the-job search.
This creates an additional source of ambiguity with respect to the overall effect on
unemployed job seekers’ job finding probabilities. To the extent that the internet also
raises the job finding prospects of employed job seekers, the resulting search externalities
may mitigate or counteract the internet’s effect on unemployed job seekers’ job finding
9Strictly speaking, a higher job offer arrival rate has been recognized to have an ambiguous impact
on unemployment durations. The reason is that, in addition to increasing job offers, a higher arrival rate
makes job seekers more selective and leads to an increase in their reservation wages. van den Berg (1994)
derives regularity conditions under which an increase in the job offer arrival rate will reduce unemployment
durations.
10In particular, if M(u,v) denotes the number of matches as a function of the number of vacancies, v,
and the unemployed, u, the job offer arrival rate, λ , is given by λ = M(u,v)u .
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rates. This is particularly relevant given that employed job seekers are likely to differ in
productivity from unemployed job seekers and potentially may make more effective use
of the internet than their unemployed counterparts.11
4.4 Identification
Identifying the effects of internet availability on labor market outcomes suffers from
several endogeneity issues. Regions (in our case: municipalities) with high-speed internet
access are different compared to regions with lower speed. By simply comparing e.g.
unemployed job seekers’ reemployment propensities across municipalities with two
different high-speed internet levels, one would not be able to estimate the true causal
effect. As a result, a simple regression of DSL availability on labor market outcomes at
the municipality level would potentially be biased. The same is true when controlling
for (municipality) observables, since the expansion of broadband internet might still be
correlated with time-variant unobservables (see below).
To overcome potential endogeneity biases, we will make use of regional peculiarities
of the West German traditional public switched telephone network (PSTN), which
determined the capacity to provide DSL in certain municipalities. As described in Falck
et al. (2014) and Steinmetz and Elias (1979), early DSL availability required copper
wires between households and the main distribution frames (MDFs). The distribution
of MDFs was originally determined in the 1960s with the overall purpose to provide
telephone services in West Germany. While municipalities with a high population density
have at least one MDF, less agglomerated areas typically share one MDF. The reason is
that hosting a MDF required the acquisition of lots and buildings. As the distance to the
next MDF did not affect the quality of telephone services, the choice of MDF locations
in less agglomerated areas was determined by the availability of such facilities. The
crucial issue causing exogenous variation in DSL availability is that, while the length
of the copper wires connecting households and the MDFs did not matter for telephone
11In the literature, such externalities are referred to as “congestion” externalities. These capture the fact
that competing job seekers who more rapidly find a job do not internalize that they match with other job
seekers’ potential employers. At the same time, an increase in search intensity implies that it will be easier
for firms to find a match, which gives rise to a second type of externality, the “thick market” externality.
Shimer and Smith (2001) argue that for more productive agents the “thick market” externality typically
dominates the “congestion” externality, i.e. when stopping search they fail to internalize the inability of
other firms to match with them. Thus, ex-ante heterogeneity renders the market solution of search and
matching inefficient and implies that productive agents do not search enough, whereas the less productive
ones search too much. To the extent that employed job seekers are more productive and potentially make
more effective use of the internet than their unemployed counterparts, the internet may create a kind of
search subsidy for the more productive job seekers, thereby leading to a gain in efficiency. In Section 4.9.3,
we directly address this issue and do not find any evidence in favor of such an effect.
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services, it strongly affected the DSL connection. In particular, there exists a critical
value of 4,200 meters, with municipalities situated beyond this distance from the MDF
had no access to DSL. The only way to provide internet availability was to replace copper
wires by fiber wires, which took time and was costly. These technical peculiarities
provide a quasi-experimental setting for less agglomerated municipalities without an
own MDF, for whom the distance to each municipality’s regional centroid to the MDF
can be used as an instrument for DSL availability. We exploit this quasi-experimental
set-up for West German municipalities that are connected to a MDF located in another
municipality and where no closer MDF is available.12 Because of the quasi-experimental
setting spelled out above, we label municipalities with a distance below the threshold
of 4,200 meters as lucky ones and municipalities with a distance above the threshold as
unlucky ones.13 To illustrate DSL availability rates at the household level for both groups,
Figure 4.1 Panel (A) plots the mean fraction of households having access to DSL from
2007 to 2008. Municipalities with relatively short distances to the next MDF (below
4,200 meters) exhibit a fraction of about 92% of households for whom DSL is available.
The low confidence intervals at the top of the bars indicate only little variation across
municipalities. Once the distance surpasses 4,200 meters, the share drops considerably
to about 82% with a higher variation across municipalities as reflected by the higher
confidence intervals.
Panel (B) plots the DSL shares against the distances to the next MDF for 250 meter
bins. The size of the circles corresponds to the number of municipalities. Lucky mu-
nicipalities below the threshold exhibit a constant DSL share, whereas the DSL share
decreases monotonically with higher distances among the unlucky municipalities. There
are, however, some municipalities that exhibit a large distance to the next MDF, while
simultaneously having relatively high DSL shares. Note that this might violate the exo-
geneity assumption. To address potential endogeneity concerns for these municipalities,
we will later perform robustness checks by excluding these outliers. Moreover, we will
also narrow the bandwidth around the threshold, which creates a set of municipalities
that are likely to be more comparable in terms of their observables.
12Our analysis concentrates on West German municipalities because East Germany modernized the dis-
tribution frames after German unification. The average size of western German municipalities corresponds
to a radius of about 3.1 kilometers.
13Roughly one third of the municipalities used in our analysis are unlucky municipalities.
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Figure 4.1: Share of households with DSL availability
4.5 Empirical Model
In our empirical analysis, we first compare changes in outcomes across municipalities
i with different changes in DSL availabilities. ∆t measures changes from a defined
pre-DSL period to the DSL period, indexed by t. Thus, we regress the change in the
outcome variable on the change of the share of households who technically have home
internet access in municipality i and time period t, ∆DSLit , and a vector of differences in
covariates ∆Xit :
∆yitm = β0m+β1m ·∆DSLit +∆X ′it ·β2m+(MDFi×δt)+ εitm (4.1)
Given that DSL availability is zero in the pre-DSL period, equation (4.1) regresses the
change in the outcome variable on the actual level of households with DSL availability,
DSLit . ∆Xitm is a vector of characteristics at the municipality level (see Table 4.1)
and εitm is an idiosyncratic error term. Moreover, we introduce MDF-fixed effects
(MDFi), thus comparing two municipalities that are connected to the same MDF but
differ in their distance to the MDF.14 In terms of the outcome variable, we concentrate on
monthly reemployment probabilities by calculating the share of unemployed individuals
experiencing a transition into employment in municipality i in month m.15 As we estimate
14We interact the MDF-fixed effects with time-fixed effects δt , thus, allowing for heterogeneous trends
within smaller (MDF) regional units.
15See Section 4.6 for a precise definition of this variable.
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this equation separately by month m after the inflow into unemployment, the coefficients
and the changes in the outcome variable are indexed by m as well.
The empirical model in equation (4.1) might be subject to endogeneity issues. In-
dividuals in municipality i might acquire broadband internet in order to search for a
job. Moreover, individuals’ unobserved productivity attributes, such as the level of
motivation and propensity to work, might be correlated with the willingness to pay for
broadband internet, such that compositional changes at the regional level might also
be correlated with the expansion in high-speed internet. To account for time-varying
unobserved effects that are correlated with both, labor market performance and DSL
availability at the municipality level, we follow an instrumental variable (IV) approach.
As spelled out above, we use as an instrument the distance from each municipality’s
center (population-weighted) to the next MDF. The first-stage can thus be written as:
∆DSLit = γ0+ γ1 ·PST Ni+∆X ′it · γ2+(MDFi×δt)+ψit (4.2)
In the first stage, PST Ni is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for unlucky
(treated) municipalities.16 This IV strategy identifies a local average treatment effect for
the compliant municipalities. The first stage does not contain a subscript for month m
because the DSL variable only varies with t for each municipality.
4.6 Data and Sample Selection
Data. The data used in this study stem from different data sources. We measure high-
speed internet availability by the share of households at the municipality level for whom
digital subscriber line technologies (DSL) are potentially available. The original data
stem from the broadband atlas (Breitbandatlas Deutschland) published by the Federal
Ministry of Economics and Technology (2009). The telecommunication operators self-
report covered households with a minimum data transfer rate of 384 kb/s. Hence, for
these covered households a high-speed internet connection is technically available. The
self-reported data is available for the universe of German municipalities from 2005
onwards. In this study, we use the territorial boundaries of the municipalities from the
year 2008. In the literature, the DSL period is typically defined as covering the years
from 2005 to 2008, whereas the pre-DSL period refers to the years 1996 to 1999 (Falck
et al., 2014).
Even though we measure broadband availability at the household level, it might be
16In a robustness check, we also use the distance as a continuous measure instead of a dummy variable
as an instrument.
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conceivable that DSL effects capture some potential demand-side dynamics. Higher
broadband internet availability might, e.g., alter the dynamics of firm entries and exits. If
labor demand is affected by an increase in high-speed internet availability, unemployed
individuals might experience different unemployment durations without necessarily
searching online for a job. In our empirical analysis we therefore include demand-side
controls in order to isolate the effect of online job search from potential demand-side
effects. Using data provided by the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP), we retrieve
information on the number of firm exits and entries at the municipality level.17 We
further include variables provided by the Establishment History Panel of the Federal
Employment Agency. These include the total number of establishments and establishment
size.
The main outcome variable in this study is a measure of unemployment duration. To
measure unemployment durations and reemployment probabilities, we will use German
register data, the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of the Federal Employment
Agency provided by the IAB (for detailed information of a sub-sample of this data set,
see e.g. Oberschachtsiek et al., 2009 and Table 4.B.2 in Appendix 4.B for a description of
all labor market states). This administrative data set covers the universe of all individuals
who have at least one entry in their social security records from 1975 on in West Germany
and starting from 1992 in East Germany. The data cover approximately 80% of the
German workforce and provide longitudinal information on individual employment
biographies. Self-employed workers, civil servants, and individuals doing their military
service are not included in the data set. For our empirical analysis, we use the universe of
unemployed individuals who experienced at least one unemployment spell in the above
defined subset of municipalities during our time period of consideration (1996-2008).18
The data provide daily information on employment records subject to social security
contributions, unemployment records with transfer receipt as well as periods of job
search. This permits us to precisely measure the duration of different labor market
states and transitions between them, most notably transitions between unemployment
and employment. The data do not allow for a distinction between voluntary and
involuntary unemployment, though. We therefore follow Lee and Wilke (2009) and
define involuntary unemployment as periods of registered job search and/or transfer
receipt without a parallel employment relationship. Further information on the definition
17The data set covers the universe of firms in Germany including a municipality identifier. The earliest
available representative year is 2000. Thus, we use the year 2000 as the pre-DSL year.
18When constructing the outcome variables as well as some control variables, we exploit the universe of
individuals who experienced at least one unemployment spell in the above defined subset of municipalities
during our time period of consideration as well as a random 50%-sample of employed individuals living in
the above defined subset of municipalities.
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of un- and non-employment can be found in Appendix 4.B. As the IEB are based
on employers’ notifications to the social security authorities, they are less prone to
measurement error than comparable information from survey data, like e.g. the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Additional advantages over survey data include
the much lower extent of panel attrition and most notably the possibility to construct
an inflow sample, which captures also shorter unemployment spells. To construct a
measure of municipality-specific reemployment propensities, we link the universe of
individuals with an employment to unemployment transition in every single year during
the pre-DSL and DSL period (referred to as the unemployment inflow sample) with a
municipality identifier at either the individual or establishment level. This allows us
to merge the administrative data with information from other data sources (see Table
4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B).19 In our analysis, we concentrate on individuals who were at
least three months employed before they became unemployed. Doing so, we exclude
individuals with short employment spells who are less likely to be engaged in true search
activities during unemployment.
Sample selection and main outcome variable. In our empirical analysis, the pre-DSL
period covers the years 1998 and 1999, whereas the DSL period covers 2007 and 2008.
We focus on these later DSL years for several reasons. First, as set out earlier, we will
complement our analysis with individual-level survey data that are available from 2007
onwards. This restricts us in documenting first stage effects starting from 2007 only.
Second, there is evidence that the early DSL years may be considered as transition
years towards a new technology equilibrium. This appears to be particulary true for the
less agglomerated municipalities, which typically have no own MDF and hence form
the basis for our empirical analysis. To support this notion, Figure 4.C.1 in Appendix
4.C plots the distribution of DSL availability against time. Panel (A) of Figure 4.C.1
displays the development for agglomerated municipalities, whereas Panel (B) shows the
distributions for less agglomerated municipalities. The graphs illustrate that the transition
phase among less agglomerated municipalities took apparently longer as compared to
urban regions. Third, online search and recruiting technologies appear to have become
more elaborated over the course of time. Some evidence for this consideration was
documented in Section 4.2, pointing to some inefficiencies of the Federal Employment
Agency’s job board technology during the early DSL period. Some further evidence for
19More specifically, the municipality identifier in the administrative data is based on individuals’ place
of residence. If the place of residence is missing, we use the municipality identifier of individual spells
from the previous or subsequent five years or - in a final step - information on individuals’ workplace
(establishment) location.
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improvements of the underlying technologies is given by the increasing importance of
online recruiting among employers. According to figures from the IAB Vacancy Survey,
between 2005 and 2008 the fraction of hirings that were preceded by online recruiting
increased from about 45% to over 60% (see Figure 4.A.1 in Appendix 4.A).
As to our main outcome variable of interest, we compute reemployment propensities
as the municipality-specific share of individuals reentering employment within m months
after the inflow into unemployment, relative to the number of individuals at risk, i.e.
those who are still unemployed. Cumulative reemployment probabilities are defined
as the complement of the survival function, which is estimated by the non-parametric
Kaplan-Meier estimator.20 Figure 4.C.2 (4.C.3) in Appendix 4.C plots the distribution of
the number of observed individuals in the data set by municipality and period (year). In
the median municipality, 93 individuals were entering unemployment during the whole
DSL period. The median over all pre-DSL years equals 87. To calculate meaningful
averages at the municipality level, we further condition the sample on observing at least
five individuals per year and municipality in our final unemployment inflow sample. Due
to this condition, the final sample of municipalities (2,988) covers 90% of all available
less agglomerated municipalities (3,339) that fulfill the requirements described above.
4.7 Descriptive Statistics
Given that our empirical strategy focuses on less agglomerated municipalities without
an own main distribution frame (MDF), we provide descriptive statistics for the above
defined subset of 2,988 municipalities.
Municipality-level variables. Table 4.1 shows that in West Germany during the years
2007 and 2008 DSL was, on average, available for a fraction of 88% of households at
the municipality level. In addition to broadband internet information, the table provides
information on further regional characteristics at the municipality level.21 Panel B of
Table 4.1 shows the main control variables used in the empirical analysis. The first
set of variables indicates that the population was aging, the average real daily wage
20Formally, the estimator is given by: Sˆ(m) = ∏
i:mi≤m
(1− dini ), where di is the number of spells that
transit into employment in month, mi, and ni is the total number of individuals at risk during the time
interval [mi,mi+1] .
21The descriptive statistics of the municipality characteristics shown in Panel B of Table 4.1 are based
on re-weighted averages. As our sample consists of the universe of the unemployed and a 50% sample of
employed individuals, we re-weight the averages to match the official unemployment rates. Some further
regional characteristics for the pre-DSL and DSL years are also available from Falck et al. (2014) (see
Table 4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B).
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
pre-DSL years 1998/99 DSL years 2007/08
(1) (2)
Panel A: Broadband availability
DSL 0.000 0.878
(0.000) (0.190)
Panel B: Municipality characteristics
Inflow unemployed 30.983 32.022
(32.195) (33.774)
Population 1375.209 1384.957
(1416.369) (1436.977)
Female population share 0.500 0.502
(0.018) (0.037)
Population share aged 18-65 0.659 0.616
(0.030) (0.055)
Population share > 65 0.161 0.186
(0.034) (0.036)
Net migration rate 0.005 -0.001
(0.021) (0.018)
Unemployment rate 0.040 0.040
(0.015) (0.020)
Average real daily wage 97.526 98.631
(12.002) (17.088)
Low-skilled 0.169 0.151
(0.045) (0.037)
Medium-skilled 0.774 0.776
(0.048) (0.046)
High-skilled 0.056 0.073
(0.034) (0.038)
Foreign nationals 0.025 0.024
(0.027) (0.025)
Regional occupational structure
Agriculture 0.025 0.025
(0.023) (0.022)
Production 0.361 0.298
(0.088) (0.076)
Salary 0.109 0.116
(0.041) (0.038)
Sale 0.066 0.071
(0.023) (0.022)
Clerical 0.205 0.212
(0.057) (0.055)
Service 0.226 0.270
(0.063) (0.073)
Panel C: Inflow characteristics
Age 35.376 35.832
(3.415) (3.398)
Female share 0.370 0.416
(0.140) (0.133)
Low-skilled 0.201 0.214
(0.112) (0.109)
Medium-skilled 0.756 0.732
(0.119) (0.118)
High-skilled 0.043 0.053
(0.057) (0.060)
Foreign nationals 0.037 0.035
(0.058) (0.054)
Number of individuals in inflow sample 175,426 181,306
Number of municipalities 2,988 2,988
Notes: The table reports municipality-level descriptive statistics for West Germany. The pre-DSL period covers the years 1998
and 1999. The DSL period covers the years 2007 and 2008. The numbers are averaged within the pre-DSL and the DSL years,
respectively. Panel A reports the DSL availability rate. Panel B reports municipality characteristics. Panel C reports age, female,
education and nationality structure for the unemployment inflow sample. Further control variables are reported in Table 4.C.1 in
Appendix 4.C.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
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increased over time and that the population became more skilled. The second set of
variables refers to the occupational structure at the municipality level. The figures reveal
that for less agglomerated Western German municipalities the occupational structure
became more service oriented and less production-intensive. Panel C of Table 4.1
displays the main characteristics of the unemployment inflow sample. The average
age exhibits a slight increase from 35.4 to 35.8 years. The same pattern is observed
for the share of females among those entering unemployment. Moreover, as expected,
low-skilled individuals and foreigners tend to be disproportionately represented in the
inflow sample as compared to the overall average skill level and the share of foreign-
ers at the municipality level (see Panel C of Table 4.C.1 for further inflow characteristics).
Demand-side variables. Table 4.C.1 in Appendix 4.C displays firm and establishment
information at the municipality level. The figures indicate that the average number
of establishments increased in West Germany, whereas average establishment size
decreased slightly and amounted to above six. As to firm entries and exits, the table
documents that less firms entered and more firms exited the market, while total sales
increased.22
Cumulative reemployment probabilities. Based on the inflow sample at the municipality
level, Panel (A) of Figure 4.2 shows cumulative reemployment probabilities at the
municipality level for month, m, after the entry into unemployment, separately for
the DSL (2007/08) and the pre-DSL years (1998/99). For example, the cumulative
probability of having experienced a transition into employment by month 12 after
entering unemployment was about 78% during the defined DSL years, whereas during
the pre-DSL years the respective probability was about 75%. At the end of the second
year, we observe that the cumulative reemployment probability increased further by
10% points. This indicates that much of the dynamics already occurs during the first 12
months of unemployment. For this reason, we concentrate in our empirical analysis on
the first year of unemployment.23 The bottom line in Figure 4.2 (A) plots the difference
between the two upper graphs against time. Overall, this line illustrates that during the
DSL years the cumulative probability of experiencing a transition into employment is
22In Table 4.C.2 in Appendix 4.C, we document that there appears to be no causal effect of an increase
in DSL availability at the municipality level on the number of firm entries and exits as well as net firm
creation. Note, however, that our broadband internet measure refers to the household level and that a large
fraction of firms already had access to broadband internet, for example, via dedicated lines.
23A further reason is that after one year of unemployment, individuals are counted as long-term
unemployed and experience different state-governed treatments, such as lower unemployment benefits and
increased job search assistance.
178 of 235
CHAPTER 4. Does the Internet Help Unemployed Job Seekers Find a Job?
larger than in the pre-DSL period. Over the first 12 months, cumulative reemployment
probabilities increased, on average, by 3.5% points. Panel (B) of Figure 4.2 further
distinguishes between lucky and unlucky municipalities. The graphs show that after the
third month lucky municipalities show higher cumulative reemployment probabilities
than their unlucky counterparts. This indicates, on a descriptive basis, that municipalities
with higher DSL availability experienced a larger increase in reemployment probabilities
and, as a result, a larger decline in unemployment durations over the two defined periods.
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Figure 4.2: Reemployment probability and difference between lucky and unlucky munici-
palities
4.8 Empirical Results
4.8.1 Transitions from Unemployment to Employment
Baseline effects. We now turn to regression models in order to calculate standard errors
and conduct hypothesis tests. We start our regression analysis by looking at differences
in outcomes between the pre-DSL years (1998/99) and the DSL years (2007/08) over
a constant time span. More specifically, we keep the differences between the periods
constant at nine years, by connecting 2007 with 1998 and 2008 with 1999. We cluster
standard errors at the municipality level as the identifying variation is measured at this
level. Figure 4.3 displays the estimated effects of a 1% point increase in the municipality-
specific share of households with DSL availability on the cumulative probability of
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reentering employment within m months after their inflow into unemployment. The left
figure shows the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the first difference model
controlling for observable characteristics and MDF-by-year-fixed effects. The OLS
coefficients are negative and partly significant at the 10% level during the first months
after the inflow into unemployment. According to these estimates, a 1% point increase
in DSL reduces the cumulative reemployment probability by about 0.03% points. The
right figure shows the IV estimates. The Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistics is 84.0 and the
first stage treatment coefficient equals 0.054, indicating that unlucky municipalities have
on average 5% points lower DSL rates. Therefore, weak identification issues do not
apply here. In the IV model the point estimates become positive and partly significant
after seven months in unemployment. In terms of magnitude, the coefficient amounts
to 0.13 in month eight, which corresponds to up to 1.3% points higher cumulative
reemployment probabilities after moving from an unlucky to a lucky municipality, where
the unconditional difference in DSL rates (shown in Figure 4.1) is roughly 10% points.
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(B) IV
Notes: The figure shows the effects of a 1% point increase in the share of households with DSL availability on the cumulative
transition probability from unemployment to employment within m months for an inflow sample of individuals who entered unem-
ployment between 1998/1999 and 2007/2008. The regressions are population-weighted and performed separately for each month.
The list of control variables includes the population structure, employment structure, occupational shares, industry shares and firm
structure (see Table 4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B). Dotted lines present the 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are heteroskedas-
ticity robust and clustered at the municipality level. Panel (A) plots the effects using OLS. Panel (B) corresponds to the IV model,
where the distance is measured from the geographic centroid to the MDF and weighted by the location of the population. Regres-
sions are based on 2,988 municipalities and 850 MDFs. The Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic for the first stage in Panel (B) is 83.98.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
Figure 4.3: IV regression results of DSL on unemployment-to-employment transitions
Heterogeneous effects by socio-economic characteristics. The results from the pooled
sample might mask heterogeneous effects across different subgroups. In particular, it
might be conceivable that more skilled individuals or younger workers have greater
exposure to the internet and thereby make more efficient use of online job search tools.
We test this hypothesis by estimating the regressions for different subgroups of the
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unemployment inflow sample. We first break down the sample by gender as well as age,
by distinguishing young (< 35 years) and old workers (≥ 35 years). We further test
the hypothesis that the intensity with which employers use the internet for recruitment
purposes may matter for its effectiveness in raising reemployment prospects for job
seekers. Given that the descriptives from the IAB Job Vacancy Survey (see Section
4.2) suggested that vacancies for more skilled and white-collar occupations were more
likely to be advertised online, we restrict our sample to these occupations. We do so
by looking at skilled individuals (who have completed a vocational training or hold a
university degree/technical school degree) entering unemployment from a white-collar
job, with the latter comprising higher clerks, service, clerical or sales occupations. Figure
4.4 plots the estimated coefficients along with their confidence intervals. Compared
with the estimates from the pooled sample, Panel (A) of Figure 4.4 point to a clearer
picture for unemployed males, for whom the positive effect of higher DSL availability
is particularly pronounced after month four. In terms of magnitude, moving from an
unlucky to a lucky municipality increases the cumulative reemployment probability by
2.3% points on average after four months in unemployment. For skilled individuals
who entered unemployment from white-collar jobs and young job seekers, we observe
slightly negative effects during the first six months in unemployment with significant
point estimates for young individuals. This negative effect may point to an inefficient
use by the group of individuals below 35 years of age. During the second half of the
first year in unemployment, the cumulative reemployment probability stays relatively
close at zero. Overall, the comparison of the IV and OLS estimates points to different
selection mechanisms. Males seem to be negatively selected, whereas the results for
young individuals indicate a slightly positive selection.
Figure 4.D.1 in Appendix 4.D further plots the coefficients measuring the effects on
monthly hazard rates rather than on cumulative probabilities. For males, the effects on
monthly hazard rates exhibit a similar pattern as the effects on cumulative reemployment
probabilities, as there are positive effects between 2%-4% points after four months in
unemployment. For skilled white-collar workers and to some extent for young individuals,
we document positive effects between 5% and 6% points in month seven and eight.
These significant higher monthly reemployment probabilities do not translate into higher
cumulative reemployment probabilities, though (see Figure 4.4). Still, the estimates
indicate that - conditional on being at risk - especially skilled white-collar workers
experience positive internet effects on their hazard rates later in their unemployment
spells.
The results so far suggest that the increase in DSL availability appears to raise the
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cumulative reemployment probabilities especially for males. Moreover, a further finding
is that the positive effect on reemployment probabilities shows up or becomes significant
only with a certain time delay after entering unemployment. In Section 4.9, we will turn
to the underlying mechanisms and address the question to what extent this finding may
be explained by heterogeneous changes in job search related outcomes across subgroups,
such as job seekers’ adopted search channels and their application behavior.
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(B) Young
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(C) Skilled white-collar
Notes: The figure shows the effects of a 1% point increase in the share of households with DSL availability on the cumulative
transition probability from unemployment to employment within m months for an inflow sample of individuals who entered un-
employment between 1998/1999 and 2007/2008 separately for males, young individuals (below 35 years) and skilled white-collar
individuals. The regressions are population-weighted and performed separately for each month. The list of control variables in-
cludes the population structure, employment structure, occupational shares, industry shares and firm structure (see Table 4.B.1 in
Appendix 4.B). Dotted lines present the 90% confidence interval. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at
the municipality level. The distance is measured from the geographic centroid to the MDF and weighted by the location of the
population. Regressions are based on 2,551 municipalities and 803 MDFs for males, 2,359 municipalities and 765 MDFs for young
individuals and 2,066 municipalities and 713 MDFs for skilled white-collar individuals. The Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic for the
first stage is 60.0, 53.4 and 57.6 for the three groups, respectively.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
Figure 4.4: IV regression results of DSL on unemployment-to-employment transitions by
socio-economic characteristics
4.8.2 Robustness Checks
Sample specification and weighting. In this subsection, we conduct several robustness
checks. We start by providing regressions results for different sample specifications.
First, we include all individuals in the inflow sample irrespectively of the length of
their previous employment spell. Second, to address the issue that the results might be
driven by small municipalities with few inflows into unemployment, we re-estimated
our specifications by conditioning on municipalities with at least 500 inhabitants (in
addition to conditioning on at least five individuals entering unemployment). As a third
check, we allow for a non-employment gap of six months between two unemployment
spells as well as between unemployment and reemployment and count this period as
unemployment. Finally, we show the results without weighting the municipality-level
182 of 235
CHAPTER 4. Does the Internet Help Unemployed Job Seekers Find a Job?
variables by the number of inhabitants. The estimates shown in Figure 4.E.1 in Appendix
4.E suggest that the overall pattern of results remains unaltered. However, without
conditioning on the length of the previous employment spell (Panel 2-A), the negative
effect for young job seekers becomes close to zero.
Recalls. A further concern could be that our estimates are affected by potential recalls,
e.g. individuals who return to their pre-unemployment establishment.24 In particular, it
might be conceivable that unemployed individuals who are reemployed by the same
employer do not actively search for a new job. There is evidence that individuals with
recalls experience shorter unemployment durations and lower search intensities as
compared to unemployed job seekers entering a new job (Nekoei and Weber, 2015, Fujita
and Moscarini, 2013). This could be a potential explanation for the non-positive DSL
effect at the beginning of the unemployment spell. Due to the endogeneity of recalls,
we refrain from conditioning on this outcome, but rather re-estimate our model after
excluding industries with a priori high recall rates. These industries include agriculture,
construction, hotels and restaurant, passenger transport and delivery services. Figure
4.E.2 in Appendix 4.E presents the results. For males and young workers, the point
estimates are higher than in the baseline specifications, with the estimates for males
indicating a DSL effect of up to 5% points.
Empirical specification. We further conduct several robustness checks with respect to
the empirical specification. In particular, we start by narrowing the distance around
the threshold and excluding outlier municipalities in terms of their distance to the
threshold and their broadband availability shares. In our baseline model, we have relied
on 9-year differences in outcomes, by connecting e.g. 1998 and 2007 and 1999 and 2008.
Given this procedure, a concern might be that our results are driven by (differences in)
outcomes in specific years. To address this issue, we perform two robustness checks with
respect to the definition of differences. We first average all variables within the pre-DSL
and the DSL years, respectively, and then compute the difference between the averaged
pre-DSL and DSL variables per municipality. This procedure is also likely to mitigate
potential outlier values in specific years of our variables of interest. Second, to construct
differences, we rely on 1998 as the only pre-DSL year, by taking the differences between
2007 and 1998 as well as 2008 and 1998. This robustness check gives rise to different
lengths of the measured distances and provides a test of whether the distances and/or
specific years matter for the estimated DSL effects. Figure 4.E.3 in Appendix 4.E gives
24In our sample, 25% of all individuals who become unemployed in a given year return to their previous
employer.
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the results for the three socio-economic groups. The figures corroborate the pattern of
results that has been found earlier.
Treatment intensity - continuous instrument. The analysis so far has used a dichotomous
treatment variable dividing municipalities into lucky and unlucky ones. Panel (B) of
Figure 4.1 shows that the treatment intensity increases with higher distances. As a further
robustness check, we therefore specify the first stage equation using the distance as a
continuous measure of treatment intensity:
∆DSLit = γ0+ γ1 ·PST Ni ·distancei+∆X ′it · γ2+(MDFi×δt)+ψit , (4.3)
where PSTN takes on the value of 1 if a municipality is located more than 4,200 meters
away from the MDF (unlucky) and zero otherwise. To measure different treatment
intensities among the unlucky municipalities, the treatment dummy is interacted with
the actual distance to the next MDF centered at the threshold value of 4,200 meters.25
Figure 4.E.4 in Appendix 4.E presents the results. The positive effect for males stays at
around 0.2. The results for young individuals and skilled white-collar workers are similar
to the baseline results. Overall, the main pattern of results remains unaltered across
these different specifications, suggesting that higher internet availability has helped male
unemployed job seekers finding a job.
4.8.3 Effects During the Early DSL Years
Appendix 4.F presents the results for the early DSL years (2005/06), which have been
shown to characterize a transition period towards a new technology equilibrium especially
for the less agglomerated municipalities. Figure 4.F.1 presents the baseline results. The
overall pattern that emerges from the baseline estimates is that higher DSL availability
does not affect the cumulative reemployment probabilities for all defined subgroups. For
males, the estimates even point to lower cumulative reemployment probabilities during
the first 3 months in unemployment.26 Overall, the results point to the absence of causal
internet effects on cumulative reemployment probabilities during the first 12 months in
unemployment. A potential explanation for these findings may be that employers and job
seekers were still adapting to the new technology and that job search technologies, such
as that from the Federal Employment Agency, were still characterized by inefficiencies
25It should be noted that any change of the IV specification that tries to capture the observed distribution
would be entirely data driven. However, it may still be informative to assess the validity of the instrument
by changing the empirical specification as shown above.
26This effect is relatively robust across the different specifications presented for the years 2007/08.
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during the early DSL period. Taken together, the comparison of the early and late
DSL years leads us to conclude that the effectiveness of the internet appears to have
considerably improved across these periods. Note that this is in line with the findings of
Kuhn and Mansour (2014), who showed that the relationship between internet job search
and unemployment durations became more efficient over time.
4.8.4 Placebo Test
To test for the similarity or divergence in time trends across lucky and unlucky munici-
palities during the pre-DSL period, we further conduct a placebo test. In particular, we
compute the differences in outcomes and covariates between 1999 and 1995 and regress
the treatment dummy (and further controls including MDF fixed effects) on the change in
the fraction of unemployed entering employment during the first 12 months after entering
unemployment. The results in Figure 4.5 show that the treatment dummy is insignificant
and close to zero for each month after the inflow into unemployment for males and young
workers. For skilled white-collar workers, results point to significant positive effects
after six months indicating that during the pre-DSL period this group exhibits larger
cumulative reemployment probabilities in unlucky municipalities as compared to their
lucky counterparts. This trend during the pre-DSL years might lead to a downward bias
in the estimated DSL coefficients. The placebo estimates for males and young workers
point to a similar pre-treatment trend across lucky and unlucky municipalities and suggest
that both groups performed similarly during the pre-DSL years. Overall, this suggests a
causal interpretation of the DSL effect on cumulative reemployment probabilities.
4.9 Mechanisms
4.9.1 Individual-Level Job Search Strategies Based on Survey Data
Given that our strategy thus far identified an ITT, the question of to what extent the estab-
lished effects arise from changes in individuals’ job search behavior remains unanswered
at this stage. To provide evidence on the underlying mechanisms, we complement our
analysis by exploiting survey data on job search channels among job seekers from the
survey Panel Study on Labour Markets and Social Security (PASS). A detailed descrip-
tion of the variables used in this study can be found in Appendix 4.G (Table 4.G.1).
The survey started in 2007 as a panel, with the main purpose of surveying low-income
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Notes: The figure shows the effects of the treatment dummy on the cumulative transition probability from unemployment to em-
ployment within m months for an inflow sample of individuals who entered unemployment in 1995 and 1999 separately for males,
young individuals (below 35 years) and skilled white-collar individuals. The endogenous variable is the change between 1999 and
1995. The regressions are population-weighted and performed separately for each month. The list of control variables includes
the employment structure, occupational shares and industry shares (see Table 4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B). Due to data availability con-
straints we cannot control for firm dynamics, total population and age structure. Dotted lines present the 95% confidence interval.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Number of municipalities: Male: (A): 2,529; Young: (B): 2,339; Skilled white-collar: (C): 2,049.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
Figure 4.5: Placebo results
households. We use the first three waves of the data set which correspond to the years
2007 to 2009 (see Trappmann et al., 2010 for a detailed description of the data).27
If respondents are currently looking for a job, they are asked to report their specific
adopted job search channels. Possible categories include online job search, search via
newspapers, friends/relatives, private brokers, the local employment agencies or further
(non-specified) search channels. Moreover, the survey also asks whether a job seeker’s
household possesses a computer with an internet connection.28 Table 4.G.2 in Appendix
4.G shows on a descriptive basis that home internet access is positively correlated with
the incidence of online job search. Overall, the fraction of job seekers searching online is
more than 25% points higher among job seekers with home internet access as compared
to those with no home internet access.29
In what follows, we explore whether home internet access has a causal effect on the
incidence of online job search and on other job search channels. Similar to our empirical
27The first wave is conducted mainly in 2007. 73% of all individuals used in our sample are interviewed
in 2007. 23% are interviewed in 2008/09. The remaining 4% correspond to the year 2006. This restricts
the explanation of the mechanism behind the identified ITT to the later DSL years 2007/08.
28The survey does not specifically ask about broadband internet connection. This can induce misclas-
sification of our explanatory variable. Depending on the extent of misclassification, IV estimates would
therefore represent an upper bound.
29To estimate the causal impact of home internet access on online job search, we exploit information
on both, unemployed and employed, job seekers. However, most individuals were unemployed at the time
of the interview date (82%, see Table 4.G.3 in Appendix 4.G). Moreover, about 16% of the employed
individuals entered unemployment between two interview dates. Thus, we capture some individuals who
search in anticipation of future unemployment. This provides greater comparability with the administrative
data sample which includes individuals with very short unemployment spells.
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strategy at the municipality level, we again make use of regional identifiers provided
by the Federal Employment Agency. Apart from the municipality identifier, we are
also able to take advantage of the postal codes provided by PASS. This is a particularly
attractive feature of the data, as the combination of the municipality identifier and the
postal code provides greater scope for variation in the treatment indicator that is needed
for the IV regression (see Figure 4.G.1 in Appendix 4.G for a graphical illustration).
Survey evidence on search channels. Table 4.2 reports the estimates of the effect of
home internet access on the probability of searching online for a job. The F-Statistic
in the full sample is close to the benchmark value of 10. This value decreases when
analyzing subsamples. While weak instruments in just-identified models are of no major
concern as long as the first stage coefficient differs from zero, they are associated with
higher standard errors (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Overall,
the IV estimates suggest that the OLS estimates are downward biased. This downward
bias has also been documented in the analysis using the administrative data. Home
internet access causes a strong and significant increase in the probability of online job
search. Moreover, the results suggest that this effect is most pronounced among males,
whereas the point estimate for young individuals is insignificant and lower as compared
to that for the pooled sample. Note that the insignificant effect for young job seekers
is broadly consistent with the municipality-level results suggesting no positive internet
effects on the job finding prospects for this group. A potential explanation for the absent
effect of home internet access on online job-search among the young might relate to
time-consuming online activities other than job search.30 Turning to our final subgroup,
we are not able to condition on skilled individuals with white-collar occupations (if
unemployed, in their previous job) due to sample size restrictions. For this reason, we
provide separate estimations for skilled individuals and individuals whose (previous)
occupation was a white-collar job. The results show that the point estimate for skilled
individuals is of the same order of magnitude as in the pooled sample and significant
at the 10% level, whereas individuals whose last job was a white-collar job feature the
highest point estimates. Consistent with our considerations in Section 4.2, this result
lends support to the notion that the frequency with which employers’ use the internet
for recruiting purposes may matter for the intensity with which job seekers make use of
online job search channels.
30Kolko (2010) shows that broadband internet leads to more music downloads and online shopping,
which is likely to be particulary relevant for younger individuals. There is also evidence that primarily
young males spend time on computer games (e.g. first person shooter games) and fulfill the need for social
interaction through playing in an online network (Jansz and Tanis, 2007, Frostling-Henningsson, 2009).
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Table 4.2: Estimation results for home internet on online job search
Full sample Full sample Male Young Skilled White-collar jobs
OLS IV IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Home internet access 0.273*** 0.674** 0.685** 0.517 0.699* 0.774*
(0.018) (0.317) (0.346) (0.530) (0.391) (0.426)
Threshold (first stage) -0.118*** -0.160*** -0.123* -0.112*** -0.117**
(0.037) (0.053) (0.067) (0.043) (0.048)
F-statistic 10.00 9.06 3.41 6.67 5.99
Observations 2,914 2,914 1,478 1,133 1,884 1,624
Notes: The table reports regression results of home internet access on online job search for individuals in West Germany. The
results are based on linear probability models. Home internet access is instrumented by a threshold dummy indicating whether the
distance of the centroid of a person’s home municipality to the next MDF is above 4,200 meters. The F-test of excluded instruments
refers to the Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the household level. The
number of observations (2,914) refers to the first observation of individuals during the first three waves. Thus, if we observe an
individual multiple times during the first three waves, we use the first information only. The list of control variables includes
individual characteristics, household information, father’s education and information on the labor market history (see Table 4.G.1
in Appendix 4.G). Tables 4.G.2 and 4.G.3 provide descriptive statistics. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the
5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, Breitbandatlas Deutschland, Falck et al. (2014) and Geodaten Deutschland, own computations.
While the results from Table 4.2 thus far suggest that home internet access leads
to more online job search, it might be conceivable that online job search crowds out
non-online job search channels. To address this issue, we further analyze the effect of
home internet access on job seekers’ use of the remaining reported job search channels
provided by the PASS data. Panel A of Table 4.G.2 in Appendix 4.G further reports the
share of individuals adopting different search methods broken down by home internet
access. The figures point to a slight negative correlation between home internet access
and the incidence of non-online job search channels. On average, individuals without
home internet access make use of 2.2 non-online search channels, whereas individuals
with home internet access use 2.0 non-online channels, with the difference being signifi-
cant. Note, however, that the internet’s effect on job finding probabilities via possible
substitution effects is, in general, ambiguous as the overall effect is likely to depend on
the relative efficiency of the different channels. To explore which channels are potentially
affected by crowding out effects, Table 4.3 reports the results of home internet access
on search via newspapers, referrals of friends or relatives, the local employment agency
and the jobseeker’s own initiative. The last column reports the effect on the sum of all
non-online job search channels, which also includes private brokers and others.
The figures provide some weak evidence for a negative effect of home internet access
on referrals by friends or relatives (column(2)). The estimated coefficient in the pooled
sample is of the same order of magnitude as the corresponding effect on online job
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Table 4.3: Estimation results for home internet on other job search channels
Newspapers Referral Empl. Agency Own-initiative Sum non-online
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Full sample
Home internet access 0.228 -0.646* -0.495 0.056 -1.006
(0.261) (0.355) (0.345) (0.060) (0.773)
Panel B: Male
Home internet access 0.157 -0.380 -0.068 0.063 -0.117
(0.300) (0.347) (0.363) (0.094) (0.765)
Panel C: Young
Home internet access 0.791 -0.567 -0.190 0.165 0.231
(0.666) (0.574) (0.534) (0.102) (1.049)
Panel D: Skilled
Home internet access 0.116 -0.398 -0.196 0.019 -0.504
(0.296) (0.394) (0.379) (0.077) (0.899)
Panel E: White-collar jobs
Home internet access 0.494 -0.584 -0.266 0.076 -0.498
(0.385) (0.423) (0.402) (0.050) (0.962)
Notes: The table reports regression results of home internet access on various non-online job search channels for individuals in
West Germany. The results are based on linear probability models. Home internet access is instrumented by a threshold dummy
indicating whether the distance of the centroid of a person’s home municipality to the next MDF is above 4,200 meters. The F-tests
of excluded instruments refer to the Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic and are equal to those reported in Table 4.2. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the household level. The number of observations is equal to that reported in Table 4.2.
The number of observations (2,914) refers to the first observation of individuals during the first three waves. Thus, if we observe
an individual multiple times during the first three waves, we use the first information only. The list of control variables includes
individual characteristics, household information, father’s education and information on the labor market history (see Table 4.G.1
in Appendix 4.G). Tables 4.G.2 and 4.G.3 provide descriptive statistics. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the
5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, Breitbandatlas Deutschland, Falck et al. (2014) and Geodaten Deutschland, own computations.
search from the previous table. Moreover, we find a negative but insignificant effect
on job search via the federal employment agency (column (3)). For the subgroups, the
effects on referrals and the employment agency are also negative but insignificant. On
the other hand, the estimates in column (4) indicate that own-initiative search and job
search via newspapers are positively affected by home internet access (accompanied
by large standard errors). This suggests that home internet access induces individuals
to search more proactively. Turning to the sum of all non-online job search channels
in column (5), the figures reveal insignificant but negative effects (except for young
individuals) of home internet access on non-online search. Overall, these findings
suggest an (insignificant but sizeable) reduction in non-online job search especially for
skilled and white collar jobs, whereas for men crowding out effects seem to play a minor
role.
Survey evidence on application intensity. Apart from job search channels, the data set
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allows us to analyze the number of job applications as a measure of search intensity as
well as the number of (realized) job interviews. While the number of applications may
be considered as a further measure of search intensity, the number of job interviews is
likely to be an important prerequisite of job offers and may therefore be viewed as a
(weak) proxy for the arrival of job offers. Table 4.4 reports the estimation results of the
effects of home internet access on these outcomes.31 For the pooled sample, none of the
coefficients from the IV regressions turn out to be significant in Panel A. Comparing
the point estimates from the IV specification with the OLS results reveals that the OLS
coefficients are downward biased. Turning to the subsamples shows that especially
males exhibit a positive home internet access effect on the number of applications. In
particular, the local average treatment effect shows that home internet raises the number
of applications by more than 12. This substantial increase in search intensity does not
translate into a larger number of realized job interviews, though. For the pooled sample
as well as for the subgroups, the figures from the last two columns indicate that all
estimated coefficients are either negative or very small and insignificant at conventional
levels.
Table 4.4: Estimation results for home internet on application intensity
Full sample Full sample Male Young Skilled White-collar jobs
OLS IV IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: # Own-initiative applications
Home internet access -0.031 5.212 12.033** 0.688 5.832 3.147
(0.229) (3.781) (4.805) (7.279) (4.805) (4.376)
Panel B: # Job interviews
Home internet access 0.007 0.040 -0.636 0.626 -0.126 -0.415
(0.066) (0.897) (1.170) (1.364) (1.156) (1.147)
Observations 2,914 2,914 1,478 1,133 1,884 1,624
Notes: The table reports regression results of home internet access on the number of applications and realized job interviews for
individuals in West Germany. The results for indicator outcome variables are based on linear probability models. Home internet
access is instrumented by a threshold dummy whether the distance of the centroid of a person’s home municipality to the next MDF
is above 4,200 meters. The F-test of excluded instruments refers to the Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic and is the same as in Table 4.2.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the household level. The number of observations (2,914) refers to the
first observation of individuals during the first three waves. Thus, if we observe an individual multiple times during the first three
waves, we use the first information only. The list of control variables includes individual characteristics, household information,
father’s education and information on the labor market history (see Table 4.G.1 in Appendix 4.G). Tables 4.G.2 and 4.G.3 provide
descriptive statistics. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, Breitbandatlas Deutschland, Falck et al. (2014) and Geodaten Deutschland, own computations.
31More specifically, the survey asks respondents to report the number of own-initiative applications as
well as the number of realized job interviews during the last 4 weeks.
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4.9.2 Dynamics Within Individual Unemployment Spells
The overall pattern of results from our municipality analysis is that the positive effect
on reemployment probabilities shows up or becomes significant only with a certain
time delay after entering unemployment. What might explain this time pattern? Our
considerations from Section 4.3 suggested that an absent internet effect in the beginning
of an unemployment spell may be rationalized within a search theoretic framework,
where the internet’s negative effect on search costs initially dominates its positive effect
on job offer arrival rates. Such a possible delay in the increase in job offers may be
explained, for example, by the fact that the initial decline in search costs implies that
job seekers can potentially apply to considerably more job advertisements as compared
to non-online job search channels. Thus, when applying to online job advertisements,
job seekers are confronted with considerably more potential jobs and employers that
need to be evaluated against each other. This takes time and may therefore provide an
explanation for the delay in the (internet-induced) increase in the arrival of job offers.
To test this notion, we analyze the dynamics of job interviews over the duration of
an unemployment spell again using the PASS survey data. In particular, we look at
how the number of job interviews evolve over the elapsed length of an unemployment
spell. As explained earlier, the number and incidence of job interviews is the only
measure that is available to operationalize job offers in our data sources. A pattern
that would support the above considerations would involve a delayed increase in the
incidence of job interviews. Due to data restrictions, we provide the analysis on a
purely descriptive basis, by comparing the outcomes of interest between individuals
with different unemployment durations. Restricting the analysis to individuals who were
unemployed for a maximum of one year reduces the sample size considerably and renders
a causal analysis unfeasible.32
To rationalize the established delay of the internet’s effect on reemployment proba-
bilities, we need to document different time patterns of job interviews over the spell’s
duration across those with and without home internet access. In this regard, Table 4.4
has pointed to insignificant (and often negative) effects of home internet access on the
number and incidence of job interviews. In what follows, we explore whether the es-
tablished insignificant effects might be due to time-varying effects over the duration of
32We also show in Appendix 4.G dynamics of online job search over the unemployment spell and
document that the incidence of online job search increases during the first year of unemployment among
individuals with home internet access. The relative increase is more pronounced among males after four
months in unemployment. Among skilled white-collar workers, this increase starts after six months in
unemployment (see Figures 4.G.2 in Appendix 4.G). This time pattern of online job search effort matches
the results for the monthly hazard rates, indicating that reemployment hazards are 5-6% points higher in
month 7 and 8.
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an unemployment spell. To address this issue, Figure 4.G.3 plots the difference in the
fraction of unemployed with job interviews by home internet access against different
unemployment durations. Overall, the graphs illustrate that among those with home
internet access the probability of job interviews is greater during the second to fourth
quarter in unemployment as compared to their counterparts without home internet ac-
cess. However, we wish to note that due to the small sample size these differences are
estimated quite imprecisely. For males, home internet access raises the incidence of job
talks even more pronounced during the second to fourth quarter in unemployment - but
again imprecisely estimated. The time gap is found to match that from the municipality
level estimations. This may potentially account for the delay of the established positive
effects of the internet on unemployed job seekers’ reemployment probabilities. Overall,
these patterns are consistent with the internet expansion raising job offer arrival rates
with a certain time delay of at least one quarter in unemployment.
Figure 4.G.2 in Appendix 4.G also shows the corresponding graphs for the other
three subgroups. For young individuals, job interviews seem to be lower during the
first quarter. Along with the insignificant overall online job search incidence this result
may provide a rationale for the negative DSL coefficient documented in Section 4.8.
The increase in the incidence of job interviews during the second to fourth first quarter
in unemployment is also visible for young and skilled white-collar workers, but less
pronounced than for males.
4.9.3 Search Externalities
In this section, we address potential search externalities. A first source of spill-overs
relates to interdependencies across lucky and unlucky municipalities. If the job finding
prospects of unemployed job seekers located in lucky municipalities improve due to
better online job search opportunities, this might, in turn, reduce the respective prospects
of those located in unlucky municipalities. The underlying notion is that job seekers
in lucky and unlucky municipalities are likely to compete for jobs in the same local
labor market, such that those benefitting from the internet expansion may impose a
congestion externality on their “unlucky" counterparts. The quantitative relevance of
such spill-overs is likely to depend on individuals’ and employers’ search radius and
the extent to which this radius has been altered by the internet expansion. As long
as interdependencies arise from employers’ behavioral changes, this should limit the
scope for spill-overs. The reason is that employers’ search radius was likely to comprise
unlucky as well as lucky municipalities already in the pre-DSL period. At the same
time, however, there is evidence that the pre-DSL restrictions in internet access were
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more likely to be binding for workers than for firms (see Section 4.2). Thus, we would
expect that potential spill-over effects primarily arise from the behavior of individual job
seekers, whose search radius was likely to be affected by the internet. Note that in the
presence of such externalities, our estimated coefficients would have to be interpreted as
effects inclusive of potential general equilibrium spill-overs.
While we are not able to directly deal with such kinds of externalities, we attempt to
address externalities caused by a different group of job seekers, who are not included in
our treatment and control group. As set out in Section 4.3, the internet expansion not
only reduces search costs for the unemployed, but also for those searching on-the-job.
To the extent that the internet also raises the job finding prospects of the employed,
the resulting search externalities may mitigate or counteract the internet’s effect on
unemployed job seekers’ job finding rates. To test this notion, we explore whether the
expansion in broadband availability has led to an increase in job-to-job transitions among
employed individuals. To rule out potential match quality effects, we confine our analysis
to employment relationships that had already started prior to the DSL-period. To do
so, we construct a stock sample of individuals who were employed at the cut-off date
of 30th of June 2000 and who were still employed at the same employer at the start
of 2007. For this sample, we then calculate the fraction of job-to-job transitions at the
municipality level during the late DSL years 2007/08. To compare this outcome with
the pre-DSL period, we construct an analogous sample and outcome variable for the
pre-internet period, based on individuals who were employed at the cut-off date of 30th
of June in 1991 and who were still employed at the same employer at the start of 1998
(see Table 4.H.1 in Appendix 4.H for basic descriptive statistics for both samples). This
implies that we exclude individuals from our sample who experienced a transition from
employment to unemployment or non-employment during the pre-DSL and DSL period,
respectively. While this procedure allows us to rule out match quality effects, which -
depending on the direction of the internet’s effect on match quality - are also likely to
affect the extent of job-to-job transitions, it comes at the cost of restricting the analysis
to very stable employment relationships.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.5 show the OLS and IV results for the full sample.
The coefficients are negative and not significantly different from zero. An increase in
DSL availability does not affect the probability of a direct job-to-job transition at the
municipality level. If anything, the results point to slightly negative effects. A similar
result holds if the regressions are performed separately by subgroups. Overall, these
findings argue against the view that increased competition from employed job seekers
should have played a significant role for the internet’s effect on the job finding prospects
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of their unemployed counterparts. To the extent that employed individuals may have
made use of their workplace internet access for job search, these results are consistent
with the fact that the restrictions in internet access were less likely to be binding for
employers than for private households during the DSL period.
Table 4.5: Spill-over estimation results, job-to-job transitions
Full sample Male Young Skilled white-collar
OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆DSL -0.016 -0.049 -0.101 -0.025 -0.026
(0.012) (0.063) (0.082) (0.108) (0.089)
Threshold (first stage) -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.050***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
F-Statistic 71.07 67.95 63.84 61.76
Municipalities 2,523 2,523 2,497 2,376 2,424
Notes: The table shows the effects of a 1% point increase in the share of households with DSL availability on the probability of job-
to-job transitions for a stock sample of employed individuals (see Table 4.H.1 in Appendix 4.H). The estimates in columns (1) and
(2) are based on a sample of individuals whose employment relationship started prior to the DSL/pre-DSL period. Columns (3)-(5)
show the results separately for males, young individuals (below 35 years) and skilled white-collar individuals. The list of control
variables includes the population structure, employment structure, occupational shares, industry shares and the firm structure (see
Table 4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B). Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level. The distance is
measured from the geographic centroid to the MDF and weighted by the location of the population. *** Significant at the 1 percent
level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
4.10 Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter, we study the effects of the expansion in broadband internet (DSL)
on reemployment probabilities among unemployed job seekers by exploiting regional
peculiarities of the traditional public switched telephone network in West Germany.
Overall, our results suggest that effects of the internet on the reemployment prospects of
unemployed individuals based on OLS estimates are downward biased. After accounting
for the endogeneity in internet availability, our estimates for the pooled sample provide
slight positive internet advantages for unemployed job seekers with a certain time delay.
Breaking down the analysis by socio-economic characteristics suggests that the internet’s
positive effect is particularly pronounced for male job seekers after spending four months
in unemployment.
Given that the above strategy identifies an ITT, we also address first-stage effects by
retrieving information on the adoption of job search channels from the PASS survey data.
Using these data, we explore whether the availability of internet at home has a causal
impact on job seekers’ use of the internet as a search channel. To gain further insights
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into potential crowding out effects, we also look at whether home internet access causally
affects the use of alternative job search channels. The results, which are based on the
same IV strategy as in the municipality-level analysis, indicate that home internet access
causes an increase in online job search activities. Consistent with our municipality-level
results, especially male and skilled white-collar job seekers are found to increase online
job search if they have home internet access. The results provide also some evidence
for crowding out effects on non-online job search, which are most pronounced (albeit
insignificant) for white-collar and skilled workers and which appear to play less of a role
for male job seekers. These findings lead us to conclude that the expansion of internet
availability led to better reemployment prospects especially for males via raising the
intensity with which this group has made use of the internet to search for jobs, without at
the same time reducing their overall search effort.
The survey data also reveal that home internet access raises the number of own-
initiative applications, especially for males. A further finding was that the positive effect
on reemployment probabilities shows up or becomes significant only with a certain time
delay after entering unemployment. This time pattern may be rationalized within a
search theoretic framework, where the internet’s negative effect on search costs initially
dominates its positive effect on job offer arrival rates. To provide empirical support for
a delayed positive effect on job offers, we further explore whether the incidence of job
interviews across those with and without home internet access varies over the duration
of an unemployment spell. Our findings provide some tentative evidence that internet
access appears to give rise to an increase in the incidence of job interviews with a certain
time delay, which appears to match the delay found in the municipality level analysis.
Even though these findings are derived on a merely descriptive basis, they are consistent
with the view that online job search puts job seekers in a situation where they need to
compare more potential jobs and employers, which takes time and may delay the arrival
of job offers. These results also offer potential directions for future research. Given that
the internet raises the number of potential jobs that need to be evaluated against each
other, future research should examine in more detail the internet’s effect on job quality,
e.g. whether the internet helps job seekers find a better job.
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4.Appendix
4.A Evolution of Online Recruiting
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(A) Overall online recruiting
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(B) Online recruiting by occupation - I
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(C) Online recruiting by occupation - II
Notes: The plots show the fraction of vacancies being posted online among all successful hirings. Panel (A) shows the overall time
trend. Panel (B) and Panel (C) show the trend by different occupational categories.
Source: IAB Job Vacancy survey, own computations.
Figure 4.A.1: Evolution of online recruiting
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4.B Administrative Data Addendum
Table 4.B.1: Definition of variables
Labor market variables Description
Reemployment probability
Reemployment probabilities are based on a yearly inflow sample of individuals into unemployment.
Reemployment probabilities are estimated at the municipality level as the share of individuals with
a transition into employment.
Source: IEB, Federal Employment Agency
Internet variables
Broadband internet
Fraction of households in municipality i at year t with a subscription to DSL defined by an access
speed of 384 kb/s or above. Documented numbers start in 2005.
Source: Breitbandatlas Deutschland
Treatment
Equals 1 for municipalities in West Germany with a distance of more than 4,200 meters to the next
main distribution frame (MDF). The distance is calculated using the geographic centroid weighted
by the location of the population.
Source: Falck et al. (2014)
Control variables
Population Number of inhabitants in municipality i at year t.
Source: Falck et al. (2014)
Inflow unemployed Number of individuals who became unemployed in municipality i at year t.
Source: IEB, Federal Employment Agency
Female population share
Fraction of females in municipality i at year t. The female share is also measured for the inflow-
specific sample.
Source: Falck et al. (2014) and IEB, Federal Employment Agency
Population aged 18-65
Fraction of the population aged between 18 and 65 years in municipality i at year t. The pre-DSL
fraction refers to the year 2001.
Source: Falck et al. (2014)
Population aged > 65
Fraction of the population aged above 65 years in municipality i at year t. The pre-DSL fraction
refers to the year 2001.
Source: Falck et al. (2014)
Net migration Net migration rate in municipality i at year t. The pre-DSL fraction refers to the year 2001.
Source: Falck et al. (2014)
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate in municipality i at year t. The pre-DSL fraction refers to the year 2001.
Source: Falck et al. (2014)
Foreign nationals
Fraction of foreigners in municipality i at year t. The nationality is also measured for the inflow-
specific sample.
Source: IEB, Federal Employment Agency
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Table 4.B.1: Definition of variables (continuation)
Control variables Description
Occupation
Occupational shares in municipality i at year t calculated for the categories agriculture, production,
salary, sale, clerical and service (ref. service sector). The occupation is also measured for the
inflow-specific sample.
Source: IEB, Federal Employment Agency
Industry
Industry shares in municipality i at year t calculated for the categories agriculture/energy/mining,
production, steel/metal/machinery, vehicle construction/apparatus engineering, consumer goods,
food, construction, finishing trade, wholesale trade, retail trade, transport and communication, busi-
ness services, household services, education/helth, organizations, public sector, else.
Source: IEB, Federal Employment Agency
Skill level
Skill level in municipality i at year t. Low skilled: No degree/ highschool degree Medium skilled:
Vocational training High skilled: Technical college degree or university degree. Skill level is also
measured for the inflow-specific sample. Missing and inconsistent data on education are corrected
according to the imputation procedure described in Fitzenberger et al. (2006). This procedure relies
on the assumption that individuals cannot lose their educational degrees.
Source: IEB, Federal Employment Agency
Real daily wage
Average real daily wage in municipality i at year t calculated among full-time employees. Gross
daily wages are right-censored due to the upper social security contribution limit. To address this
problem, we construct cells based on gender and year. For each cell, a Tobit regression is estimated
with log daily wages as the dependent variable and age, tenure, age squared, tenure squared, full-
time dummy, two skill dummies, occupational, sectoral as well as regional (Federal State) dummies
as explanatory variables. As described in Gartner (2005), right-censored observations are replaced
by wages randomly drawn from a truncated normal distribution whose moments are constructed by
the predicted values from the Tobit regressions and whose (lower) truncation point is given by the
contribution limit to the social security system. After this imputation procedure, nominal wages
are deflated by the CPI of the Federal Statistical Office Germany normalised to 1 in 2010.
Source: IEB, Federal Employment Agency
Number of establishments Number of establishments in municipality i at year t.
Source: Establishment History Panel, Federal Employment Agency
Size of establishments Number of employees per establishment in municipality i at year t.
Source: Establishment History Panel, Federal Employment Agency
Number of firm entries
Number of firms entering the market in municipality i at year t. The pre-DSL fraction refers to the
year 2000.
Source: Mannheim Enterprise Panel
Number of firm exits
Number of firms exiting the market in municipality i at year t. The pre-DSL fraction refers to the
year 2000.
Source: Mannheim Enterprise Panel
Total sales
Total sales based on firm information in municipality i at year t. The pre-DSL fraction refers to the
year 2001.
Source: Mannheim Enterprise Panel
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Table 4.B.2: Definition of labor market states
Employment: Employment spells include continuous periods of employment
(allowing gaps of up to one month) subject to social security contributions
and (after 1998) marginal employment. For parallel spells of employment and
unemployment (e.g. for those individuals who in addition to their earnings
receive supplementary benefits), we treat employment as the dominant labor
market state.
Unemployment Unemployment spells include periods of job search as well as
periods with transfer receipt. Prior to 2005, the latter include benefits such as
unemployment insurance and means-tested unemployment assistance benefits.
Those (employable) individuals who were not entitled to unemployment insur-
ance or assistance benefits could claim means-tested social assistance benefits.
However, prior to 2005, spells with social assistance receipt may be observed
in the data only if the job seekers’ history records social assistance recipients
as searching for a job. After 2004, means-tested unemployment and social
assistance benefits were merged into one unified benefit, also known as ‘unem-
ployment benefit II’ (ALG II). Unemployment spells with receipt of ALG II are
recorded in the data from 2007 onwards, such that the data provide a consistent
definition of unemployment only for the period 2007-2010.
Distinction between un- and non-employment Extending the procedure pro-
posed by Lee and Wilke (2009), involuntary unemployment is defined as com-
prising all continuous periods of registered job search and/or transfer receipt.
Gaps between such unemployment periods or gaps between transfer receipt or
job search and a new employment spell may not exceed three months, otherwise
these periods are considered as non-employment spells (involving voluntary
unemployment or an exit out of the social security labor force). Similarly, gaps
between periods of employment and transfer receipt or job search are treated
as involuntary unemployment as long as the gap does not exceed six weeks,
otherwise the gap is treated as non-employment.
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4.C Descriptive Statistics
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Notes: The figures show histograms of DSL availability (measured as a percentage of households for which DSL is technically
available) in German municipalities for the defined DSL years 2005 to 2008. Panel (A) shows the development for agglomerated
municipalities. Panel (B) shows the results for less agglomerated municipalities (used in the IV approach) without an own MDF and
no closer MDF available. The graphs are truncated at 40%. The dotted line connects the population-weighted mean availabilities
for all years.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
Figure 4.C.1: Empirical distribution of DSL availability by sample
200 of 235
CHAPTER 4. Does the Internet Help Unemployed Job Seekers Find a Job?
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Number of individuals per municipality
(A) DSL period
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Number of individuals per municipality
(B) Pre-DSL period
Notes: The figures plot the distribution of the number of individuals in the unemployment inflow sample per municipality for the
DSL (2005-2008) and the pre-DSL period (1996-1999). The median over all DSL years equals 93. The median over all pre-DSL
years equals 87.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
Figure 4.C.2: Observed individuals per municipality by period
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Notes: The figures plot the distribution of the number of individuals in the unemployment inflow sample per municipality for each
pre-DSL and DSL year.
Figure 4.C.3: Observed individuals per municipality for all DSL and pre-DSL years
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Table 4.C.1: Further descriptive statistics
Pre-DSL years 1998/99 DSL years 2007/08
(1) (2)
Panel A: Demand-side variables
Number of establishments 30.167 40.939
(39.655) (52.480)
Establishment size 6.244 6.121
(5.213) (4.572)
Number of firm entries 2.742 2.378
(3.773) (3.284)
Number of firm exits 1.867 3.290
(3.010) (4.478)
Sales 30.089 64.663
(413.700) (568.570)
Panel B: Sector composition
Agriculture/Energy/Mining 0.034 0.033
(0.027) (0.026)
Production 0.065 0.049
(0.052) (0.040)
Steel/Metal/Machinery 0.091 0.085
(0.062) (0.060)
Vehicle construction/Apparatus engineering 0.041 0.038
(0.044) (0.039)
Consumer goods 0.055 0.042
(0.039) (0.028)
Food 0.035 0.033
(0.024) (0.022)
Construction 0.068 0.042
(0.040) (0.027)
Finishing trade 0.049 0.037
(0.023) (0.018)
Wholesale trade 0.052 0.049
(0.027) (0.024)
Retail trade 0.093 0.098
(0.033) (0.030)
Transport and communication 0.047 0.054
(0.026) (0.023)
Business services 0.084 0.105
(0.034) (0.037)
Household services 0.066 0.081
(0.039) (0.036)
Education/Health 0.120 0.136
(0.045) (0.045)
Organizations 0.018 0.021
(0.013) (0.013)
Public sector 0.057 0.056
(0.026) (0.023)
Panel C: Inflow characteristics
Occupation
Agriculture 0.056 0.043
(0.075) (0.060)
Production 0.452 0.391
(0.159) (0.144)
Salary 0.074 0.073
(0.072) (0.068)
Sale 0.061 0.073
(0.062) (0.065)
Clerical 0.142 0.146
(0.100) (0.096)
Service 0.215 0.274
(0.112) (0.122)
Notes: The table reports municipality-level descriptive statistics for West Germany. The numbers are averaged within the pre-
DSL and the DSL years, respectively. Panel A reports demand-side variable. Panel B report the sector structure. Panel C reports
occupational for the unemployment inflow sample.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
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Table 4.C.2: Estimation results analyzing demand-side effects
Net firm creation Firm entry Firm exit Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ DSL 0.270 -0.136 -0.495 86.62
(0.716) (0.510) (0.504) (97.32)
F-Statistic (first stage) 211.7 213.7 211.7 211.7
Observations 6,568 6,678 6,568 6,566
Number of Municipalities 3,284 3,339 3,284 3,283
Notes: The figure shows the effect of a 1% point increase in the share of households with DSL availability on selected demand-side
variables. Sales are measured in million euro. The pre-DSL year refers to the year 2000. The DSL period covers the years between
2007 and 2008. The list of control variables includes population structure, employment structure, occupational shares and industry
shares. The F-test of excluded instruments refers to the Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust
and clustered at the municipality level. The distance is measured from the geographic centroid to the MDF and weighted by the
location of the population. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent
level.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
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4.D Empirical Hazard Rates
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(C) Skilled white-collar
Notes: The figure shows the effects of a 1% point increase in the share of households with DSL availability on the transition
probability from unemployment to employment in month m for an inflow sample of individuals who entered unemployment between
1998/1999 and 2007/2008 separately for males, young individuals (below 35 years) and skilled white-collar individuals. The
regressions are population-weighted and performed separately for each month. The list of control variables includes the population
structure, employment structure, occupational shares, industry shares and firm structure (see Table 4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B). Dotted
lines present the 90% confidence interval. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level.
The distance is measured from the geographic centroid to the MDF and weighted by the location of the population. Regressions
are based on 2,551 municipalities and 803 MDFs for males, 2,359 municipalities and 765 MDFs for young individuals and 2,066
municipalities and 713 MDFs for skilled white-collar individuals. The Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic for the first stage is 60.0, 53.4
and 57.6 for the three groups, respectively.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
Figure 4.D.1: IV regression results of DSL on unemployment-to-employment transitions
by socio-economic characteristics
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4.E Sensitivity and Robustness Results
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(3-A) All tenure,
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(3-B) Population 500+,
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(3-C) 6 month gap,
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(3-D) Without weighting,
Skilled white-collar
Notes: The figure shows the effects of a 1% point increase in the share of households with DSL availability on the cumulative
transition probability from unemployment to employment within m months for an inflow sample of individuals who entered un-
employment between 1998/1999 and 2007/2008 separately for males, young individuals (below 35 years) and skilled white-collar
individuals. Panel (A) performs the analysis for an inflow sample of individuals without excluding persons who have been less
than three months employed before entering unemployment. Panel (B) performs the analysis conditional on the local municipality
size of at least 500 inhabitants. Panel (C) performs the analysis for an inflow sample by allowing for gaps in the administrative
records between unemployment and another labor market state of at most six months. Panel (D) performs the analysis without
population-weighting. The regressions in Panel (A) - (C) are population-weighted and performed separately for each month. The
list of control variables includes the population structure, employment structure, occupational shares, industry shares and firm struc-
ture (see Table 4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B). Dotted lines present the 90% confidence interval. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity
robust and clustered at the municipality level.
Number of municipalities: Male: (1-A): 2,812, (1-B): 2,046, (1-C): 2,553, (1-D): 2,551; Young: (2-A): 2,688, (2-B): 2,009, (2-C):
2,363, (2-D): 2,359; Skilled white-collar: (3-A): 2,405, (3-B): 1,842, (3-C): 2,072, (3-D): 2,066.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
Figure 4.E.1: IV regression results of DSL on unemployment-to-employment transitions,
sample specification
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(C) Skilled white-collar
The figure shows the effects of a 1% point increase in the share of households with DSL availability on the cumulative transition
probability from unemployment to employment within m months for an inflow sample of individuals who entered unemployment be-
tween 1998/1999 and 2007/2008 separately for males, young individuals (below 35 years) and skilled white-collar individuals. The
regressions exclude individuals entering unemployment from sectors with a priori high recall rates (e.g. agriculture, construction,
hotel and restaurant, passenger transport and delivery service). The regressions are population-weighted and performed separately
for each month. The list of control variables includes the population structure, employment structure, occupational shares, industry
shares and firm structure (see Table 4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B). Dotted lines present the 90% confidence interval. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level.
Number of municipalities: Male: (A): 2,529; Young: (B): 2,350; Skilled white-collar: (C): 2,064.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
Figure 4.E.2: IV regression results of DSL on unemployment-to-employment transitions,
excluding recall industries
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(1-D) Pre-DSL year 1998,
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(3-C) Mean,
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(3-D) Pre-DSL year 1998,
Skilled white-collar
Notes: The figure shows the effects of a 1% point increase in the share of households with DSL availability on the cumulative
transition probability from unemployment to employment within m months for an inflow sample of individuals who entered un-
employment between 1998/1999 and 2007/2008 separately for males, young individuals (below 35 years) and skilled white-collar
individuals. Panel (A) performs the analysis on municipalities whose distance to the next MDF is less than 2,000 meters from
the threshold. Panel (B) performs the analysis by excluding outlier municipalities (see above). Panel (C) performs the analysis
by averaging over the single years within the DSL and pre-DSL period. Panel (D) performs the analysis by assigning the year
1998 to every DSL year and then calculate the differences. The regressions are population-weighted and performed separately for
each month. The list of control variables includes the population structure, employment structure, occupational shares, industry
shares and firm structure (see Table 4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B). Dotted lines present the 90% confidence interval. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level.
Number of municipalities: Male: (1-A): 1,928, (1-B): 2,537, (1-C): 2,812, (1-D): 2,455; Young: (2-A): 1,785, (2-B): 2,347, (2-C):
2,359, (2-D): 2,254; Skilled white-collar: (3-A): 1,545, (3-B): 2,054, (3-C): 2,066, (3-D): 1,902.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
Figure 4.E.3: IV regression results of DSL on unemployment-to-employment transitions,
empirical specification
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(C) Skilled white-collar
Notes: The figure shows the effects of a 1% point increase in the share of households with DSL availability on the cumulative
transition probability from unemployment to employment within m months for an inflow sample of individuals who entered un-
employment between 1998/1999 and 2007/2008 separately for males, young individuals (below 35 years) and skilled white-collar
individuals. All regressions include a continuous instrument by interacting the treatment dummy with the actual distance. The
regressions are population-weighted and performed separately for each month. The list of control variables includes the population
structure, employment structure, occupational shares, industry shares and firm structure (see Table 4.B.1 in Appendix 4.B). Dotted
lines present the 90% confidence interval. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the municipality level.
Number of municipalities: Male: (A): 2,551; Young: (B): 2,359; Skilled white-collar: (C): 2,066.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
Figure 4.E.4: IV regression results of DSL on unemployment-to-employment transitions,
continuous instrument specification
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4.F Estimation Results for the Years 2005/06
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(C) Skilled white-collar
Notes: The figure shows the effects of a 1% point increase in the share of households with DSL availability on the cumulative
transition probability from unemployment to employment within m months for an inflow sample of individuals who entered un-
employment between 1996/1997 and 2005/2006 separately for males, young individuals (below 35 years) and skilled white-collar
individuals. The regressions are population-weighted and performed separately for each month. The list of control variables in-
cludes the population structure, employment structure, occupational shares, industry shares and firm structure (see Table 4.B.1 in
Appendix 4.B). Dotted lines present the 90% confidence interval. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at
the municipality level. The distance is measured from the geographic centroid to the MDF and weighted by the location of the
population. Regressions are based on 2,724 municipalities and 820 MDFs for males, 2,541 municipalities and 790 MDFs for young
individuals and 2,127 municipalities and 724 MDFs for skilled white-collar individuals. The Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic for the
first stage is 110.6, 101.6 and 76.6 for the three groups, respectively.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
Figure 4.F.1: IV regression results of DSL on unemployment-to-employment transitions
by socio-economic characteristics 2005/06
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4.G PASS Data Addendum
Table 4.G.1: Definition of variables
Outcomes Description
Job search
Dummies for job search channels used by individuals who are looking for a job at the interview
date: online job search, search via newspapers, friends/relatives, private broker, the local employ-
ment agency, own-initiative or non-specified search channels
Number of applications Number of own-initiative applications during last four weeks
Number of job interviews Number of job interviews during last four weeks
Individual characteristics
Main employment status
Dummies for main employment status at interview date: employed, program participant, reference
category: unemployed
Age
Dummies for age groups: age 26 - 35 years, age 36 - 45 years, age 46 - 55 years, age 56 - 65 years,
reference category: age ≤ 25 years
Immigrant Dummy for being an immigrant
Female Dummy for being female
Professional qualification
Dummies for highest professional qualification level: certificate of secondary education
(Hauptschulabschluss, Realschulabschluss) without vocational training, high school diploma
(Fachhochschulreife, Hochschulreife) without vocational training, certificate of secondary educa-
tion with vocational training, high school diploma with vocational training, Foreman (Meister, Tech-
niker) or diploma of Berufsakademie (BA), technical college (TC) or university degree, reference
category: no degree
Married Dummy for being married
Attitudes to work
Dummies for work attitude based on four item-scale ranging from 1 (disagree) to 4 (totally agree)
to valuate four statements ("Work is only a means to earn money", "Having a job is the most
important thing in life", "Work is important, because it gives you the feeling of being part of
society", "I would like to work even if I didn’t need the money"): high (≥ 4), medium (> 0 and <
4), missing, reference category: low (≤ 0)
Household information
HH income
Dummies for household income per month in e: 1,000 - 1,499, 1,500 - 1,999, 2,000 - 2,999, 3,000
- 3,999, 4,000 - 4,999, ≥ 5,000, reference category: ≤ 1,000
Means-tested HH Dummy for household receiving unemployment benefits II
HH size
Dummies for household size: two persons, three persons, more than three persons, reference cate-
gory: single household
Housing situation Dummy for being home owner, for living in a shared flat, reference category: rent
Father’s education
Professional qualification
Dummies for highest professional qualification level: certificate of secondary educa-
tion (Hauptschulabschluss, Realschulabschluss) or high school diploma (Fachhochschulreife,
Hochschulreife) without vocational training, certificate of secondary education or high school
diploma with vocational training, Foreman (Meister, Techniker) or diploma of Berufsakademie,
technical college or university degree, father’s education is missing, reference category: no degree
Labor market history
Unemployment duration
Dummies for cumulative unemployment duration in months: categories are spitted according to
percentiles: 0 - 25, 25 - 50, 50 - 75, > 75, reference category: 0
Tenure
Dummies for length of last employment spell (with social security contributions) in months: cat-
egories are spitted according to percentiles: 0 - 25, 25 - 50, 50 - 75, > 75, reference category:
0
Daily wage Daily wage of last employment spell (with social security contributions) in 2010 e
History missing Dummy for information on labor market history based on administrative data is missing
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, own computations.
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Table 4.G.2: Home internet access, job search methods and application intensity
N No home internet Home internet p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Job search
Job search: online 2,914 0.578 0.848 0.000
Job search: newspaper 2,914 0.864 0.813 0.000
Job search: referral 2,914 0.669 0.601 0.000
Job search: empl. agency 2,914 0.423 0.342 0.000
Job search: private broker 2,914 0.151 0.139 0.349
Job search: own-initiative 2,914 0.018 0.013 0.225
Job search: else 2,914 0.129 0.100 0.013
Sum non-online search 2,914 2.255 2.008 0.000
Panel B: Application
No. of applications (own-initiative) 2,914 2.525 2.465 0.781
No. of job interviews 2,914 0.597 0.600 0.967
Notes: The number of observations refers to individuals observed during the first three waves (2006/07, 2008 and 2009).
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, Breitbandatlas Deutschland, Falck et al. (2014) and Geodaten Deutschland, own computations.
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Table 4.G.3: Descriptive statistics of individual characteristics
N Mean No home internet Home internet p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employed 2,914 0.177 0.105 0.232 0.000
Program participant 2,914 0.122 0.128 0.117 0.399
Age ≤ 25 2,914 0.140 0.142 0.138 0.757
Age 26-35 2,914 0.249 0.232 0.263 0.055
Age 36-45 2,914 0.314 0.290 0.333 0.014
Age 46-55 2,914 0.230 0.253 0.212 0.010
Age 56-65 2,914 0.067 0.083 0.054 0.002
Immigrant 2,914 0.125 0.149 0.107 0.001
Female 2,914 0.493 0.473 0.508 0.068
No degree 2,914 0.061 0.098 0.033 0.000
Sec./Interm. no training 2,914 0.257 0.289 0.232 0.001
TC/Abitur no training 2,914 0.035 0.024 0.044 0.003
Sec./Interm. with training 2,914 0.407 0.438 0.384 0.003
TC/Abitur with training 2,914 0.058 0.040 0.072 0.000
Foremen/BA 2,914 0.076 0.055 0.092 0.000
TC, University 2,914 0.105 0.056 0.143 0.000
Married 2,914 0.315 0.251 0.364 0.000
Female and married 2,914 0.122 0.084 0.151 0.000
Work attitude: missing 2,914 0.136 0.124 0.145 0.103
Work attitude: low 2,914 0.235 0.215 0.250 0.027
Work attitude: medium 2,914 0.394 0.423 0.371 0.004
Work attitude: high 2,914 0.236 0.238 0.235 0.841
Household information
HH income less 1000 2,914 0.414 0.556 0.306 0.000
HH income 1000 - 1500 2,914 0.286 0.289 0.284 0.798
HH income 1500 - 2000 2,914 0.144 0.102 0.175 0.000
HH income 2000 - 3000 2,914 0.102 0.048 0.142 0.000
HH income 3000 - 4000 2,914 0.038 0.006 0.063 0.000
HH income 4000 - 5000 2,914 0.009 0.000 0.015 0.000
HH income more 5000 2,914 0.010 0.001 0.016 0.000
Means-tested HH 2,914 0.721 0.814 0.650 0.000
HH = 1 2,914 0.284 0.392 0.202 0.000
HH = 2 2,914 0.269 0.282 0.260 0.185
HH = 3 2,914 0.221 0.174 0.257 0.000
HH = 4-11 2,914 0.225 0.152 0.281 0.000
Home owner 2,914 0.133 0.069 0.181 0.000
Flat-sharing 2,914 0.071 0.079 0.066 0.192
Father’s education
Degree missing 2,914 0.263 0.300 0.234 0.000
No degree 2,914 0.060 0.086 0.041 0.000
School degree no training 2,914 0.080 0.092 0.070 0.031
School degree with training 2,914 0.432 0.411 0.448 0.043
Foremen/BA 2,914 0.083 0.062 0.099 0.000
TC, University 2,914 0.083 0.049 0.108 0.000
Labor market history
Unemployment duration 2,315 67.206 76.124 60.352 0.000
Tenure 2,315 15.856 14.906 16.587 0.232
Daily wage 2,022 48.529 44.389 51.700 0.000
History missing 2,914 0.206 0.202 0.208 0.697
Notes: The number of observations refers to individuals observed during the first three waves (2006/07, 2008 and 2009).
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, Breitbandatlas Deutschland, Falck et al. (2014) and Geodaten Deutschland, own computations.
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(1-A) Ingolstadt - municipality region (1-B) Ingolstadt - postal codes
(2-A) Ingelfingen/Kränzelsau - municipality region (2-B) Ingelfingen/Kränzelsau - postal codes
Notes: The figures present examples, where the smallest regional unit is either the postal code or the municipality. The combination
of the municipality identifier and the postal code provides greater scope for variation in the treatment indicator that is needed for
the IV regression. To illustrate this, the figure provides two examples where the municipality identifier is preferred over the postal
code and vice versa. Panels (1-A) and (1-B) show the borders from Ingolstadt. Panel (1-A) depicts the municipality and (1-B) the
postal code borders. The dots represent the main distributions frames. For the example of Ingolstadt, using the postal code would
provide an advantage over using the municipality as the geographic centroid of the western postal code region is more than 4,200
meters away from the next MDF. The lower figures draw the borders of a less agglomerated region, where two municipalities share
the same postal code. In this setting, the municipality ID would be preferred over the postal code.
Source: Geodaten Deutschland, own computations.
Figure 4.G.1: Exploiting municipality and postal code information for the instrument
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(2-D) White-collar jobs
Notes: The figures plot the difference in the share of individuals searching online for a job by home internet access dependent on
the elapsed unemployment duration. Panel (1) shows the results for the full sample. Panel (2) shows the results by socio-economic
characteristics. 90% confidence interval at the top of each bar.
Number of individuals: 1st category (1-3 months): Full sample: 155, Male: 83, Young: 86, Skilled: 99, White-collar jobs: 58; 2nd
category (4-6 months): Full sample: 68, Male: 32, Young: 36, Skilled: 49, White-collar jobs: 49; 3rd category (7-12 months): Full
sample: 133, Male: 68, Young: 67, Skilled: 92, White-collar jobs: 82.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, Breitbandatlas Deutschland, Falck et al. (2014) and Geodaten Deutschland, own computations.
Figure 4.G.2: Difference in online job search by home internet access, three unemploy-
ment intervals
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Notes: The figures plot the difference in the share of individuals with job interviews by home internet access dependent on the
elapsed unemployment duration. Panel (1) shows the results for the full sample. Panel (2) shows the results by socio-economic
characteristics. 90% confidence interval at the top of each bar.
Number of individuals: 1st category (1-3 months): Full sample: 155, Male: 83, Young: 86, Skilled: 99, White-collar jobs: 58; 2nd
category (4-6 months): Full sample: 68, Male: 32, Young: 36, Skilled: 49, White-collar jobs: 49; 3rd category (7-12 months): Full
sample: 133, Male: 68, Young: 67, Skilled: 92, White-collar jobs: 82.
Source: PASS-ADIAB 7515, Breitbandatlas Deutschland, Falck et al. (2014) and Geodaten Deutschland, own computations.
Figure 4.G.3: Difference in interview probability by home internet access, three unem-
ployment intervals
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4.H Search Externalities
Table 4.H.1: Descriptive statistics from the sample of employed individuals
Pre-DSL years 1998/99 DSL years 2007/08
(1) (2)
Panel A: Sample construction
Sampling date June 30, 1991 June 30, 2000
Number of individuals per municipality 72.757 89.676
(80.129) (93.422)
Panel B: Outcome variable
Job-to-job transitions 0.325 0.222
(0.098) (0.077)
Panel C: Baseline characteristics
Age 35.629 39.121
(2.027) (1.652)
Female share 0.329 0.419
(0.092) (0.080)
Low-skilled 0.131 0.104
(0.072) (0.054)
Medium-skilled 0.815 0.824
(0.079) (0.067)
High-skilled 0.055 0.073
(0.049) (0.054)
Foreign 0.033 0.031
(0.051) (0.045)
Occupation
Agriculture 0.014 0.015
(0.027) (0.026)
Production 0.406 0.329
(0.127) (0.107)
Salary 0.121 0.136
(0.068) (0.063)
Sale 0.046 0.056
(0.039) (0.038)
Clerical 0.241 0.246
(0.091) (0.082)
Service 0.171 0.217
(0.077) (0.077)
Notes: The table reports basic municipality-level descriptive statistics for West Germany on the sample used to estimate the effects
of broadband internet availability on job-to-job transitions. Job-to-job transitions are defined as employer changes allowing gaps
of up to one month. The pre-DSL period covers the years 1998 and 1999. The DSL period covers the years 2007 and 2008. The
numbers are averaged within the pre-DSL and the DSL years, respectively. The sample for the DSL period is based on employed
individuals at the reference date 30th June 2000 who are still employed at the same employer at the start of the year 2007. The
sample for the pre-DSL period is based on employed individuals at the reference date 30th June 1991 who are still employed at
the same employer at the start of the year 1998. Individuals who experience a transition from employment to unemployment or
non-employment in the pre-DSL and DSL period, respectively are excluded from the analysis.
Source: IEB, Establishment History Panel , MUP, Breitbandatlas Deutschland and Falck et al. (2014), own computations.
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